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2Foreword 
3Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) play an essential role in helping to create sta-
ble and just societies and states. More civic actors means more opportunities for a wider 
range of disadvantaged groups to have their ‘voices’ heard, more autonomous organisa-
tions to act as ‘watchdogs’ vis-à-vis the state, and more opportunities for networking 
and creating alliances of civic actors. ERSTE Foundation recognises the importance of 
NGOs. We have been closely cooperating with the civil society sector, have been listening 
to their concerns and needs, and have adjusted our actions to best accommodate them. 
One of the main concerns, especially among NGOs from Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), is the future of funding for this sector. Over the last 25 years, most funding for the 
civil society sector in CEE came from foreign donors, a trend that in recent years showed 
a steady decline. In addition to this, there has been a lack of government funding and 
slow steps in corporate funding, leaving the sector in a vacuum, vulnerable and fighting 
for survival, and a large number of marginalised and disadvantaged groups in jeopardy or 
not having their basic needs met. 
Our contact with NGOs from countries which have already introduced tax designation for 
social and cultural purposes and our awareness of the declining number of international 
donors made us realise that this mechanism could be one possible solution for bridging 
the funding gap: a legal tool that allows taxpayers to allocate a certain percentage of 
their income tax to beneficiaries entitled to receive such funds. This research was primar-
ily oriented to five countries with the aim of critically assessing its value and its impact, 
i.e. to evaluate the role of the mechanism in supporting civil society and in developing a 
philanthropic culture from a more long-term perspective. 
We believe that the lessons learned and presented in this research could be instrumental 
and useful to policy makers, donors and civil society actors not only in the countries that 
currently use the mechanism, but also in other countries that are looking for innovative ap-
proaches to raising public funding for civil society or other ways to strengthen civil society.
Franz Karl Prüller
Chairman of the Board
ERSTE Foundation
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The subject of this study is the percentage tax designation system as a phenomenon in 
the nexus of public finance allocation, public benefit/civil society realm and taxation. Its 
focus is Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where the system has remained to be a popu-
lar policy instrument over twenty years. 
This research had been prepared in 2014 and was conducted during 2015 in five CEE 
countries that use the percentage tax designation system: Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia. It focused on four areas: 1) What the percentage tax designation 
system actually is and what it is not, 2) What is its role in funding of the non-profit sector, 
3) What are its side effects and 4) What is the connection between the policy making 
and the results?
The research had a form of expert panel through country research associates that worked 
according to the unified methodology, using secondary quantitative and qualitative data. 
The data including the expert opinion were organized into the project’s database.
The percentage mechanism was met with enthusiasm in the transitional phase of post-
communist Central and Eastern Europe. It has offered a unique way of redistribution of 
state resources to public benefit activities in an environment that was resource dry with 
bureaucratic and un-transparent, politically biased public funding mechanisms. The per-
centage tax designation system works as a decentralised decision making mechanism 
where state resources, namely certain percentages of the income tax, are channelled, 
mostly to not-for-profit organizations (as well as other public and private entities with 
public benefit purposes), based on the decision of the taxpayers and therefore reflecting 
the societal needs as perceived by taxpayers. 
While this system is often referred to as “percentage philanthropy”, it is wrong to call it 
“philanthropy” as the resources used are not private resources, but resources that must 
be paid anyway as income tax. It is also wrong to assume that the mechanism supports 
the non-profit sector at large, as not only, and not all not-for-profit organizations benefit 
from the percentage mechanism. Nevertheless it is true that the system aims to support 
the public good. 
The procedure, and at the same time the key feature, of the mechanism is that a taxpayer 
communicates its decision regarding the chosen beneficiary of the income tax percent-
age allocation to the tax authority and based on that, the beneficiary entity receives the 
financial designation together with other designations to be used in the given year- is the 
same throughout the years and countries. Small technicalities of the operation vary from 
one country to another and adjustments in the processes and procedures can influence 
the outcome.
The review of the perceived effects and intended policies suggests, that today, in many of 
the percentage club countries, there is a modest but distinctive contribution of the mech-
anism towards the sustainability of the public benefit organizations, especially the NGOs. 
The percentage mechanism has been noted as an important source of revenue to many 
organizations that is estimated to have provided around 5 billion EUR support to a variety 
of beneficiaries in Europe over the years. Still, this source is a small portion of the overall 
revenues of the non-profit sectors (around 2%). At the same time, it is an important and 
often only source of revenue to many non-profit organizations in the region. The system 
has grown over time in terms of the number of beneficiaries and amounts they receive. 
Crowding out of state and private resources can not be observed (the latter point is also 
supported by the cases of Poland and Hungary) even though incentives for individual 
private giving have lessened in most countries.
7Besides the area of financial viability, the mechanism has produced visible benefits and 
added value to civil society organizations in all percentage club countries in the area of 
public image as visibility has increased and communications skills have developed. The 
flexibility and predictability of the mechanism has contributed to the stability of the third 
sector. This unique way of channelling public funds has provided state resources to re-
cipients that would otherwise have limited access to them. In addition, in all of the studied 
countries positive changes occurred in the associative dimension of civil society and in 
philanthropic activities, but these can not necessarily be attributed to the percentage 
mechanism.  
There have been some unintended effects that raise point of concern. On the level of 
understanding of the concept, there has been an ongoing misunderstanding of the per-
centage tax designation system with philanthropy. One of the rather negative side ef-
fects or unrelated occurrences of the percentage designation from the perspective of the 
sustainability of NGOs has been the abolishment of fiscal incentives for giving in several 
countries. 
The systematic policy evaluation regarding the percentage tax designation mechanism 
is lacking in most countries. The system does not stagnate: changes and adjustments 
are frequent; the proportion of taxpayers using the system, the amounts designated, the 
number of beneficiaries has been growing (with a slower speed and sometimes small 
decline in some countries in recent years). The system that once was an innovative policy 
solution has become part of the in-country status quo that the societal actors live with 
and enjoy the benefits of. The system continues to operate in all countries and it is found 
to be used in new ways in these countries. In addition, after twenty years of the percent-
age tax mechanism was started in Central and Eastern Europe, a new country (Moldova) 
has enacted a percentage legislation in 2015.
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Background
Boris Strečanský and Marianna Török
The percentage tax designation system concept emerged in Central and Eastern Europe 
in the policy debates around the issue of church and civil society funding in the early 
nineties (1992-1995). First in Hungary (1996), then later on in other countries, newly de-
mocratized governments were looking for ways to establish new relationships with these 
societal actors.   
After discussions among stakeholders, a mechanism emerged in Hungary and later on in 
Slovakia, Romania, Lithuania and Poland, as a public finance innovation that channelled 
public funds to civil society for public benefit purposes in a decentralized way. Today, 
it has a slightly different form in each country, but the core principle is the same: the 
mechanism grants a right to a taxpayer to designate 1%, 2% or 3% of paid income tax to 
a non-profit, non-governmental organization or other type of public benefit entity, as well 
as to a church or a political party. 
The main rationale for introducing the mechanism was to support the development of 
civil society, to develop a philanthropic culture and tradition, as well as to de-politicize the 
government funding of civil society. The mechanism has had several observed side effects 
in some countries – such as the abolition of tax incentives for giving, or increasing public 
awareness of civil society. 
The new mechanism attracted interest of researchers, especially in Hungary, the innovator 
in the region. The mechanism was described and mapped, as it was a very new instrument 
in both fiscal and legal environments. While there was an excitement around the mecha-
nism, there were also voices of caution around it and the research community was looking 
at its potentional of crowding-out other public or private funding. 
Later on, between 2004–2008, after replicating the mechanism in other countries, NIOK 
(Non-Profit Information and Training Centre, Hungary) conducted the largest compara-
tive research of the mechanism to date: the  Percentage Philanthropy Research Project. 
However, the comparative part was conducted in a very early phase of the mechanism in 
other countries of the region, so its contribution was mostly in capturing, reflecting and 
identifying initial steps. 
Today, twenty years after the introduction of the mechanism in Hungary and ten years af-
ter the latest and only comparative research, a need has emerged to evaluate the mecha-
nism in light of its original ambition: to evaluate the role and impact of the percentage 
tax designation system on civil society based on experience in the Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEE):  Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. 
The lessons to be learnt from such effort could be instrumental and useful to policy mak-
ers, donors and civil society actors not only in the countries that currently use the mecha-
nism, but also in other countries looking for innovative ways to fund civil society. 
The research project that emerged from this context and whose outcomes are presented 
in this publication consisted of two phases. 
The first and initial phase, conducted through 2015, was focused on generating new 
knowledge and answering the content questions related to the research (impact of the 
mechanism). 
The second phase, part of which is this publication, was focused on dissemination of 
results and findings to various audiences – civil society realm, policy development arena 
and civil society/philanthropy research in the CEE and beyond with the purpose of pro-
viding knowledge for more informed conversation in each of the three spaces as well as 
among them.  
9Project Partners and Collaborators
The research project that has been commissioned by the ERSTE Foundation has been im-
plemented by the Center for Philanthropy, a not-for-profit organization in Bratislava, Slo-
vak Republic. The international team of country research associates (CRAs) from Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia 
operated under the coordination and guidance of lead researchers Dr. Marianna Török and 
Mr. Boris Strečanský. The team combined practioners‘ as well as researchers‘ perspectives 
on the tax designation issue. Researchers were not only from the tax designation coun-
tries but also from countries without the mechanism.
Four Hypotheses
The researchers formulated four hypotheses that the research attempted to test – 
to challenge or to confirm: 
HYPOTHESIS I.
The “percentage systems”, often called “percentage philanthropy mechanisms”, are 
different but similar. There is no existing definition of what these similar systems really 
are. As they all bear some common features, it is assumed that across countries such 
mechanisms are used to transfer state resources to the non-profit sector in a decen-
tralised manner, reflecting on societal needs as perceived by taxpayers. 
HYPOTHESIS II.
Since the implementation of the percentage system, the non-profit sector is believed 
to be in a financially better position. It is also assumed by many that the percentage 
tax designation mechanism provides substantial financial contribution to the revenues 
of the non-profit sector, some believing it to be one of the most important sources 
of funding. 
HYPOTHESIS III.
It is believed that besides providing monetary support to public benefit purposes, the 
system has had numerous, mostly valuable side effects, some of which are in direct re-
lation with the sustainability of public benefit organizations, especially the non-profit 
sector, and some that reach beyond it.
HYPOTHESIS IV.
It is hypothesized that the lack of rigorous policy evaluation of the mechanism results 
in a stagnating system, where changes and adjustments are rare and the results are 
foreseeably reaching their plateau without using the mechanism to its full potential. 
The system, that once was an innovative policy solution becomes part of the in-coun-
try status quo that the societal actors live with.
Methodology 
In the initial phase of work, the project leaders identified five groups of countries:
I. The so-called “Percentage Club” countries, where some version of the percentage 
tax designation system is in operation: Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia and Spain.
II. The so-called “Potential” countries, where the issue has been seriously discussed 
by one or more groups of stakeholders: Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Ukraine 
but no decision has been made regarding its implementation.
III. The so-called “No” countries, where the issue had been seriously discussed by one 
or more groups of stakeholders, and it was decided not to implement the mecha-
nism: Czech Republic and Estonia.
IV. The so-called “Not-in-operation yet” category, where the law of a percentage tax 
designation system has been passed but it is not in operation yet: Moldova.
V. The so-called “Other related countries” where something related to the percent-
age  tax designation system is in operation: Japan. 
10
Project leaders decided to focus on the “Percentage Club” countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe due to the fact that most countries with the percentage tax designa-
tion mechanism are based in this region and the socio-economic developments of these 
countries are relatively similar and comparable to one another. It was also decided that 
some attention will be given to Italy, the first country to introduce the mechanism.
In addition, to a lesser extent, information on the “Potential”, the “No” and “Not-in-Oper-
ation yet” countries will also be explored.
The project leaders organized preliminary conversations with researchers, civil society 
leaders and public administrators in order to determine the key questions of concern and 
map the available mass of “second hand” information about the various percentage tax 
designation systems, and to map the potential data sources (as the work did not include 
direct data collection). 
As a result of these conversations, the key issues for the assessment have been identified 
and explored in three ways: 
1. A common questionnaire was developed for the CEE “Percentage Club” countries 
with a list of qualitative and quantitative questions, which was filled in by the coun-
try research associates. It required a lot of research work, including data mining, 
studying financial and statistical reports, describing legal background, etc. The 
whole questionnaire can be found in the Appendix 1.
After the data gathering, the quantitative parts of the questionnaires were pro-
cessed, and a common database was set up by datalogist, Dr. István Sebestény, to 
support the findings and tables found in the final text. The database contains vari-
ous indicators calculated from the basic figures. In order to create a time series, 
data were drawn from each country in the year when the percentage tax designa-
tion system was introduced, as well as the fifth, the tenth and/or the most recent 
year of operation, respectively. Since sometimes there was no available informa-
tion for a given year, and the introduction of the systems took place in different 
years, at the end, the four representative years – called snapshots – were assigned 
in time series (Table 1). The reference years are in each country as the follows:
 Not all countries could provide all information. In these cases, the missing values 
were substituted by estimation or remained empty. Figures coming from the com-
mon databases are referenced in the background materials as “Per Phil database”. 
The original sources and availability of the national data are also listed in the Ap-
pendix. As no similar endeavor has taken place before, the work has faced serious 
challenges in data harmonization and even data availability.
The results of this work provide the core of the current publication and the 













Hungary 1997 1997 2001 2006 2013/2014
Slovakia 2002 2002 2007 2012/2014
Poland 2004 2004/2005 2009/2010 2013/2014
Lithuania 2004 2004 2009 2014
Romania 2004 2004 2009 2014
Table 1: 
Snapshot in time 
series in five CEE 
countries to support 
“Per Phil Database”
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2.  Country Reports were collected from country associates to provide an overall and 
comprehensive picture of the percentage tax designation system as is (in the CEE 
“Percentage Club” countries and Italy) and as it has been considered (in the “Po-
tential”, the “No” and “Not-in-Operation yet” countries). The reports contain nar-
rative descriptions of the current  state of the percentage tax designation system, 
with key achievements and challenges. These reports also highlight trends, key 
facts and figures. The published version of the work includes some of the country 
reports while the Internet version is complete with all additional information.
3.  Additional papers were commissioned on key cross-cutting issues and challenges 
of the  designation that raise interesting questions about the mechanism, and 
describe the key questions relevant in the system today, highlighting trends and 
expressing local researchers’ personal view with as much concrete background 
information as possible, interviews, case studies, references etc.
The project leaders organized two working meetings and a closing conference. The final 
publication was developed as a comprehensive summary and analysis from these differ-
ent sources in continuous collaboration among authors and the country researchers.
The project maintains a website: www.taxdesignation.org.
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Chapter II.




As several countries have made their own version of the percentage tax designation 
mechanism, the arising question is: what can be defined as the “percentage tax desig-
nation mechanism” (often called percentage philanthropy). Is it always true that by this 
mechanism state resources are transferred to public benefit purposes in decentralised 
manner, reflecting the societal needs as perceived by taxpayers? The questions, such as 
who can make use of this mechanism and who are the beneficiaries, what percentage is 
allocated through this system, and the questions around the process of designation itself 
are to be discussed in this chapter. The goal is to figure out a definition of the percentage 
tax designation system based on the case at hand. The broadly understood percentage 
mechanism, as well as a narrower concept (where the primary beneficiary group is civil 
society based not-for-profit entities), are conceptualized here.
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The Concept
The “otto per mille system” is a mechanism through which Italian taxpayers can elect to 
assign a per mille of their annual personal income tax intended for social services to one 
of the country’s religious organizations or to the state (Allen 2007, 173) (Tremonti 2015, 
231-234). The purposes of the designation in this system are primarily religious (the exact 
use is laid down in agreements between the government and the churches). In case of the 
Catholic Church, the purposes are specified in article 48 of the 1985 law: "worship needs 
support of the people, support of the clergy, and charitable activities in favor of Italian 
society and the Third World"1. 
The idea of the percentage tax designation system emerged in the policy debates beyond 
Italy. In some countries, the option to implement the system is still debated; in others, 
such as the Czech Republic and Estonia, it was discussed and decided not to adopt a 
similar mechanism. Some form of a percentage system was discussed and has material-
ised not only in Italy, but also in Hungary, Japan, Lithuania, Slovakia, Spain, Poland, Por-
tugal, Romania, and most recently in Moldova. In Portugal, initially discussing the system 
for religious purposes only, one can now allocate a share of the income tax to both public 
(charities) and private organizations (public utility institution of benevolence, assistance 
or humanitarian purposes or private social welfare institutions),. In Spain, taxpayers can 
transfer 7% of their income tax to Church or to "other social purposes "(usually these are 
projects related to social issues such as poverty, social exclusion, seniors, immigration, 
and also projects directly related to quality of life). In case of Portugal and Spain, one 
can not directly choose the beneficiary (Montedore and Marucci 2011, 59-74). In Spain, if 
the “Church” box is marked on the declaration, the money will be allocated to the liturgy 
expenses while the money collected through “the social causes” box is used to finance 
social projects selected by the Ministries of Social and Foreign Affairs. Similarly, in Por-
tugal since 2001, a 5/1000 can be transferred, but taxpayers cannot choose a concrete 
beneficiary entity. Percentage allocations are part of state support that is the most impor-
tant financial source for voluntary organizations in Portugal, followed by self-generated 
income from member contributions (Franco 2006). 
These examples can be considered to be a broad interpretation of the percentage model. 
The Ichikawa city government in Chiba prefecture of Japan2 operates with a broad varia-
tion of the model as well. It has opted for a model where the idea is based on the percent-
age system but it is on a local government level and not on the state government level.  It 
is also worth to note a most exciting variation introduced in Slovakia that enables corpo-
rate bodies to participate in the tax percentage system and allocate a given percentage 
of their taxes that has had important positive consequences on the financial well-being of 
not-for-profit organizations in Slovakia.
The percentage designation mechanism, as a broadly understood concept, is a mech-
anism that channels public resources (collected from taxes) in a decentralized way to 
public benefit purposes. The essence of the percentage designation mechanism is that 
it grants the right to a taxpayer to designate some part of paid income tax to public 
benefit purposes. 
Different countries have introduced different systems. For example, in the original Italian 
otto per mille model, the beneficiaries are churches. Later, Italy used the same model to 
benefit other entities as well, such as the not-for-profit organizations and political parties. 
In other countries, beneficiaries can be non-profit, non-governmental organizations, or 
other types of public benefit entities, churches, and political parties. 
While this publication reflects on the broad concept of the percentage tax designation, its 
focus is one particular type of percentage mechanism where its primary aim is to benefit 
mostly civil society’s not-for-profit entities (not the ones that primarily target churches 
and political parties); where public resources of central government are redistributed (as 
opposed to local government resources); where decisions are made by individual taxpay-
ers (as opposed to corporations) who name a concrete entity as a beneficiary and the 
taxpayers’ choice is not challenged. 
This research focuses on the assessment of the “percentage designations benefiting not-
1 http://www.8xmille.it/rendiconti/ripartizione2012.pdf
2 The Ichikawa city government in Chiba prefecture, according to their website, has been running a sys-
tem based on the percentage mechanism for ten years (Special thanks to Junko Chano, President of 
the Sasakawa Peace Foundation for providing this information).
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for-profit entities” from taxes paid to central government based on the decision of tax-
paying individual’s concrete choice of entities to support. There are six countries that fit 
the narrower definition, out of which special attention is given to countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) with reflections 
on the sixth country, Italy, where a 0.5% (cinque per mille, i.e. 5X1000) mechanism was 
introduced to benefit not-for-profit and other entities (in addition to the otto per mille 
(8X1000) and the 2X1000 mechanism for political parties). 
The focus of our attention in this assessment is the effect of the percentage mechanism 
on the development of the non-profit sectors and its organizations in the CEE countries.
The Designator “donor”
Delegating the decision-making power to a taxpayer to distribute a portion of her/his 
taxes is an essential feature of the mechanism, and it is an innovative policy solution. Such 
a solution is unprecedented in the post-communist region and can be considered to be 
a unique form of a participatory budgeting rather than philanthropy. Generally, individual 
taxpayers can use this opportunity, and in Slovakia, corporations also have the option to 
designate a certain percentage of their taxes3. 
In the percentage mechanism system examined here, individual taxpayers are making their 
own autonomous decisions (without any political or economic influence) that are respected 
and not challenged by any entity (for other than formal reasons). The individual aims to sup-
port the public good, to relieve the pains of social problems and to improve quality of life 
for people, as it does in the case of philanthropy and charity. Still, there is a major difference 
between percentage designations and philanthropy. In the case of philanthropy, private re-
sources are used while in the case of the percentage mechanism, the allocated resources are 
related to personal earnings, but they are taxes that the individual would pay anyway. This 
is why this mechanism should not be considered philanthropy and the allocated resources 
are not donations. This also means that the percentage designation option is only available 
to taxpayers, unlike philanthropy, that is open to anyone. It is generally true that the law is 
applicable to all taxpaying individuals4 (with minor limitations in some countries).        
In the five “Central- Eastern European Percentage Club/CEE Percentage Club” countries 
(Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), almost half of the population, around 
17 million of all individual taxpayers (out of 40 million individual taxpayers, Table 2), use 
this designation mechanism. 
An additional 16.7 million taxpayers (Montedore and Marucci 2011), use the mechanism in 
Italy totalling 34 million people a year in Europe. 
3 A separate paper in this publication assesses this special form.
4 A minor variation on the basic mechanism operates in Hungary and in Slovakia, for example, that ex-








Hungary 9.9 4.6 1.9
Poland 38.5 24.2 12.0
Slovakia 5.4 1.9 0.6
Lithuania 2.9 1.0 0.5





Population, number of taxpayers and designators 
in the CEE Percentage countries based (“Per Phil 
database” based on national data sources)
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Beneficiaries of the Percentage Laws
The percentage tax designation system is often viewed as a financial support mecha-
nism for the non-profit sector/civil society organizations. This section will provide evi-
dence that this claim does not fully hold true for three reasons. 
1. Firstly, in the broadly understood percentage tax designation mechanism, ben-
eficiary groups can be churches as well as political parties and civil society-
based not-for-profits in some countries ( Figure 1).  In Italy, for example, there are 
three different percentage mechanisms targeting different beneficiaries: there is 
a percentage mechanism for churches, another for political parties and another 
for not-for-profit entities. In the five CEE countries, there is a maximum of two 
separate mechanisms, mostly a mechanism for not-for-profits and another one for 
churches (e.g. Hungary), or a mechanism for not-for-profits and another one for 
political parties (e.g. Lithuania). In Poland, Slovakia and Romania, there is “only” 
one percentage mechanism for not-for-profit and other public benefit entities. 
 
This means that the broadly understood percentage mechanism can benefit enti-
ties that are not-profit making, such as churches and political parties, but may not 
necessarily be civil society-based not-for-profit ones, as is the case in most of the 
countries (such as cultural or research institutions).
2. Secondly, one needs to note that even in the narrowly understood percentage 
mechanism of this research, where the primary beneficiary group is civil society 
based not-for-profit entities; other types of legal entities (from the public or 
private sector) are often included in the same group as eligible entities for the 
given percentage designation. 
While the mechanism is often perceived to benefit “grass-root” not-for-profits 
only, in some countries, churches, public entities, trade unions, and even needy 
individuals can be beneficiaries of this system (Table 3).
It’s incorrect to assume that the beneficiaries of the percentage mechanisms 
are only civil society based not-for-profit organizations. There are at least three 
broad category variations of the percentage mechanism in the six countries ex-
amined; and even where the mechanism is generally believed to be benefiting 
civil society not-for-profit organizations only, other legal entities are included. 
Therefore assuming that the percentage designation is used for civil society 
(non-profit sector) only is inaccurate. 
Figure 1: 
Potential beneficiaries of broadly 
understood percentage tax designation 
legislations
Civil society not-for-profit 
and other public benefit 
entities (trade unions, public 
cultural and research insitu-
tions, churches, etc.) 







1.  Public institutions which are declared to be eligible 
at the political decision makers’ discretion: 
 •   nation-wide cultural institutions (their list is 
included in Article 4 of the Law), and 
 •  local cultural institutions (theatres, museums, 
exhibition halls, community centres) which 
received subsidies from the municipalities in at 
least one of the last  three years. 
2.  Non-governmental organizations which are en-
gaged in preventive medicine, health care, social 
services, culture, education, research, public safety, 
human rights, environmental protection, protection 
of cultural heritage, sports and leisure time activi-
ties for the youth and the disabled; care for the 
elderly, children, the poor, the handicapped, national 
and ethnic minorities, and Hungarian minorities in 
foreign countries  if they belong to the following 
groups of institutions and also meet some other 
requirements: 
 •   institutions run by churches  which were offi-
cially registered not later than 3 years before the 
year of the tax declaration; 
 •   public law foundations regardless of their year 
of establishment; 
 •   private foundations and voluntary associations 
which 
  –  are registered in Hungary and have been in 
existence for at least 3 years; 
  –  are independent of political parties and do 
not support candidates for political office; 
and 
  –  are not in arrears with tax and duties, or they 
agree that the amount they would receive 
from the personal income tax is used to pay 
or decrease their debt.
POLAND
Beneficiaries include the NGOs, which obtained the 
status of public benefit organizations, including:
•   NGOs understood as institutions, which are not 
public sector entities and do not operate for profit,
•   legal persons and persons without legal personality, 
including foundations and associations,
•   legal persons and organizational entities of the Pol-
ish National Catholic Church, and other churches 
and religious communities,
•   associations of regional or local government bodies 
(Law of 24.04.2003).
Public Benefit Organization (PBO) - is a specific legal 
form of organization in Poland, which makes it possible 
for these institutions to use many privileges, including 
the 1% of income tax benefit. The donors can provide it 
to concrete organizations enjoying the public ben-
efit status. In compliance with one of the conditions 
introduced in 2010 (Law of 22.01.2010), the organiza-
tions must incessantly conduct their social activity for 
at least 2 years. In order to provide an incentive for 
public benefit organizations to report on their activi-
ties, a principle was introduced providing that only the 
organizations which duly submit a substantive and 
financial annual report will have the right to use the 1% 
“donations”.
SLOVAKIA
The original legal definition explicitly provided a list of 
potential recipients combining “grass roots” NGOs with 
another type of NGOs with various specific charac-
teristics, such as church organizations or international 
organizations. Among the listed NGOs, there was one 
with a prominent position, namely the Slovak Red 
Cross. Two subsequent law amendments had broad-
ened the original list, either by an explicit definition 
of a particular recipient category, e.g. Fund for the 
Development of Vocational Training (in 2009) or by 
enlisting/creating a new general category of potential 
recipients, e.g. subjects of research and development 
(in 2009) that include legal entities from the state sec-
tor (research institutes of Slovak Academy of Sciences), 
public or private universities, and even business sector 
entities that are registered as R&D subjects.
LITHUANA
In Lithuania, the beneficiaries of percentage scheme 
were described as entities, which possess the right to 
receive charitable donations. The status of charitable 
donations recipients in Lithuania is regulated by sepa-
rate legislation – the Lithuanian law regulating chari-
table donations stipulates that the following entities 
registered in Lithuania have a right to receive donations 
(after they had applied and been granted the above 
mentioned status): charitable foundations, public (state 
financed) institutions, associations, public enterprises 
(private non-profits), churches, branches of interna-
tional organisations, foreign Lithuanian (expatriates)  
communities other non-profits. The 2015 amendments 
extended the eligible entities to “natural persons who 
have art creator status (artists).”
ROMANIA
The recipients of the initial law were "nonprofit entities". 
These included NGOs established under law 21/1924 
(associations, foundations and federations). The 2007 
amendments introduced 2 new types of beneficiaries: 
religious organizations (churches, parishes, etc.) and 
private persons as recipients of private scholarships. 
The rationale behind this was to create a new income 
stream for religious organizations and to create a 
decentralized funding source for merit- or need-based 
scholarships.
Table 3: Beneficiaries of percentage legislations in the CEE countries  
(not including the additional percentages in Hungary and Lithuania)
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NOT-FOR-PROFIT ENTITIES AS PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES  
The intent to support not-for-profit organizations as entities of public benefit pur-
poses5 is evident in all the six European countries. 
In Poland, beneficiaries of the percentage mechanism include only NGOs that have 
obtained the public benefit status; in Lithuania the beneficiaries of the original law 
were entities that possess the right to receive charitable donations; in Romania the 
beneficiaries of the original law were “non-profit entities”; NGOs established under 
law 21/1924 (associations, foundations and federations) and religious entities were 
added in 2007; in Slovakia the original legal definition explicitly provided a list of po-
tential recipients combining “grassroots” NGOs with other types of NGOs with vari-
ous special characteristics, such as church-based and international organizations. 
CHURCHES AS BENEFICIARIES
The possible inclusion of the churches among the mechanism beneficiaries can be 
understood when looking at its history in general as well as specifically in Hungary. 
The concept of the percentage tax designation has roots in church financing poli-
cies of the 19th Century (Bullain 2004), which have typically acquired a form of a 
“church tax” mandatory for members of the church (of various denominations). 
After the French revolution, other countries were looking for ways to create a 
system of church financing, while clearly defining its separation from the state. 
This was common in Austria or Germany, for example, where there was a special 
church-tax, still in place today. The Italian model of otto per mille, established in 
1985, and originally dedicated to support the Catholic Church after the reform 
of the Concordate in 1984, was referenced as a model in the first presentation of 
the concept in the Hungarian Parliament in 1991 (Bullain 2004). It is suggested, 
that in the Western European experience, the percentage tax designation concept 
served the purpose of a “specific, non-political way of financing the (Catholic) 
Church (and later, other churches) and also some state-determined objectives of 
public interests” (Bullain 2004). Later, as the CEE experimented with targeting the 
mechanism at the non-profit sector, Italy also expanded its mechanism to cover 
other purposes and beneficiaries beyond the churches. 
The intended purpose and idea of the mechanism in Hungary, the first country in 
Central and Eastern Europe where the percentage allocation system for civil society 
not-for-profit organizations was introduced, reflected the structure of the Italian otto 
per mille. Hungarian policy makers were planning to create a similar law to include a 
broader group of beneficiaries. The churches, however, opposed the idea and thus 
the original law included two major types of the potential beneficiaries: 
 1.   Non-governmental organizations6 belonging to thematic categories of 
their area of work that also meet some other requirements (public law 
foundations; private foundations and voluntary associations)7. 
 2.  Institutions run by churches8 were included in the first version of the law. 
After passing the original Law (CXXVI/1996), its amendment a year later 
(Law CXXIX/1997) provided a separate 1% of the personal income tax option 
to the churches while keeping the original 1%. This has allowed churches to 
5 Note that „public benefit” is not used as a legal term and is undertstood in its common meaning of 
public serving. Also note that public benefit law regulations tend to be different from percentage reg-
ulations, the treatment of the percentage system as a policy mechanism that can support purposes of 
public benefit are universal in all of the countries using the percentage mechanism.
6 An addition was made to this list in 1998 when the legislation on public benefit organizations defined 
public benefit activities. This more complete list also includes consumer protection, rehabilitating 
employment, training and employment related services for disadvantaged people, promotion of the 
Euro-Atlantic integration, services for public benefit organizations, promotion of flood prevention, 
and promotion of public transport.
7  which are declared to be eligible at the political decision makers’discretion:  
• nation-wide cultural institutions (their list is included in Article 4 of the Law), and  
•  local cultural institutions (theaters, museums, exhibition halls, community centers) which received 
subsidies from the municipalities in at least one of the past three years. 
8 This group of institutions lost its eligibility when the 1% law was amended by the Law CXXIX/1997, 
which provided that, upon the taxpayers’ decision, another 1% of the personal income tax could be 
transferred to the churches.
18
receive their own 1%9. In this way a 1% plus 1% mechanism was developed so 
that churches are not in competition with the other group of 1% beneficiaries 
(mainly NGOs and some state institutions). Interestingly, in Italy, a percent-
age mechanism had been in place for years in churches, before the 0.5% 
system for not-for-profits (together with some other entities, like sports and 
research centres, universities, municipalities of residence) was introduced.
The 2007 amendments in Romania introduced the opposite concept (which is the 
very first Hungarian concept) in which religious organizations (churches, parishes, 
etc.) can be beneficiaries of the same 1% allocations (and compete with other 
secular civil society entities for their share of percentage allocations).  This version 
of the model has been replicated in the most recently passed percentage legisla-
tion in Moldova, where the state has adopted an approach similar to the original 
Hungarian and the amended Romanian model, in which both NGOs and churches 
can be beneficiaries of the same percentage designations10 and compete with 
each other for the designations. Meanwhile, Hungary continues to use the model 
of a separate percentage allocation for NGOs and churches. 
In Slovakia, from the very beginning, the mechanism includes “facilities of church 
and religious organizations” and does not include churches per se among eligible 
recipients. That means the mechanism supports legal entities that derive their legal 
subjectivity from the officially registered churches – these could be church charita-
ble institutions, religious orders (brotherhoods and sisterhoods), etc. that are not 
considered churches, but rather institutions performing social, charitable, educa-
tional or spiritual functions directly related to the church. Thus the mechanism dis-
tinguishes between the church as such and social engagement of church through 
its subsidiaries, that fall into the narrower space of civil society not-for-profit sphere. 
PUBLIC ENTITIES AS POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES
The other broader group of beneficiaries besides NGOs and churches is the group 
of public/state entities. In Hungary, the reasoning to include such entities and 
trade unions among the beneficiaries of the percentage mechanism was driven by 
the need to find suitable financial models to sustain those numerous entities (e.g. 
cultural centres, museums, trade unions) that serve the public and were financed 
by the state during the Socialist regime, but could not be sustained after the col-
lapse of the regime in 1989. 
In Lithuania, where the group of beneficiaries is taken very broadly, public institu-
tions have been argued to be part of the mechanism beneficiary group because 
they, too, need resources and deserve to be eligible to participate in the percent-
age scheme. Therefore it was proposed that all “public benefit institutions” in 
Lithuania would be able to receive 2% designations, regardless of their private or 
public origins11.  
For several years, some NGOs and politicians argued12 that the “2% scheme” in 
Lithuania got distorted – the majority of designations should go to public (state 
run) entities, because it wouldn’t be fair to leave “2%” solely to NGOs as they are 
not better than public schools, hospitals or museums. At the end of the day, in 
this competition of taxpayers’ preferences, NGOs receive more financial resources 
from percentage designations than public institutions. (according to data provid-
ed by the Lithuanian State Tax Inspection13 Table 4)
9 This assessment is not dealing with the Hungarian 1% for churches as that is a separate issue.
10 Unfortunately there is no real data available about the end users of the resources in Romania. Howev-
er, analysis of data before and after broadening the beneficiary base, suggests that NGOs and church 
organizations split the revenue relatively evenly. On the NGO side, main end users are organizations 
dealing with disadvantaged groups, health issues and education. Personal communications of ARC 
Romania with the tax authorities indicate that currently they are not able to provide information bro-
ken down by beneficiary organizations.
11 Aurelija Olendraitė, Ar filantropijos daigais vėl maitinsime biudžetines įstaigas? NVO teisės institutas, 
2015, accessed August 28, 2015, http://www.nvoteise.lt/lt/node/232
12 “Dviejų procentų” vertės detektyvas, accessed August 28, 2015, http://www.donoryste.eu/lt/Dvieju_
procentu_vertes_detektyvas.html




There is no information available as to which public benefit sector receives most of 
the 2% designations in Lithuania. Available is only the breakdown according to a) 
legal forms of recipients, b) Lithuanian counties and c) top recipients list14. Similar 
to Lithuania, the number of public entities among the percentage beneficiaries, 
and their share of allocated resources is small in Hungary (receiving around 1% of 
the percentage allocations). 
Irrespective of whether the state public entities are formally included in the legisla-
tion or not, an interesting debate resonates in the region regarding the mechanism 
being a channel of additional resources to public institutions that are traditionally 
financed by state and/or local government resources. The phenomenon is ob-
served in all CEE countries, even in the countries where public entities are not 
formally included among the beneficiaries. In this part of the world,  public kin-
dergartens, public schools, or state hospitals are traditionally expected to be fully 
financed by public resources from taxes and used by the vast majority of popula-
tion. As the public resources are dry, donations as well as percentage designations 
are being sought as additional resources beyond state and local government rev-
enues. To be able to channel percentage resources, many state entities or people 
around those entities have set up not-for-profits (e.g. numerous parent-teacher 
associations in Hungary and Slovakia) or work with intermediary not-for-profits 
for a certain brokerage fee (e.g. in Poland and Slovakia) to benefit the given public 
entity15. 
Finding data on the extent of this rechanneling was found to be impossible, as 
in most of the countries, these entities are formally independent not-for-profit 
organizations (civic associations) and therefore they fall into classic catch-all not-
for-profit clusters, even when they are not true  functioning organizations but 
simple revenue channels for public entities. 
14 Official Statistics Portal, Juridinių asmenų gauta parama, accessed August 28, 2015, http://osp.stat.
gov.lt/web/guest/statistiniu-rodikliu-analize?portletFormName=visualization&hash=40c2e975-
3378-4783-a399-a30858ae7180
15 Or private entity – see discussion below on individuals as beneficiaries.





Association 156,239 8,732 3,900,370
Public (state run) institution 160,73 2,757 3,458,179
Public (non-profit) establishment 82,392 4,087 2,446,420




Traditional church 27,814 855 702,499
Trade union 8,420 381 190,808
Church 1,796 94 35,467
Private family orphanage 112 27 2,678
Chamber of commerce 0 0 0
Table 4: 
List of bene ficiaries 
in Lithuania (not 
including the sepa-
rate percentage for 
 political parties)
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Interpretations of this phenomenon vary. Some find this alarming because they 
believe the percentage allocation is meant to make independent not-for-profit 
entities better off, and rechanneling is not in line with this mission. Others argue 
that the purpose of the mechanism is to finance goods of public benefit based on 
citizens’ decision and whether the end beneficiaries are not-for-profits or public 
entities is secondary as they all fund the public good.
INDIVIDUALS AS BENEFICIARIES
Another debated issue is when individual people become beneficiaries of the per-
centage mechanism and compete with not-for-profits for the same percentage 
designation resources, as is the case in some countries. 
In Slovakia, the law on tax designation (Demeš 2001), adopted in 1999, specified 
that any physical or legal person can be a beneficiary of the tax designation as 
long as the designation will be used for the public benefit purpose. This changed 
through an amendment of the law in 2001, before the tax designation came into 
implementation (which was 2002) and only not-for-profit organizations as legal 
entities could be beneficiaries (Demeš 2001).
 A law was introduced in Romania (2007), where private persons as recipients 
of private scholarships can be beneficiaries of the percentage mechanism. The 
rationale behind this was to create a new income stream for either merit- or need-
based scholarships and low income students, but it ended up to be rarely used. 
On December 17, 2015, the Lithuanian Parliament passed two amendments allow-
ing Lithuanian residents to allocate up to 2% of their income tax to “natural per-
sons who have art creator status” (artists). This amendment comes into effect on 
January 1, 2017 and therefore no results can be discussed yet. 
In Poland, private persons in need as a category has not been legislated, still, 
some key leaders in the Polish non-profit sector, such as Kuba Wygnanski, argue 
that “the mechanism was somehow privatized (and it was meant to serve public 
benefit). Quite often the role of the organization is limited to the role of a collector 
and a mechanical intermediary … to … obtain profit ... The resources from the per-
centage designations are … transferred to an individual (often in health and social 
needs) or to other institutions such as schools or kindergartens. In 2014, when the 
1% payment was made to nearly 7,500 organizations, over 25% of the total sum 
was collected by literally one foundation, which has been gathering  funds for 
years through its so-called sub-accounts, directing the funds to individual people. 
Ten organizations from the top of the list (six of them are known as "intermediary 
in collecting funds" for the benefit of individual persons or institutions that do not 
have the PBO status) collect approximately PLN 180 million (for the whole amount 
of PLN 500 million obtained in 2014 from the 1% PIT mechanism)” (Conference 
presentation 2015). Because of these kinds of transfers, many organizations in 
Poland are disappointed and believe that the mechanism is not bringing the ex-
pected results of supporting not-for-profit organizations. A few people question 
the whole mechanism and whether it serves its intended purpose and if it should 
be used at all, while others argue that the general policy is still valid but change in 
the mechanism is needed to reflect the original policy intention.
3. The third and last point regarding the assumption that the non-profit sector is 
the beneficiary of this mechanism, one needs to note that not the whole non-
profit sector benefits from it (Figure 2). In the CEE region where the mechanism 
is used, around 35% of the non-profit sector benefits from the mechanism. 
There are two arguments for this: 
One, based on the non-profit sector demography, looks only at the the non-profit 
sector benefitting from the mechanism vs. the whole non-profit sector. Lithuania 
leads with the highest proportion of designated organizations at 80%, followed 
by 35% in Hungary, and 30% in Romania, 24% in Slovakia, while in Poland it is only 
7%. In Italy, 12.5% of the sector is benefiting, the second lowest after Poland, of 
the seven countries examined. This means that on average in these six countries, 
every third organizations benefits from the system; in the CEE the percentage is 
slightly higher at 34%.
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There is a caveat in this reasoning that suggests that out of the total number of 
non-profit entities, there is a fair share of entities that either ceased to exist and 
were not taken out from the registries or are entities that are dormant and inac-
tive, while being formally registered (Strečanský, Civil Society in Slovakia 2015) 
(Domaradzka 2015).
To sum up this section, one can say that the percentage laws that are often 
viewed as support mechanisms for NGOs, go in practice beyond being a mecha-
nism for not-for-profit organizations16 in most countries. As of 2016, only in one 
country (Poland) is the group of beneficiaries limited to PBOs. At the same time, 
assuming that all members of the non-profit sector benefit from the mechanism 
is inaccurate, as in none of the above countries do all NGOs benefit from it.
Designated Percentages
The source of the tax percentage designation resources is the personal income tax 
that, based on the taxpayer’s decision either remains at the disposal of the state or it is 
channeled towards public benefit (For this reason it is administered as state resource 
in national accounts). 
The level of the possible designation is determined by the laws of different countries.
In Italy it is 0.5%, in Hungary and Poland a 1% mechanism was introduced and maintained 
to date (not considering the additional 1% for churches in Hungary). In Slovakia, since 2002, 
individual tax payers can designate 1%, and as of 2003, the percentage had been raised 
to 2% (moreover, the tax designation model had expanded to include corporate bodies). 
Today, it can even be 3% in case the individual taxpayer provides the regulatory body with 
a certificate of 40 hours of volunteer work. In Romania and Lithuania, the original law in-
troduced the 2% mechanism and it has been maintained at that level (with the option of 
designating an additional 1% to political parties in Lithuania). Most recently, Moldova has 
introduced a 2% system. In Italy, there has been a policy to announce the total amount of 
money that can be allocated through this mechanism annually (of 500 million EUR in 2015) 
(Art. 1, paragraph 154, Law 190/2014 - the Italian Budgetary Stability Act 2015).
Today, in CEE countries that use the percentage systems, there is an option for tax pay-
ing individuals to make their own decision about dedicating certain percentage of the 
personal income taxes., It is max 3% in Slovakia, 2%+1% in Lithuania, 2% in Romania, 
1%+1% in Hungary and 1% in Poland (and 0.8+0.5+0.2% in Italy). In all of these countries, 
one of the percentage options is primarily aimed to benefit not-for-profit organizations 
(Slovakia offering the most, 3%, and Hungary and Poland the least to this purpose: 1% 
of the CEE countries).  
16 This area of the law, that regulates the group of beneficiaries, has broad variations in the different 
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Figure 2:
Ratio of designated organizations among all NGOs 
over the years in five CEE countries (based on 
“Per Phil database” using national data sources 




The key steps in the process of allocating the percentage mechanism itself are the same 
in each of the five CEE countries. 
Step 1: 
 At the end of the tax year, the taxpayer pays the full taxes to the tax authority17. If the 
taxpayer wishes so, he/she can decide to designate a certain percentage of the full tax 
to a public purpose. The decision regarding the allocation of the given percentage is 
fully the decision of the taxpayer and the taxpayer names a concrete entity as benefi-
ciary. If a person pays 100 EUR in personal income tax at the end of the year, that per-
son will pay the total amount but may decide to assign a certain percentage of that 
tax, say 1%, i.e. 1 Euro to an entity serving the public good of his/her choice (within the 
limits of the regulations). In some countries, an open, “active” system is used where 
the organizations are listed in advance and taxpayers can choose only from that list 
(Italy, Poland and Slovakia and from 2015 Hungary) while in other countries there is no 
list provided to the taxpayers. 
Step 2: 
If the taxpayer decides to use this opportunity, he/she communicates the decision to 
the authority that will follow up by transferring the 1 Euro amount (in our example) 
to the given entity. If the taxpayers decide not to use this opportunity, the personal 
income taxes are fully paid and used as usual by the state. In some of the countries (in 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, and Romania), there is an option of sharing the percent-
age designation among several beneficiaries.
Step 3:
The entity is to receive and use the resources generated from percentage alloca-
tions according to the law (usually defining the use to be of public benefit purposes, 
sometimes the amount that can be used for fundraising or regulates the use of the 
resources for overhead etc.).  In the classic model of the mechanism, due to data pro-
tection reasons, the entity receiving percentage assignations receives the resources in 
one lump sum without knowing who has contributed the resources. Recently (2015), 
Slovakia and Hungary adopted an opt-in system that allows the taxpayer to actively 
indicate agreement with providing information of his/her identity (but not the des-
ignated amount) to the beneficiary in case the beneficiary asks the tax office for it. 
In some countries, the cycle is completed with the beneficiaries reporting on the us-
age of the designated amounts.
The way the process is set up affects the outcome to some extent. It is easy to see 
that the more user friendly the system is, the more likely it is for taxpayers to use it. In 
Poland, for example, it was originally the taxpayer who was transferring the percentage 
to an NGO of his/her choice and was later reimbursed by the tax authorities, a complica-
tion that was argued not to be a user-friendly experience. This was changed in 2006 and 
resulted in a procedure where the taxpayer only needs to write the official number of the 
organization he/she wishes to designate to and the rest is done by the tax authority - re-
sulting in higher number of people using the mechanism. This change was an important 
driving force behind the immense growth of the popularity of the mechanism in  Poland 
(2006: 1.1 million, 2007: 1.6 million, 2008: 5.1 million) (for details see country report on 
Poland in this publication).
Another example is the case of Hungary. When the system started, the individual taxpayer 
had to use an envelope as an attachment to his/her personal income tax form with the 
necessary information needed for the allocation. This mechanism was criticised for being 
not only too complicated but also costly. Some worried that the taxpayers will find it too 
time-intensive and will not make this extra effort, while the tax authority has complained 
about the labour needed to open and process hundreds of thousands of envelopes. As a 
reaction to these complaints, a simpler mechanism was introduced as of 2008, where a 
line in the tax declaration itself is printed to leave space for the taxpayer to indicate his/
her 1% allocation. This technical change did not result in any significant growth of usage, 
17 A certain variation of the percentage mechanism operates in Japan on a local government level (not 
in focus of this work).
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but, at least, in the middle of the financial crisis, the number of designators did not stag-
nate, but continued to grow.
At the time of writing this paper, the most recent percentage legislation in Moldova does 
not have its formal procedures in place yet, but many worry that the process itself can be 
a big handicap for the success of the system. In Moldova, the tax revenue received from 
the natural persons’ salaries is planned to be transferred to the local budgets. Respec-
tively, the 2% will have to be withdrawn from the budgets of local authorities. There are 
procedural questions that can hijack the system: tax incomes are transferred to the local 
budgets the month after being paid by the natural persons’ employers, but the designa-
tions are made the following year while the local authority is supposed to spend it in the 
current year. (For instance, I will designate in 2016 for the income received in 2015, but 
the income taxes were already spent by the local authorities in 2015). One can only hope 
that the final design of the implementation will be user friendly to individuals, state and 
municipal authorities as well as beneficiaries.
A procedural point that has received a lot of criticism in all of the countries is related to 
the connection of the “percentage donor” and the recipient entity. As the receiving end 
is not aware of who its supporters are (due to data protection reasons), there is a miss-
ing link between the two. It has been argued that without this link, there will not be a real 
connection between the individual and the receiving entity and thus it will be impossible 
to develop a relationship where the individual designators could be approached by their 
recipients, build a long-term relationship, and work or collaborate to further their work. 
(The identity of the taxpayer is hidden from the recipient). Responding to this criticism, 
the most recent changes in Hungary and in Slovakia include an option where taxpayers 
can opt in to reveal their identity to the recipient by marking it on their tax papers when 
making their designation. Supporters of this change believe that in the long run, this 
technical change will strengthen the relationship between the taxpayer and the receiving 
organizations. With this new option, if the taxpayer wishes to, his/her identity is revealed 
to the recipient that can make use of this information and get in touch with the “donor” 
to ask not only for regular donations but also to establish a relationship beyond the per-
centage assignations. It is to be seen (and empirically researched) how many people are 
willing to share their identity and whether this technical change will contribute to a better 
relationship between designator and recipient. 
The effect of the mechanism design is most striking in the Polish system, where taxpayers 
chose from a pre-prepared list of entities eligible to be recipients of the percentage do-
nation, resulting on average in almost two thousand people giving to each organization, 
while in Lithuania much less people on average give to each beneficiary. Such a system 
also affects the ratio of potential and designated organizations. In Poland and Slovakia 
where organizations are pre-registered in a pre-approved limited list of potential benefi-
ciary entities, almost all entities on the list become beneficiaries of the system.
As of 2015, an “active system” has been applied instead of “passive system” in Hungary 
as well, where organizations that want to collect 1% designations must be registered with 
the tax office in advance. Earlier, the designator could pick almost any entity as the scope 
of potential beneficiaries has been very broad and no lists of eligible entities were pre-
pared in advance. It is more likely for a passive system with large number of organizations 
resulting in smaller number of beneficiaries and therefore more taxpayer concentration, 
as is the case in Slovakia.  Changes in the procedures have been frequent, often resulting 
in some differences in outcome, but the essence of the system has remained the same.
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Conclusion
To conclude the question about the percentage designation system definition, based 
on the variety of practices and understandings examined, it is understood as a decen-
tralised decision making mechanism where state resources, namely certain percentages 
of the income tax are channelled mostly to not-for-profit organizations as well as other 
entities with (mostly) public benefit purposes based on the decision of the taxpayers 
and therefore reflecting the societal needs as perceived by taxpayers. This paper fo-
cuses on the percentage designation where the designator is an individual that makes 
a choice to benefit a concrete organization from the tax amount that he/she would 
pay anyway. Therefore it is incorrect to call the system private “philanthropy” as the 
resources used are not private resources, but resources that must be paid as income 
tax. It is also inaccurate to assume that the mechanism supports the non-profit sector 
at large, as not only, and not all not-for-profit organizations benefit from the percent-
age mechanism. Nevertheless it is true that the system aims to support the public good. 
The essential procedure of the mechanism is the same throughout the years and coun-
tries (individual taxpayer communicates its decision on the personal income tax per-
centage allocation to the tax authority and the beneficiary receives his/her designation 
together with other designations), small technicalities of the operation18 vary from one 
country to another (Török and Moss 2004) and adjustments in the processes and pro-





The financial value 
of the percentage 
 designation mechanism 
Marianna Török
It is assumed by many that the percentage tax designation mechanism system provides 
substantial financial contribution to the revenues of the non-profit sectors, some believ-
ing it to be one of the most important sources of funding. This section is to examine this 
assumption by focusing on the revenues this mechanism brings to the non-profit sector 
and its organizations. For this purpose available data and certain policy instruments of 
the five CEE countries will be examined with a special section on Hungary and Poland. 
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Revenue Growth
The percentage mechanism is estimated to be a 242 million EUR yearly revenue source 
in the five CEE countries (Table 5). Over the years, the mechanism has provided around 
5 billion EUR of support to a variety of beneficiaries in Europe, including Italy19 (based 
on the different time periods of functioning of the system). 
Revenues from this type of percentage designations in four countries tend to be bellow 
50 million EUR a year per country, while in Poland it is around 120 million EUR and in Italy, 
for similar entities, it is 264 million EUR20. The reason for these major differences lies partly 
in the disparity of salaries and taxes paid in different countries and partly in the number 
of tax payers as it is related to the number of actual designators. In Poland alone, the 
number of the taxpayers making use of this opportunity in most recent years is around 
10-11 million people a year (i.e. more than the whole population of Hungary). Meanwhile in 
Italy, 16.7 million people have made percentage tax designations in 2011 (40.4% of total of 
41.3 millions of taxpayers). 
 
19 Not counting the church and the political party percentage mechanisms and the ones where no direct 
decision can be made about the beneficiary entity.
20 264 million EUR benefiting not-for-profit entities
Table 5: 
Amount of designated 
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Figure 3:
Average amount of percentage designation per beneficiary in the CEE countries of the 
percentage system (based on “Per Phil database” using national data sources)
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While the total amounts may look substantial, the average amount per beneficiary is not 
high in any of the countries. When not counting the highest Polish average, the average in 
the remianing four CEE countries is  1,291 EUR while with Poland included, it is  4,104 EUR 
per organization (based on the tenth year of operation)21.
While not all countries issue official lists of top beneficiaries, it is clear that not-for-profits 
with a strong emotional appeal are the most likely to win taxpayers’ hearts to receive 
their percentage donations22. By the type of activity, organizations that fall into the 
health and healthcare related issues category are the most popular, followed by educa-
tion and science; religion; environment; sports and tourism; culture and arts in the five 
countries (based on reports of local researchers).
In Poland, the most effective in 1% collections has been the Fundacja Zdążyć z Pomocą. 
Foundation for Children „Help on Time”23 that work as an intermediary for almost twenty 
thousand individuals who collect 1% designations for their own (mostly social and eco-
nomical) needs24. In Lithuania, the top beneficiary is the Foundation “Trouble market”25, 
followed by two animal shelters26. 
It has been assumed that the percentage designations are not reaching pro-democracy, 
advocacy, civil rights related organizations as their mission is not appealing enough to 
the general public. One needs to note a new trend in Hungary that goes against this 
argument. In most recent years, not-for-profit organizations with an advocacy role and 
independent voice have been benefiting more and more from percentage designations: 
e.g. an independent radio channel run by the Tilos civil entity; The Hungarian Civil Liber-
ties Union; and the Asimov Foundation that runs Átlátszó a transparency entity were 
supported by thousands of people. The latter one, for example, has tripled its percentage 
revenues in 2015 compared to the previous year (NAV 2016)27, but is still not making it to 
the top beneficiaries list. The top beneficiaries of the percentage donations in Hungary re-
main to be children’s health related entities, such as the Children’s Cancer Foundation and 
most recently the Foundation for the Development of the Pál Heim Children’s Hospital.
The Slovak case, where a significant part of the corporate tax designation is further al-
located by corporate foundations, shows interestingly that the tax designation fund-
ing through corporate foundations as intermediaries is more frequently and in higher 
amounts invested in the areas that are less popular among general public (transparency, 
interventions among marginalized groups, etc.) (Hrica 2014).
Another important aspect that points to the vulnerability of the mechanism when it is 
connected with advocacy activities is based on Slovak experience. In the 2006 parlia-
mentary debate in Slovakia,  human rights and education were proposed to be excluded 
from the list of eligible public benefit purposes for the tax designation mechanism by a 
political party with strong illiberal and undemocratic background. In words of the party’s 
deputy: “…it is mostly about limiting those non-profit non-governmental organizations 
that in 1998 secretly meddled with politics via their education, science and other [pro-
jects] and largely influenced election results” (Strečanský et al. 2007). 
21 The Italian average in the 9th year of the operation is a bit less than the Polish (in 2014 total amount 
was 485 million EUR and the total admitted organizations beneficiaries were 53,457 out of which 




22 In Slovakia the survey among the Asscociation of Corporate Foundations which is representative of  
over 1/3 of corporate tax designations show a different prioritization of issues than the individual des-
ignation giving a highest allocations to 1) Culture, 2) Education and 3) Sports.
23 http://dzieciom.pl/english
24 This causes frequent criticism for two reasons: the huge concentration of resources and the end users 
being individuals (For details see Poland country report). 
25 As one observer puts it: „This entity runs a popular weekly TV show exposing different families in 
need and "selling their troubles" to potential donors.”





This motion was approved and human rights, education and environment were removed 
from the list of eligible organizations for one year. Despite the fact that this motion has 
been overridden in 2007, it showed the vulnerability of this mechanism to the distortions 
of the political discourse in a particular context. 
The Broader Context
It is an undeniable fact that the percentage mechanism system provides financial resourc-
es to many not-for-profit organizations, some even assume it to be the most important 
revenue source for the non-profit sector in the countries where it is used. Because its 
true impact on the overall financial development of the sector is unexplored, this section 
focuses on the broader financial impact of the percentage mechanism. First, it will give 
a perspective of the financial significance of this resource for the whole non-profit sec-
tor. Second, it will examine related developments taking place beyond the percentage 
system that have contributed to the overall financial well being of the non-profit sectors 
and examine the question of generation or crowding out of private and state resources 
focusing on the cases of Poland and Hungary. 
THE FINANCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PERCENTAGE DESIGNATIONS
To assess whether the percentage designation is a key financial support mechanism for 
the non-profit sectors, an important point of perspective to take is the proportionate 
value of the percentage designations in the overall revenue of the non-profit sectors. The 
revenue from percentage designation in proportion to the overall revenue of the non-
profit sectors in the five CEE countries is around 2% (Figure 4 based on data available 
around the tenth year of operation of the percentage mechanism). Therefore assuming 
that the percentage mechanism is one of the most important sources of funding for the 
non-profit sectors is wrong. 
Figure 4:
Share of percentage designations within the total revenues of five CEE countries  






While the percentage designation is a small portion of the overall revenues of the non-
profit sectors in the 5 CEE countries, some believe it is the most important source for 
three reasons: 
a) it is the most important source for many entities 
b) it is highly used by potential beneficiaries in many countries, and 
c) it has a strong communications component reaching the public.
There are a number of organizations for whom the percentage revenue is the only rev-
enue source, and for many it is the only source from state and local government which 
may give the impression of being the most important source of funding for the sector. 
The example of Hungary illustrates the high value of this state support for many NGOs 
(Figure 5).
Figure 5:
Number of NGOs receiv-
ing 1% in Hungary as the 
majority and as a total of their 
revenues 
Source: HCSO
In Hungary, the country where such data is available, the percentage designation has 
been the most important revenue stream for thousands of organizations. As much as 8% 
of the non-profit sector has received the majority of its revenues from percentage desig-
nations and for 2.4%, percentage revenues were their only source of income in 2010. This 
shows how important the percentage system is for many not-for-profit organizations in 
Hungary, even when it is only a minor revenue source in the overall not-for-profit financial 
eco-system. 
The perception that the percentage designation mechanism is a support system for the 
whole of the non-profit sector may also have resulted from the fact that in some coun-
tries, almost all NGOs that are eligible for it end up benefiting from it  (giving the inaccu-
rate perception that it is the whole of the sector). It is a wrong perception. In Hungary, for 
example, where there has not been a list to choose an entity from, the proportion of real 
beneficiaries has been ranging between 26-43% over the years, in Slovakia, where there is 
a list to chose from, it has been 13-22%.
While it is not the whole of the sector that benefits financially, the voice of this segment 
is strong. The active promotional campaigns targeting potential beneficiaries have been 
unprecedented in the CEE region. Thanks to the percentage mechanism, organizations 
started to put more emphasis on communication with their own members and clients as 
well as reaching out to the broader public. It goes without saying that it has had an effect 
on the intensity and quality of communications of the whole of the sector as well.
 Number of NGOs receiving 1% as the majority of their income
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Figure 6:
Increase of total 
revenue of the non-
profit sector in four 
countries over the 
years (based on “Per 
Phil database” using 
available national 
data sources)
The question of crowding out of resources
Claims of the significance of the percentage system are reported to be frequent in all CEE 
countries. Politicians, private individuals and companies often use the existence of the 
percentage system as an excuse for not providing support and giving enough/additional 
resources to certain areas and organizations, arguing that the percentage system should 
finance them. These observations suggest to some, that there might be a crowding out 
of resources taking place. 
As a starting point in this discussion, it needs to be noted that based on the limited data 
provided by national sources of four countries, a trend of growth in the overall financial 
revenues of the non-profit sectors can be observed over the years (Figure 6) since the 
start of the percentage system.
Unfortunately, the availability of comprehensive, reliable and precise data is limited on the 
support of state and private entities to the non-profit sector in all the five countries that 
are of the prime concern of this paper. Our experts, however, have expressed that in the 
five CEE countries observed, no crowding out of direct state resources has been noted 
as a result of the percentage designation mechanism28. 
At the same time, decrease of indirect support can be noted in most countries in the 
form of fewer tax advantages for private giving. Except for Italy29 and Romania, there 
have been legal changes that make private giving (of individuals and/or companies) to 
not-for-profit entities less attractive since the start of the percentage mechanism30. For 
example, in Hungary, the option of tax deductions and other allowances has been radi-
cally cut off. As of 2015, only corporate support can be deducted (to a limited extent). 
Whereas Slovakia’s tax reform of 2003 completely abolished the tax deductions for both 
individual and corporate donations. 
Whether these changes can be linked to the introduction of the percentage mechanism 
28 Whether the original source of direct support was European Union related resources or national and 
local government budgets was not traced.
29 Since 2005 (the 5x1000 was introduced in 2006), Italy also has had a special deduction for donations 
to not-for-profit organization, called “The More You Give, The Less You Pay” (Più dai, Meno versi). 
It works for physical persons and companies up to 10% of total taxable income for a maximum of 
70,000 EUR per year. In 2011, according to data of the Ministry of Finance, 681,672 of Italians used this 
option.
30 In Romania, the fiscal incentives for individual donors have not changed since the enactment of the 
percentage system. Giving of corporations is characterized by attractive fiscal incentives. (Donations 
are deductible from the profit tax up to a certain amount (0.5% of revenue but not more than 20% of 
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is not certain, except in the case of Lithuania, and partially in Slovakia. In Lithuania, the 
introduction of the percentage system was conditioned on the abolition of tax deduction 
for private individuals, such as the 15% income tax deductions for private donors (due 
to concerns that a proposed “2% scheme“ would represent huge costs to the national 
budget). While it could have only been a temporary act, that if proven to be unnecessary, 
could be reconsidered, the original tax incentive has not been restored ever since in Lithu-
ania.  In Slovakia, the abolition of tax incentives for giving was part of a broader tax reform 
that coincided with the expansion of the tax designation mechanism to include corporate 
entities. Among the CEE countries, Romania is the only one, where the fiscal incentives for 
individual donors have not changed since the enactment of the percentage system (and 
giving by corporations is characterized by attractive fiscal incentives).
PERCENTAGE MECHANISM AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY
The question of the percentage mechanism’s effect on private giving has existed ever 
since the idea was born: will it be a training ground for private philanthropy (“School of 
Philanthropy”) and encourage private giving, or will it discourage individuals from donat-
ing their own resources? The jury is still out to decide this question.  Unfortunately, true 
comparisons have been impossible due to the lack of comparable data in the five coun-
tries. Nevertheless, this research has been able to collect some evidence that supports the 
argument that even with less legal incentives to encourage private giving, giving by indi-
viduals shows a clear, growing trend in the four CEE countries where data was obtained 
(Sičáková a Zemanovičová 2010). As for corporate giving, based on even less data, the 
trend is not so evident. The drop in corporate giving in Slovakia, the only country where a 
corporate percentage designation is available, is a sign of concern.
Figure 7:
The value of private donations of individuals and corporations over the years (based on “Per Phil 
database’ using available national data sources)
 Hungary (indiv.)
 Hungary (corp.)
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In the following sections, two authors will provide case studies from Hungary and Poland. 
The case of Hungary, based on information from István Sebestény and data collected by 
the Central Statistics Office of Hungary for the period 1997-2013, provides some evidence 
to the argument that the percentage system does contribute to the development of 
private philanthropy. In the section on Poland, Kuba Wygnanski will argue that in the 
case of Poland, greater public awareness of NGOs can be credited to the percentage 
mechanism system, but there is no conclusive evidence that it has contributed to the 
development of private philanthropy “…which may perhaps still require more time”. 
As a last point in this discussion, one needs to mention the results of an experimental 
research (Csongrádi 2008) that support the opinion that the introduction of the percent-
age system does not significantly lower the level of individual contributions from income. 
Moreover, a little increase could be observed in the first round of the experiment’s second 
part31. The experiment’s results demonstrate that the possibility of a crowding out effect 
is not significant when the whole society is observed. (Csongrádi 2008, 33).
Case Presentations 
THE CASE OF HUNGARY  István Sebestény
In the debates surrounding the “birth” of the 1% system [(Bossányi 1997); (Mészáros and 
Sebestény 2000); (Vajda and Kuti 2000)], a central issue – certainly unresolvable at the 
time – was the effect its introduction would have on the levels of private giving among 
the general public. Those in the pessimistic camp feared that taxpayers would feel that 
their philanthropic act in form of their 1% designations was sufficient, and therefore it will 
become more difficult for NGOs to attract private donations. The optimistic camp pre-
dicted the exact  opposite would happen, i.e. that taxpayers who are already persuaded 
to exercise the new form of costless ‘percentage philanthropy’ would also gradually be 
persuaded to give money from their own pockets to support NGOs (Kuti 2007).
31 In this public good experiment students were asked to invest some money in a group project. The ex-
perimenter collected the contributions, multiplied them according to a previously given rule and then 
divided the money among the group. In some cases, no one knew the individual contributions, only 
the total. This game was modified over time and the goal of all modifications was to answer different 
aspects of individual behavior. In this research, the supply of public goods was observed with and 
without the possibility of the percentage system. Throughout the inquiry, groups have been examined 
under two different situations to determine the Nash equilibrium with and without the presence of the 
percentage system.
Figure 8:
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In this section, some key numbers are shared from Hungary, to show that based on the 
data collected by the Hungarian Central Statistics Office (HCSO) for the period 1997-2013, 
which supports the optimist point of view (Figure 8). Since the introduction of the 1% sys-
tem, the number of NGOs that have received private donations has continually increased, 
albeit not very rapidly. 
 
The Figure 8 above also shows that a large (and ever-increasing) number of NGOs were 
able to attract both private donations from members of the public as well as the 1% des-
ignations. At the same time, there was a considerable rise in the number of organisations 
that received 1% designations, but not private donations.
According to the most recent data available from HCSO (HCSOa 2014), only 23% of NGOs 
received 1% designations and only 18% got both 1% designations and private donations. 
Almost half of all NGOs received neither 1% designations nor private donations. 
In terms of the number of benficiaries, the 1% system has clearly neither overshadowed 
private donations, nor did it reduce its importance (HCSOa 2014). The same is true in 
terms of the amounts received from the two forms of funding32. 
32 The explanation of the break of positive tendency in 2008 is the economic crisis and the change in tax 
system as we described earlier.
Figure 9:
Breakdown of NGOs 
by receipt of 1% 
designations and/
or private donations 
















Growth of 1% designations, individual donations in Hungary, 1996–2013
Notwithstanding the rapid growth in 1% designations, private donations continue to be of 
greater importance in the financing of the NGO sector in Hungary. At this point, therefore, 
it is worth noting that there is now a new kind of NGO that seems to be focusing entirely 
on obtaining 1% designations and not other sources of revenue.
It seems particularly inexplicable why some successful percentage beneficiaries decide 
not to utilize their energies on collecting private donations as well, especially in the light 
of the research results carried out on private donations showing a very clear, positive and 
close link between taxpayers’ exercise of the 1% designation option and their willingness 
to make individual donations. (Kuti 2007).
THE CASE OF POLAND  Kuba Wygnański
One of the intentions of introducing the 1% tax deduction system was not only to provide 
additional funds for NGO activities, but also to inspire philanthropic activities in Poland 
(such intention was probably present in all countries that have adopted this kind of solu-
tion). We could say, that in some sense, this solution appeared to be a "prosthesis" for un-
derdeveloped philanthropic practices. The system was a kind of "philanthropy by the poor” 
in a situation where, due to a number of reasons (particularly of political and historical 
nature), the existing, pre-war philanthropic tradition was in many ways impeded. In such a 
short time (about 5-10 years from the start of the transition), it was impossible to rebuild 
it - both in terms of resources/assets and the ways to use them (wealth management).
The assumed sequence of changes was supposed to be as follows: taxpayers would be 
enabled to easily donate 1% of their personal income tax (PIT) and this way would gradu-
ally become accustomed to philanthropic habits. At the same time, the 1% mechanism 
would force organizations to better communicate with citizens in order to effectively 
convince them to entrust their money to them. The question is, whether this assumption 
indeed is proven to be true? This article aims to provide some insight on this topic.
The mechanism of soliciting the transfer of 1% has a competitive character - with all its 
positive and negative consequences. The positive ones are that organizations must some-
how make their actions accountable to citizens. This is a significant change from a situa-
tion in which their fate depended exclusively on the favor of institutional sponsors and the 
ability to write applications for grants (a kind of "grantosis"). There is no doubt that since 
the introduction of the 1% mechanism, the public awareness and recognition of NGOs 
significantly increased.
A study conducted by the Klon/Jawor Association (The image of NGOs, 2014) shows that 
in 2014, 60% of respondents of a national survey (representative sample) recognized and 
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people coming from rural areas (50%) and those with only primary education (only 36%). 
The recognition radically increases with questions targeting specific organizations (many 
of them are very well known) which is not the case when NGOs as a whole are examined. 
Charities enjoy the greatest awareness among the general public, because it is charities 
that most often try to reach the general public by soliciting its support. But since one of 
the main themes of the NGO sector's communication with the public is soliciting money 
(and thus speaking about needs), it is hardly surprising that there is a specific distortion 
in the image of the sector. As many as 79% of respondents associate organizations with 
helping the needy and 77% with fundraising; while, in reality, only 6% of NGOs in Poland 
are directly involved in such practices. The consequence of such reduced communication 
is that often some organizations – those not involved in helping the needy or fundraising 
– are barely recognized as NGOs. There is no precise method of determining the exact 
impact of the 1% mechanism for creating such state of affairs, but considering the fact 
that the number of people who used the mechanism last year was higher than 12 million, 
it is probably significant.
The fact, however, that organizations are recognized, does not automatically mean they 
necessarily have a positive image. The very fact that they are often perceived as a kind of 
piggy banks means that they often raise suspicion. Not everyone is convinced that these 
organizations are effective, fair and worthy of respect. The above mentioned study shows 
that only 35% of respondents believe that NGOs solve important problems at the local 
level and 58% believe they are more efficient than public administration. Over 44% of 
respondents trust the organizations, but exactly the same number of respondents don’t, 
and 48% believe that NGOs are not free of abuses. The local government has the same 
rating. A bittersweet comfort is the fact that the confidence in the government admin-
istration’s actions is significantly lower (22%) while the level of mistrust is significantly 
higher (64%).
There is also a problem related to the fact that the bulk of communication between or-
ganizations and the public is purely emotional. Quite often, it takes the form of emotional 
blackmail ("We need your money because we have to save your life") based on using the 
misfortune theme as a fundraising mechanism. This mechanism is extremely well devel-
oped in Poland, where in practice the means (though formally passing through organiza-
tions) are often collected for the needs of individuals (people in a difficult situation, in 
terms of health or material condition) - as many as 31% of those who decided to transfer 
1% of their tax admit that they personally know the recipient or that the recipient was 
pointed out to them by someone in their family. This results in a particular form of rivalry 
and betting on human misery. In addition, a fact that a very significant part of the 1% goes 
to NGOs only pro forma as in reality they act only as intermediaries (63% of taxpayers 
treats NGOs in such a way). These NGOs are often regarded as a kind of necessary evil 
(44% of respondents believe that NGOs waste at least a part of the funds entrusted to 
them). The biggest "experts" in the use of this mechanism are also the largest beneficiar-
ies of the 1%; in the top ten beneficiaries of the 1% they are the vast majority. For years 
now, the No. 1 beneficiary of the 1% mechanism has been the Help on Time Foundation 
(it collects about a quarter of all the funds which are distributed among a total of around 
8,000 public benefit organizations). With such a scale of generated resources and capa-
bilities to rotate them (delivering the funds to the beneficiaries with a delay), the Foun-
dation can provide an extremely attractive offer based on the fact that it nominally does 
not charge any fee on transferred funds (while they make profit from rotating entrusted 
funds). One may even suppose that if there was a possibility of transferring money di-
rectly to individuals, the organizations would prove largely redundant (such a solution 
functioned for a while about 20 years ago and it almost caused a disaster for the state 
budget due to the huge number of "mutual donations").
The role of NGOs as intermediaries (and therefore not the beneficiaries) also applies to 
the transfer of 1% to institutions that traditionally are (and should be) funded from public 
funds. Solutions in this area can be different – such a mechanism is admissible in Hungary 
and Lithuania, but in Poland, the legislators had no such intention. To be clear, we are not 
talking about well-established public institutions (such as the National Library or public 
museums), which can be automatically treated as public goods. In most cases, this mech-
anism is used (and in my opinion misused) as a mechanism for financing specific entities 
(e.g. schools or kindergartens), which the 1% donors’ children/families attend – this way 
the funds meant to support public benefit are in a way "privatized". These institutions 
(schools and kindergartens) decide not to become direct beneficiaries of the 1%, as this 
would require meeting many formal requirements and they rather chose to use brokers 
who agree to submit the funds to them, charging a certain percentage (e.g. 25%).
Not without significance is also the fact that this market-like type of communication has 
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its own rules. These rules often simplify the very communication, which is based on emo-
tions, has a competitive nature and – finally and absolutely essentially, for it to be effective 
- often requires very intensive and thus costly investments. These investments often come 
from funds previously obtained with the 1% mechanism or those that are to be collected. 
Therefore, this is the type of investment that does not always pay off (it happens that or-
ganizations indebt themselves to be able to bear the fundraising campaign costs or they 
spend more on it than they are able to collect). In total, the 1% percent campaign costs 
across the sector do not exceed 5% of the amount eventually collected, but isolated cases 
of extravagance have irritated the public. The last amendment to the law on public ben-
efit imposed a requirement on organizations to cover the costs of these campaigns and 
to inform the public about it (in a press announcement, social campaigns, etc.). It is also 
worth noting that in many cases there is the so-called St. Matthew's effect, when those 
who have more, gain even greater advantage and those who have less, are left behind.
We must humbly admit that very little was left from the original assumption: for the 1% 
mechanism to be a civic exercise in which citizens choose between competing public 
goods on the basis of publicly available objective information describing the organiza-
tions. For now, despite the fact that all technical requirements are in place (including 
broad access to information about organizations), the selection mechanism is mainly of 
an emotional or "interest-based" character. Perhaps the situation will change somewhat 
as a result of better organized information campaigns indicating the necessity of reflec-
tion before deciding on the 1% allocation. The media have also increased their scrutiny 
and thoroughness in the cases of those who collect the most. The news, sometimes dis-
turbing, can result in a more critical view of some organization as a whole, but on the oth-
er hand it can make taxpayers more careful when deciding. It seems inevitable, too, that 
mechanisms such as rankings/certification emerge and allow for more informed choices 
(favored e.g. by publicly available detailed information on public benefit organizations).
To address the topic of impact on the development of philanthropy in Poland, we should 
start with pointing out the positive fact that currently, public benefit organizations obtain 
about 120 million EUR every year, as indicated in the tax return by about 12 million tax-
payers. However, the intention of the launch of the 1% mechanism was not just a simple 
increase in the amount of funds available to the organizations, but also their more uniform 
distribution. Here, the effect is very distant from the intended one - the structure of these 
funds has been specifically distorted and almost unprecedentedly concentrated in Poland 
(without any doubt such a result would not have occurred even in the worst administered 
grant system of public administration). Let us point out the fact that the number  of or-
ganizations that can benefit from the 1% mechanism is much smaller than those that can 
benefit from traditional philanthropy (of over 120,000 organizations, only 8,000 entities 
with the status of public benefit organization can be the 1% beneficiaries). In fact, the list 
of beneficiaries is even shorter than this, as the real beneficiaries (within the group of 
public benefit organizations) are a very small group of organizations. Suffice to say that a 
group of only ten organizations collects nearly 40% of all available funds. Indirectly, this is 
reinforced by an environment in which a taxpayer can choose only one organization; thus, 
it becomes a kind of rivalry with only one winner.
There is one more ambivalent consequence of the 1% system. This system reduces the 
issues of solidarity and empathy to purely financial aspects and since the giving is per-
formed only once a year when filling the tax return form, the mere act of "donation" is 
thus an act done once a year and not a continuous activity - a "habit of the heart". This 
supports the perception of philanthropy as a "festive" act rather than a daily practice.
However, the greatest misunderstanding lies in the fact that the 1% is in fact an allocation 
of the public, and not one's own, money. It can be assumed that genuine philanthropy and 
empathy was, in this case, replaced with something of a synthetic substitute. The blame 
for this situation can be partly attributed to the organizations themselves, as they referred 
to the 1% mechanism as philanthropy at the very beginning, thus contributing substan-
tially to the confusion. If the system was to be introduced today, we could reach for an 
analogy to the so-called participatory budgeting, currently popular in Poland (which is 
much closer to the principle of the allocation of PIT).
A very important consideration when introducing the 1% was that the citizens, accus-
tomed to the fact that NGOs contribute positively to society, having spent their 1% of PIT, 
would also reach into their own pockets. It is very difficult to unambiguously interpret the 
net effect here. At one point, it was quite a popular belief that the idea of allocating 1% 
of PIT  "cannibalises" philanthropy rather than develops it. It cannot be clearly confirmed, 
nor denied. The available data on Poland show that in recent years, both the amount 
of collected funds and the number of people involved in the 1% mechanism and philan-
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thropy increased. According to official figures, the number of people engaging in the 1% 
mechanism has grown over the last 10 years (2004 through 2014) from 80,000 to more 
than 12 million. The amount obtained in this way increased from 2.2 million to over 120 
million EUR. At the same time, the number of philanthropic operations recorded in the tax 
system (while certainly the majority of them are realized outside) also increased, but only 
slightly. We do not have accurate data for the entire period, but in 2005, approximately 
215 thousand taxpayers declared such activities, while five years later, there were slightly 
more than 283,000 of such people. In terms of collected amount, the progress has not 
been particularly impressive either – the amount increased from about 28 million to about 
37 million EUR. Another source of data on this matter are surveys conducted every year 
by the Klon/Jawor. In 2009, about 50% of respondents claimed to have exercised some 
philanthropic actions, while in 2013, it was around 74%. The fact that all of these indicators 
are rising, does not paint a clear picture yet as we we do not have a control group. It's 
hard to carry out counterfactual reasoning (see how philanthropic behavior would have 
developed, had the 1% mechanism not been introduced). There is also a serious problem 
with the data. While the data on the 1% allocation are very precise (both on the side of 
donors and receivers), we know very little about traditional donations. Allocation of 1% in 
its entirety and without exception "passes" through the fiscal system and public statistics 
– individual donations do so much less regularly. Most often, the individual donations are 
carried out in an informal way, even in form of cash transfer or SMS messages not noted 
for tax exemptions (where only bank transfers are accepted) and thus are not recorded in 
the tax system. A case in point are donations to the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity 
(which involves more than 60% of a total of approximately 75% of respondents who do 
engage in philanthropy). This institution organizes a huge fund-raising campaign once a 
year, which involves millions of Poles. It is worth noting, however, that even in this case, it 
is not clear whether it ultimately supports other forms of philanthropic engagement or in 
some cases simply replaces them.
A solid source of knowledge about the significance of 1% and philanthropy can be the sys-
tematic studies of philanthropy conducted by the Klon/Jawor in the NGOs environment. 
This is a very serious undertaking conducted every two years with a sample of two to 
four thousand organizations. One of the questions that appear in the questionnaire is the 
question about the frequency of using different sources of financing. The results are not 
conclusive. In Table 6 you can see that since 2009, the amount of funds collected from 1% 
mechanism is actually comparable to the amount from donations. The latter shows a rath-
er downward trend, but as the estimates are not quite accurate, we cannot be sure of this.
Selected sources as 
% of total 3rd sector 
income
2003r 2005 2007 2009 2011
Donations form 
 individuals
5% 5% 4% 5% 3%
1% allocation 1% 1% 5% 3%
Frequency of given 
source among 3rd 
 sector organizations
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Donations form 
 individuals
41% 36% 36% 37% 28%
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A separate issue is the frequency of using of each source. Here the trends are much 
clearer: the frequency of using subsidies drops significantly while the frequency of using 
the 1% mechanism is increasing.
39
In this section, a preliminary hypothesis about the consequences of the introduction of 
the 1% system in Poland was presented. The consequences are not clear. Without any 
doubt, one of its effects is a greater recognition of NGOs, but on the other hand there is 
a specific distortion (reduction/simplification) of the perception of their mission. Another 
important issue is whether in fact the introduction of the 1% brings the development of 
philanthropy – here the answer is even more ambivalent. Certainly, the mechanism had 
a multifarious effect here, but there is no conclusive evidence that it has developed the 
philanthropy in a positive way (which may perhaps still require more time). However, it 
is positive that we can at least state that the 1% mechanism did not significantly harm 
philanthropy..
Conclusion
The percentage mechanism is an important source of revenue to many organizations 
that is estimated to have provided around 5 billion EUR of support to a variety of ben-
eficiaries in Europe over the years. Still, this source is a small portion of the overall 
revenues of the non-profit sectors in CEE (around 2%) and therefore assuming that the 
percentage mechanism is a crucial source of funding for the non-profit sector is wrong 
(The case of Hungary shows that it is an important, and often only source of revenue for 
many entities). Since the start of the percentage system, growth can be observed in the 
overall as well the percentage revenues of the examined non-profit sectors. Crowding 
out of state and private resources can not be observed (the latter point is also sup-
ported by the cases of Poland and Hungary) and individual philanthropy contributions 
show a growing trend, even though incentives for individual private giving have gone 
down in most countries.
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Chapter IV.
Added value  
Boris Strečanský 
It is believed that besides providing monetary support to public benefit purposes, the 
system has had numerous, mostly valuable side effects, some of which are in direct rela-
tion with the sustainability of public benefit organizations, especially the NGO sector and 
some that reach beyond it. To test the above hypothesis we reviewed the policy intentions 
at the time of initiation of the mechanism in the “percentage club countries” and com-
pared them to the effects that were attributed to the mechanism by the country experts. 
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Introduction
This hypothesis builds on the assumption that any policies or actions bring about unex-
pected benefits or drawbacks. Reasons can be numerous – errors in the analysis before 
the implementation of the policy, complex situations and contextual factors that are im-
possible to predict or take sufficiently into account, or the nature of the implementation 
of the policy itself. Some effects of the mechanism implementation may need more time 
to be identifiable; they are not visible or mature yet. Finally, some changes that are ob-
served today are not attributable to the percentage system, but merely coinciding related 
and unrelated occurrences with various factors behind them. 
To test the above hypothesis, we first identified what the intentions at the time of the 
mechanism introduction in the “percentage club countries” were and briefly discussed 
their relevance based on the literature. Then we compared them to the effects and phe-
nomena that are observable today. For some of them that were attributed to the mecha-
nism by the country experts, we looked for evidence in the data. We also discussed some 
selected phenomena in the civil society realm that are logically related to the intentions 
but that are most likely a result of various other factors related and/or unrelated to the 
implementation of the mechanism. 
Added Value Dimensions 
Added value of the tax designation mechanism can be clustered into two groups: 
1. Civil society-related:
a. The “rootedness” of civil society and participation of citizens in NGOs.
b. Decentralized, flexible and less bureaucratic public funding for NGOs.
c. Increased visibilty, transparency and public image of NGOs.
d. Satisfied financial needs of NGOs / Replacing the departing donors. 
e.  To help society at large to learn and practice modern solidarity („school of 
philanthropy“). 
f. Clear differentiation of public benefit entities from the rest of the NGO sector.
2. Civil society-unrelated:
g. To figure out the reform of church financing. 
h. To allow taxpayers to allocate part of their taxes – i.e. participatory budgeting.
i. Secured funding for public benefit purposes.
A.  THE “ROOTEDNESS” OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS IN 
NGOS
The idea behind this intention was to use the percentage mechanism as a tool to intensify 
the connection between the public and the civil society organizations. Was such an inten-
tion justifiable and relevant? 
Soon after the 1989-1990, the miraculous period of civil society in the post-communist 
Europe, it became clear that civil society will not play such a prominent role as was ex-
pected. The disappointment with the post-communist transformation and the political 
and institutional reforms combined with the legacies of mistrust towards organizations, 
and strong bonding social capital (family, friends) are considered the key elements that 
contributed to the documented weakness of civil society in the post-communist Europe 
(Howard 2011). That weakness is accepted in academic as well as in the policy circles, 
though some suggest that this view requires more differentiation and that the post-com-
munist civil society space is rather diverse. (Ekiert a Foa 2011). The weakness is most typi-
cally manifested in the low levels of participation and volunteering as well as membership 
in the civil society organizations (Howard 2011) as compared to countries of Western 
Europe. 
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What do the data from our research say? 
The participation in the tax designation by the taxpayers is a form of civic participation 
requiring relatively low effort. The data on the ratio of designators show that after 10 
years, the ratio of taxpayers who participate in this system vs. those who do not partici-
pate is still growing in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, while in Lithuania and Romania it 
stagnates  (Figure 11).
Given the fact, that the percentage designation does not require significant effort and 
cost from the citizens, it is not surprising that the rate of this type of participation is quite 
high. The system, once it got going, reached significant  popularity among the taxpayers. 
However, this data does not provide evidence that the system increased the rootedness 
of civil society organizations in society. For example, the reported research findings on 
motivation of tax designators show that it is a combination of pragmatic, rational, and 
emotional reasons. In Romania 41% of taxpayers use the provision because it does not 
cost them anything, 33% do not want the money to go to the state budget, and 27% feel 
attached to the mission of the beneficiary (Per Phil database using national data sources). 
Has the rootedness of civil society organizations in the society increased in the region? 
Let us address this question briefly by looking at the density of associations/non-profit 
organizations and using as an indicator the number of non-profit organizations per 1,000 
of residents. This can be calculated based on the national statistics and data from the 
registries. The higher the number, the higher the density of non-profit organizations and 
thus, the higher the intensity of associational life, and ultimately, as the argument of the 
neo-tocqueivillian school goes, the strength of civil society (Putnam 1995). There is an 
alternative view of this approach that questions the intensity of membership engagement 
and the participatory nature of associations (Elstub 2011). However, we find this indicator 
useful in a comparative understanding of the civil society development.
The period covered in the percentage designation research and the data on the num-
ber of non-profit organizations covers roughly the same period 2004-2009-2014. When 
compared with the percentage club countries, such as  the Czech Republic and Estonia, 
as well as non-percentage countries, we can see that the trend in density of non-profit 
organizations in all countries is increasing. The Estonian case is significantly exceeding the 
regional average on its level. 
Figure 11:
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From the perspective of the associational density, the rootedness of the civil society is 
slightly increasing in the whole region in a similar tempo, except for Estonia, that stands 
out from the rest of the observed CEE countries33. Looking at the same question from 
another perspective,  such as volunteering, there is either stable (Poland), slightly increas-
ing  (Slovakia, Hungary), inconclusive (Lithuania), or decreasing (Romania) trend. (OECD 
Social Indicators 2014), (Per Phil database using national data sources), (Zamfir, Mocanu 
a Maer-Matel 2014).
The above suggests that there was a slight growth in rootedness of civil society in the 
countries that we examined. However, most likely this can not be isolated as the effect of 
the percentage tax designation as other factors play a role in it as well, as the comparison 
with two non-percentage club countries suggests. 
B. DECENTRALIZED AND LESS BUREAUCRATIC PUBLIC FUNDING SOURCE FOR NGOS
This aspect seems to be more a post-hoc realization of the tax designation effect, rather 
than a policy intention at the time of the introduction.
• decentralized
The data from the percentage club countries suggest that the public/state funding 
allocations have been, at the time of introduction of the system, to some extent po-
litically biased. The system of government subsidies for public benefit purposes has 
been perceived as poorly conceived and organized. The data from our database 
(Per Phil database) suggest that the intensity of state influence in funding alloca-
tions to civil society has been changing over time. Sometimes it was stronger and 
sometimes weaker in influencing these allocations. The tax designation mechanism 
decentralized the provision of part of the government funding to civil society and 
instead of centralized bureucracy, it is the taxpayers who make the decisions. This 
has effectively blocked the possibility of the state to influence that choice. 
• unbureaucratic and flexible
The data from the percentage club countries indicate that the system is rather 
flexible from the perspective of the recipients. There are not as many conditions 
attached to the system as they are with other public subsidies. In the context 
of growing administrative requirements attached to various subsidy and grant 
schemes, the value of the funds flexibility stands out more boldly, especially for 
grass-root NGOs, for whom access to more bureaucratic and administratively 
funds is rather restricted. 
To conclude, the effect of the tax designation, has been a realization that there is a 
decentralized and de-bureaucratized source of public funding for NGOs.
• smooth, timely and predictable
The system today provides correct and timely funding to its beneficiaries. The 
timeliness of the funds‘ transfer to the beneficiaries‘ accounts varies from 2-3 
months (Slovakia) to 6-10 months (Romania). There is also an added benefit of 
predictability. The funds arrive in a predictable period every year and this is an 
important added value for financial planning and sustainability efforts of the ben-
eficiaries. Also the financial planning skills may have improved due to the predict-
ability of the tax designation. Except for Romania, the system is not reported to 
be highly erroneous and it operates rather smoothly. The costs of the operation of 
the system to the state are reported to be appropriate.
C.  INCREASED VISIBILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND IMPROVED PUBLIC IMAGE OF 
NGOS
In this area, the impact is uneven.  On one hand, due to its simple and unbreaucratic na-
ture, the mechanism has been used by grass-roots beneficiaries and not only the large 
and well established organizations. At the same time, the mechanism facilitated intensive 
33 There are schools of thought that consider the associational aspect of civil society as not the main or 
only one and draw the attention to other dimensions of civil society – the normative – civil society as a 
good society and the deliberative - civil society as public sphere (Edwards 2014).
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communication of NGOs in the public sphere. In this sense, the mechanism has helped the 
CSO sector to emerge from the shadows. 
On the other hand, the mechanism created a rather uneven appearance in the public 
space through its social marketing and fundraising communication incentives, thus lead-
ing to a dominance of major established organizations with popular causes such as  gen-
eral charity, animal welfare, or health. 
The data are  not available to prove that the mechanism contributed to a higher trans-
parency of the NGO sector, even if there are reporting requirements in several countries. 
At the same time, most countries report increased transparency of NGOs which had oc-
curred at the same time when the percentage mechanism had been implemented. On the 
other hand, the transparency has been a rather fashionable (and justified) public policy 
concern and it is not surprising that it reached the non-profit sector through other chan-
nels as well. In Hungary and Slovakia, the tax designation system was the first policy that 
pushed NGOs to make public announcements about the use of resources. This has been 
unprecedented and it was a small step with major consequences on accountability and 
attitudes towards giving in general.
There is a common view among country experts that the above changes have contributed 
in unison to general public‘s increased understanding of civil society organizations‘ role 
and improved the public image of NGOs in the percentage club countries. 
D. SATISFIED FINANCIAL NEEDS OF NGOS / REPLACING THE DEPARTING DONORS
In most of the region’s countries, the percentage mechanism was introduced in the early 
2000s, which was a period of democratic consolidation and emerging economic stability 
that led many external public and private donors to withdraw from supporting building 
the civil society and move to other areas of need. Thus the intention at that time was 
partly to satisfy the financial demands of NGOs in the context of decreased funding and 
in the context of yet under-developed domestic philanthropy. 
This was the case especially in those countries that were catching-up with political and 
economic reforms and their domestic funding sources to civil society were less developed 
(Lithuania, Romania or Slovakia) than in Poland, Hungary or Czech Republic. 
The country experts participating in this research perceive the contribution of the tax 
designation mechanism to financial viability of NGOs as relatively high. For example, the 
funds that are channeled to NGOs through the mechanism are important for the develop-
ment of the sector not so much due to their total amount, but due to their nature. The 
mechanism in 2013 contributed a small share of the total income of non-profit sector in 
the subject countries (Figure 4). At the same time, its nature of being a very flexible finan-
cial source, substantially contributed towards the sustainability of grass roots activities. 
E. „SCHOOL OF PHILANTHROPY”
In this policy rationalization, the expectation for the tax designation, was to enable tax-
payers to show solidarity (at no costs to them) and act as a „school of philanthropy“, to 
contribute towards building a philanthropic culture that was under-developed. Based on 
the data available, this has been a marginal intention and maybe a post-hoc rationaliza-
tion, rather than a bold policy goal. 
The argument for this policy rationale is obvious.  Forty years of experience in totalitarian 
welfare states during the communism destroyed the social fabric that had been built for 
centuries. The paternalistic state taught several generations that initiative is punished and 
that passive waiting for the state to deliver will be rewarded. At the same time, the indi-
vidualism emerged as a virtue of capitalism and the concern for the common-good was 
pushed back. In this context, it is a sound policy to revive and nurture the social solidarity. 
The data is not sufficient to make a link between the level of giving and the percentage 
designation. However, there is evidence, that the private philanthropy in some countries 
of the region is increasing.
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Also, there is some evidence suggesting that the percentage designation contributed to 
the rise of private individual philanthropy in Hungary (See Figure 10). It is not as clear-cut 
in other countries, although there is some anectodatal evidence of this. In all studied CEE 
countries, except for Romania, the tax designation has been accompanied by abolishing 
tax incentives for giving which is a rather discouraging measure for private giving (for de-
tails see Chapter III.). But as the Hungarian case shows, these changes do not necessarily 
discourage private individual philanthropy. 
The language used for the mechanism is noteworthy – in some countries the percentage 
system is referred to as a “percentage philanthropy”, implying the perceived philanthropic 
dimension of this action, without sufficient conditions to make that connection to phi-
lanthropy. Because of this language, it is becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy – many tax 
designators perceive themselves to be “philanthropists” who already gave their share to 
the common good. In this sense, the system has played a rather controversial role, as it 
may have caused complacency instead of call to action. 
F. PUBLIC BENEFIT DIFFERENTIATION 
Some key intentions were also quite pragmatic. In Poland, for example, the key discourse 
behind the rationalization of the tax designation mechanism was about the public-benefit 
organizations‘ regulation and ways to differentiate this new category from the rest of 
the NGOs. This is reflected in the number of the NGOs that use the mechanism, which is 
rather low when compared to the size of the country and the third sector. 
The other policy intentions that were not related to the civil society realm are only briefly 
covered below. 
G. FIGURE OUT THE REFORM OF FINANCING OF CHURCH 
The original intention of the first debates about the percentage system in the region came 
from Hungary in the context of financing of the church, based on an inspiration from the 
Italian 8/1000 system. More on the role of the tax designation in church financing can be 
found in Chapter VI. – Variations of the Mechanism - Hungary and Chapter VII. – Country 
Report - Italy.
It should be mentioned, however, that in many conceptualizations of civil society, church 
plays a distinct role. Churches per se are eligible to receive contributions within a separate 
system in Italy, Hungary and within the civil society tax designation also in Lithuania. In 
several countries, church-derived social organizations are eligible to receive contribution 
from the tax designation system (Slovakia, Hungary, Romania). 
The financing and normalization of the relationship between the state and church has 
been an important question in the CEE countries that emerged from communist rule in 
the 1990s. It is no surprise that the financing of the church was one of the triggers that 
developed the tax designation mechanism in the region. Czech Republic and Slovakia 
have also considered the tax designation mechanism as a potential mechanism for financ-
ing of the church. 
H. PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING 
The option given to taxpayers to freely decide on the use of the tax has emerged in the 
policy debate in Hungary and since then, it has been repeatedly discussed in other coun-
tries . As the Government program of Hungary in 1994 mentioned above emphasized, the 
areas that are eligible for tax designation shall not be of political, business, or advocacy 
nature (Kormányprogram (Government program of Hungary) 1994). This approach has 
been turned around in Lithuania where the tax designation has been used also for fund-
ing of political parties. 
I. SUPPORT TO PUBLIC BENEFIT PURPOSES
Support to public benefit purposes - religious, cultural, social and others – has been the 
main intention and impact of the mechanism. Whether these purposes are effectuated by 
CSOs or public sector institutions or church-based organizations, has been secondary. In 
Slovakia, for example, early version of the system focused only on the public benefit pur-
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poses (Woleková 2000). By this logic, it is more important that the public benefit purpose 
is met than who is acting on it – a private civil society organization or a public institution. 
This was an important feature of the debate in Lithuania, which has a rather broad list of 
eligible beneficiaries of the system (see Table 3). Also in Hungary and Slovakia, the em-
phasis of the mechanism and its evaluation is on public benefit purposes and it is the main 
justification criterion for the use of the funds. But as observed, this approach does not 
bring satisfactory results. There is a broad interpretation space in the definition of “public 
benefit”. The discussion about it is going on in various countries: 
In Lithuania, some NGOs and politicians have already speculated34 for several years that 
a “2% scheme” in Lithuania got distorted – since majority of the designations goes to 
public entities. Their argument is built around the belief that clients of these institutions 
are “blackmailed” – in case if they refuse to designate, they (or their dependent relatives 
– children, elderly, patients etc.) would not receive the best possible services. Contrary to 
that, others oppose that NGOs are not better than public schools, hospitals or museums, 
so it wouldn’t be fair to leave  the “2%” solely to NGOs. They support the attitude that 
anonymous electronic designation is sufficient to avoid direct pressure from interested 
“2% recipients”.
The situation gets somewhat similar when it comes to the considerations of the tax desig-
nation performed by corporate bodies in Slovakia. The original intent was to create a tool 
that would help raising funds for the then existing foundations. The reality was different. 
After 2003, there has been a rather strong push to establish a brand new type of corpo-
rate foundations in Slovakia. As a matter of fact, corporate foundations became some of 
the most relevant grant-making institutions in Slovakia, thus overtaking the position of the 
strong international donors operating there since 1990s and partly competing with the 
very few civil society based independent grant-making foundations formed in Slovakia by 
the end of 1990s and early 2000s..
34 “Dviejų procentų” vertės detektyvas, accessed August 28, 2015, http://www.donoryste.eu/lt/Dvieju_
procentu_vertes_detektyvas.html
“The main problem is the fact that the mechanism was somehow privatized (and it was meant 
to serve public benefit). Quite often, the (including few top income Public Benefit Organiza-
tions) role of the organization is limited to the role of an intermediary – and this does not mean 
appreciation of their competence as prudent re-distributor (it is not the case of United Way or 
Community Foundation) - the role of the organizations here is purely mechanical and they simply 
obtain profit from such an agency. Those resources are then transferred to individuals (often in 
health and social needs areas) or to other institutions such as schools or kindergartens. In 2014, 
when 1% payment was made to nearly 7.5 thousand organizations, over 25% of the total sum was 
collected by literally one foundation, which has been gathering funds through its so-called sub-
accounts for years, directing the funds to individual people. Ten organizations from the top of 
the list (six of them are known as "intermediary in collecting funds" for the benefit of individual 
persons or institutions that do not have the PBO status) collect approx. PLN 180 million (for the 
whole amount of PLN 500 million obtained in 2014 from the 1% PIT mechanism). This kind of dis-
proportion can be considered pathological to some extent and is a source of frequent criticism 
of the entire mechanism of 1% PIT. Many organizations are disappointed as the mechanism is not 
providing expected results. Some of them are questioning whether the whole mechanism serves 




The review of the perceived effects and intended policies suggests, that today, 10 years 
after the implementation of the mechanism in any of the percentage club countries, 
there is a modest but distinctive contribution of the mechanism towards the sustain-
ability of the public benefit organizations, especially the NGOs. 
Especially in the area of financial viability and public image, the mechanism produced 
visible benefits and added value to civil society organizations in all percentage club 
countries. At the same time, in parallel to the percentage mechanism, in all of the stud-
ied countries, positive changes occurred in the associative dimension of civil society 
or in philanthropic activities that have not been attributed as effects of the percentage 
mechanism.  One of the most important elements of the mechanism has been its flex-
ibility and predictability which contribute towards the stability of the third sector and 
channel the public funds to those recipients that would otherwise have limited access 
to other funding?  More intensive communication and increased visibility of NGOs are 
other positive effects of the mechanism. 
There have been some unintended effects that raise concern. As far as the understand-
ing of the concept goes, there has been an ongoing misunderstanding of the tax desig-
nation and confusing it with philanthropy. On the level of the actual effects, the system 
has morphed slightly in Poland where the channeling of funds through intermediary 
recipients to individuals opens up questions on the original purpose of the mechanism. 
Similarly,  the emergence of scholarships in Romania as an eligible public benefit pur-
pose is questionable as it draws the funding out from the NGO space. 
One of the rather negative side effects or (unrelated occurrences) of the percentage 
designation from the perspective of the NGO sustainability, has been the abolishment 
of fiscal incentives for giving in several countries. 
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Chapter V.
Policy making  
Marianna Török
This section aims to examine the policymaking regarding the percentage mechanism. It 
describes the original intentions and looks at the assumption that there is no systematic 
policy evaluation of the percentage mechanism that results in a stagnating system, where 
changes and adjustments are rare and the system has foreseeably reached its plateau. 
What once was an innovative policy solution has become part of the status quo that the 
social actors live with.
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Great Expectations
After the idea of the 0.8% was established in Italy, it has found following among Liberal 
and Socialist policy makers in the Hungarian government, several European countries 
(Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia) and a local government in Japan 
adopted similar regulations. The concept has been, to some extent, considered in  eight 
additional post-communist countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Macedonia, Mol-
dova, Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia) and is still being debated in some. There is a clearly iden-
tifiable network of experts, people, and media that have served as a channel of informa-
tion regarding the percentage model after its introduction in Hungary. Such networks of 
civil society development were strong in Eastern Europe in the late 1990s (e.g. European 
Foundation Centre, Orpheus Network, Environmental Partnership) and therefore sharing 
and dissemination of information in Eastern Europe was common. In the case of Japan, 
the channel has been the Sasakawa Peace Foundation that was active in the region to-
gether with the Japanese media. Meanwhile, the developments in Italy are mainly the 
extensions of the original Italian religious 8/1000 idea and only a minor influence of the 
CEE developments is noted.
The aim of policy makers have primarily been the provision of additional financial re-
sources to (broadly defined) pubic benefit entities. 
The intentions in Hungary were originally different from what the law ended up being. 
The Hungarian non-profit sector experienced a significant growth in the early 1990s, but 
indirect government support to voluntary organizations, and especially to foundations, 
had been decreasing and a series of restrictions were imposed on not-for-profit organiza-
tions, starting around 1991-1992. While the NGOs have faced financial needs, the appear-
ance of the 1% mechanism was intended to reform the system of financing churches and 
some of the state cultural entities, which were separate concerns of that time. Creating 
an additional source of support for NGOs through the tax designation was an extension 
of the original idea.35
In Lithuania, there was a financial need together with lack of awareness about not-for-
profit entities. It was believed that the state and the municipalities, as well as individuals, 
are short of resources. In addition, more than half of the population could not name a 
single NGO36. The percentage idea has fitted the need for financial resources and better 
recognition of not-for-profits. In Romania and Slovakia, the financial need was recognized 
as well. There was an expressed concern that the most important financial supporters 
of NGO work are foreign and international donors and agencies (e.g. USAID, Open So-
ciety Foundations, C.S. Mott Foundation, etc.) that were starting to depart the pre-EU 
accession Central and Eastern European countries, leaving the NGO community on a 
hiatus. Something was needed to fill the funding gap. Meanwhile in Poland, the idea to 
use the percentage mechanism was part of a broader legislative project aimed at im-
proving the conditions for organizations to continue functioning.. The Public Benefit Law, 
among other questions of regulation of access to public funds, “legalization” of voluntary 
service, and the separation of the category of public benefit organizations from all the 
non-governmental organizations, were important issues. 
Several CEE countries have been actively searching for and some of them found (espe-
cially Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland) innovative financing models of the non-profit 
sector. In Czech Republic, the privatization revenues were used to build endowments; in 
Hungary the National Civic Fund was established; and in Poland the two were combined 
to some extent and added to it a flexible financing of non-profits from the pre-accession 
and early accession/structural funds of EU (Strečanský, 2008).
The fact that preference was given to an innovative mechanism, where allocation of 
state resources can follow the intent of the citizenry by using a decentralized decision 
making process, where people make their financially weighted choice, instead of the tra-
ditional provision of direct support to public benefit entities or offering tax advantages 
to donors, shows that the policy makers have seen more in the mechanism than a pure 
channel of financial resources. While the participatory aspect may have been appealing, 
35 Similar evolution was also in the Czech Republic. First tax designation emerged in a discussion of 
funding of church in 1997 and then in 2001 a bill was proposed to use the mechanism in funding of 
charitable purposes (http://taxdesignation.org/czech-republic/).
36 Public opinion survey “Lithuanian NGOs (SIC, 2002), 12-14, accessed August 28, 2015, http://
www.3sektorius.lt/docs/NVO_2002_2013-01-17_15_21_55.doc
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it was rarely debated and explored by the decision makers. Participatory budgeting was 
a relatively new concept in those years and the term was rarely mentioned in the discus-
sions37. The enthusiasm regarding the decentralized structure of the mechanism may be a 
reflection of the common concern in the region about the political bias of central govern-
ment decision-making in financial redistribution and the non-transparent redistribution 
of budgetary resources. Experts from the CEE “Percentage Club” countries interviewed 
for this research all agreed that the public/state financing mechanisms to fund public 
benefit entities that were in place in their countries during the years of the debate and 
introduction of the percentage mechanism, were politically biased to some extent (to a 
lesser extent in Poland but a concern in Romania and Hungary even today). The decen-
tralized decision making of the mechanism as a depoliticised redistribution model has 
been important and it continues to be a major strength of the percentage system as it 
has the potential of a democratic and transparent redistribution system.
Besides the five CEE “Percentage Club” countries, this research could identify eight CEE 
countries where the percentage system was debated. In two cases, in the Czech Republic 
and in Estonia, it was seriously considered and later dropped (in the other six countries 
the debate did not become a serious discourse and  the system was not considered as 
a weighted proposal). In the Czech Republic, the advocacy for the percentage system 
started after 1997 and was dropped couple of years later. The main argument of the sec-
ond attempt to pass the bill was to enable people to show solidarity at no direct cost to 
them, i.e. focusing on the percentage system being a training ground of philanthropy (sort 
of a “School of Philanthropy”) and thus bringing additional resources to the sector. The 
concept was debated in the Parliament and the decision was not to implement it. 
In Estonia, a civil society-lead policy discourse has resulted in the decision not to recom-
mend the mechanism for implementation. The Policy Center Praxis, with the approval of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, launched an evidence-based study with the aim of pro-
viding policy recommendations for the advancement of philanthropy in Estonia38. It has 
concluded that the Estonian civil society, donors and NGOs, were too advanced for the 
percentage mechanism and it would mean taking a step back resulting in the develop-
ment of a new structure instead of promoting and improving the existing one39.
In the Estonian policy paper, one can read between the lines a criticism by the Estonian 
authors regarding the policy making process of the CEE “Percentage Club” countries of 
those years. Specifically,  the fact that they focused on generating additional financial re-
sources to public benefit in a unique way, but their good intentions  were followed by legal 
changes rather than systematic evidence-based policy analysis of the concrete effects of 
the proposed mechanism. A similar concern was raised in the Czech Republic, where, the 
bill for the percentage mechanism was denied at one point because of unjustified meas-
ures, unclear benefits and lack of clear calculations of the financial burden.40
Evaluation of the System
There is a shortage of materials on the assessment of the mechanism. It could be assumed 
that there is no systematic policy evaluation of the system by national governments which 
can be problematic as it can result in a stagnating system, where changes and adjust-
ments are rare. And without changes, the results of the system will foreseeably reach 
their plateau. 
Indeed, the assumption that systematic evaluation of the percentage mechanism is not 
part of the protocol has proven to be true in four out of the five CEE countries. While 
in most countries there is some kind of review taking place from time to time, Poland 
is the only country where a structured evaluation is part of the designed system by the 
government (as part of the overall evaluation of public benefit development). Italy has 
introduced a model where every year a decision needs to be made regarding the con-
tinuation of the system, which can be considered to be an evaluation mechanism with 
37 It was mentioned, for example in the debates in the Czech Republic – 2001 and 2003 – as participa-
tion of citizens on the allocation of the budgetary sources.
38 In detail see the original study available in Estonian: https://vana.siseministeerium.ee/public/Prot-
sent_tulumaksust_kodanikuyhendustele.pdf
39 See www.taxdesignation.org/Estonia/
40 See country report
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a consequence. Examining and sharing the experience and lessons learnt is even more 
limited across boarders.
Changes and Amendments
Looking at the changes that have taken place within the percentage systems, one can 
note that by the time Slovakia has voted on its version of the percentage law, Hungary 
has used the system for five years and passed two amendments. By 2003, when Poland 
and Romania enacted their percentage laws, Slovakia was going through its third amend-
ment of its percentage law. All together, 22 amendments to the percentage laws were 
noted in the CEE “Percentage Club” countries over 19 years41 (Table 8). The system has 
not stagnated and it continues to evolve. Changes are expected even today, after years 
and decades of operation.
While there have been several amendments, the essence of the mechanism has stayed 
the same: to support entities of public benefit from public sources based on private 
decisions. As the original Hungarian intention was worded: “The government wishes 
to let taxpayers freely decide on the use of a given part of their personal income tax. 
The recipients of this share of the personal income tax can be religious, cultural, social 
and other civic organizations, but not the political, business and professional advocacy 
groups” (Kormányprogram (Government program of Hungary) 1994). 
41 In Slovakia, the amendment to the tax designation law in 2001 was adopted before the actual imple-
mentation of the mechanism.





















   Year when law on 
percentage legislation 
was formally accepted 
   Year of operation 
of the percentage 
mechanism
   Year of operation and 
amendment of the 
"percentage law"
Table 8
Timeline of percentage 
legislation enactments 
and amendments in the 
CEE "Percentage Club" 
52
The system becomes part of the status quo
Thinking that after more than a decade of operation, the percentage system has reached 
a plateau and is stagnating, is a commonly expressed concern. This research exam-
ined whether it is indeed stagnating by looking at the portion of taxpayers using it, the 
amounts designated and the number of beneficiaries over the years, as well as the further 
replication and development of the percentage idea. This information together with the 
knowledge on changes and amendments provides the ground for reflections on the no-
tion that the system has become part of the status quo in the five CEE countries.
TENDENCIES OVER THE YEARS
The total number of designators in the five countries of the Percentage Club reached 17 
million people in a year (based on the most recent data available for these countries), 
which is more than a third of all taxpayers (38.6%42). The ratio of designators in all the 
five countries has grown, especially steadily in the early years (Figure 12). A relatively 
quick immersion can be observed until the fifth year, after which the growth has slowed 
down. In two countries, the growth of the ratio of those using the percentage system is 
declining and in one country it is stagnating. This suggests to some that a plateau has 
been reached in this area, but the example of Poland and Hungary shows that even after 
year five, growth is possible.
The area of revenues to beneficiaries has also shown a steady growth in the first years 
of the system that slowed down in a couple of years (Figure 13) (The observer needs to 
note that the growth would not look as steep if the inflation was also taken into account 
here.) The only drop we can observe is in Hungary, where after a steady growth, the 
system shows a decline that can be explained by the introduction of a flat tax system43.
42 Meanwhile in the original otto per mille system it is estimated that 39% of the taxpayers make use  
of the system (Allen 2007, 174).
43 In 2012 a dual-key personal income tax system was changed for a flat tax system resulting in less per-
centage designations.
44 Taxes in Europe Database v2, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/tedb/taxSearch.html
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It is clear that the system has more potential than what it delivers financially. In addi-
tion, one cannot say that the system as such is stagnating but signs of decline in its 
development can be noted. The key to financial success of the mechanism lies in the 
amount of salaries and the number of taxpayers using the system, as that can result in 
higher amounts going to beneficiaries. Some believe that the number of users is not going 
to be much higher than it currently is. Others argue that a stronger connection beetween 
taxpayers and beneficiaries, even better communication by potential beneficiaries, and 
some technical changes in the process of designations could help with raising the num-
bers and making the system reach its full potential.
Growth can be noted in the number of beneficiaries (another important component, that 
is often used when assessing the system). The growth is continuous in all of the CEE 
countries, except for Poland (where the potential for growth in this regard is limited due 
to the design of the system, Figure 15).
Figure 14:
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By juxtaposing the potential (marked with lines) and the real designated sums (marked with 
triangles) one can see clearly that the system is not reaching its full potential (Figure 14).
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The percentage system has shown growth in several areas and is popular among desig-
nators as millions of taxpayers are willing to make the effort to designate their percent-
ages. Thousands of entities and millions of people involved benefit from the millions of 
euros designated. The system has not reached its potential yet, and if trends continue in 
its course,  it is most likely to remain a popular mechanism. After decades of operation, 
the system has become part of the status quo with the support of  all political parties 
in all countries, the general public, and especially the NGOs. It is even viewed to be a 
mechanism that would be too difficult to stop because of its popularity. When Lithuania 
entered into periods of economic crisis and state as well as municipalities were forced to 
cut off some of their funding programs, the 2% scheme was out of reach of political “scis-
sors” (The only reduction of designated amounts was caused by separating payments to 
Patients Fund from the income tax45 and by increased unemployment as less people were 
paying income tax). 
VARIATIONS ON THE PERCENTAGE THEME
Two areas have been examined regarding the dissemination of the percentage idea: the 
use of the same model beyond the original mechanism within the CEE “Percentage Club” 
and the dissemination of the idea beyond the original five CEE countries. 
The research has noted that in three cases, the designation model has been adopted to 
support new areas: in Hungary a separate, new percentage can be designated to church-
es; in Slovakia, tax percentages can also be designated by companies not only by indi-
viduals; in Lithuania, the most recent development is that a separate new percentage 
model was introduced to benefit political parties. Interestingly, in Italy, where the model 
originates, the same mechanism is used for three different purposes: churches, NGOs and 
political parties. This suggests that the policy makers see value in the system itself and 
find it to be an appealing mechanism for redistribution of public resources for different 
purposes, for different entities and by different actors (it also has to be noted that over 
the years, participatory budgeting, that bears some of the same values of the percentage 
system, has become a used methodology, especially in Poland).
Looking at the reach of the idea beyond Italy and the CEE “Percentage Club”, some 
Post-communist countries have been identified in this research (as described earlier) 
that are considering this mechanism for adoption but most of them have not shown 
significant development by 2015. This research could identify one country, Moldova, 
where the percentage legislation was recently enacted. This has happened 12 years 
after the last two “Percentage Club” countries have introduced their percentage sys-
tems.  In Japan, Portugal and Spain, a very different variation of the model works (that 
would require a separate work of comparison). The authors believe that awareness of 
this mechanism beyond CEE is limited. It is partly due to the limited amount of informa-
tion available in English and other major languages regarding the value of the mechanism, 
partly due to the particular niche this mechanism can meet. 





The percentage mechanism offers a unique way of redistribution of state resources 
that was met with enthusiasm in the transitional phase of post-communist Central and 
Eastern Europe. It has offered a redistribution of state resources to public benefit ac-
tivities in an environment that was resource dry with bureaucratic and un-transparent, 
politically biased public funding mechanisms. It was hypothesized that there is a lack of 
systematic policy evaluation regarding the percentage designation mechanism, which 
was proven to be true in four of the five CEE countries. Still, the system does not stag-
nate: changes and adjustments are frequent; the proportion of taxpayers using the sys-
tem, the amounts designated, and the number of beneficiaries has been growing (with 
a slower speed and sometimes slight decline in some countries in recent years). The 
system that once was an innovative policy solution has become part of the in-country 
status quo that the societal actors live with and enjoy the benefits of. There was no 
country where abolishing the percentage mechanism would have been a concern46. On 
the contrary, the model is found to be used in new ways in three of the five countries 
and after twelve years a new country has enacted a percentage legislation in 2015.
46 Slovak government between 2006-2012 several times tried unsuccessfully to abolish the extension  
of the percentage tax designation to corporations.
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The “second” 1% to Church, the National Civil  
Fund and the National Cooperation Fund István Sebestény
INTRODUCTION
When the germ of the 1% idea emerged in 1991, it was as part of a parliamentary debate 
on how to finance the churches: the liberal party suggested that taxpayers should be 
authorized to transfer 1% of their personal income tax, either to churches or to voluntary 
organizations (Bossányi 1997). As such, the motion was intended to reform the system of 
church financing, not to create an additional source of support for non-profit organiza-
tions. However, the law finally adopted in 199647, identified only social organizations as 
potential beneficiaries. In 1997, the law was amended (Act No. 129/1997), which allowed 
a taxpayer to transfer another, so-called “second”, 1% of their personal income tax to a 
church (Vajda and Kuti 2000).
THE “SECOND” 1% IN HUNGARY
In the debates that preceded the passing of this law, the argument prevailed that non-
governmental organizations and churches should not be forced to “start fighting” each 
other in the competition for the 1%. It was considered vastly unfair that not only did the 
taxpayer have to decide which non-governmental organization and/or church to support, 
they also had to choose whether they considered civil or religious activity to be more im-
portant. This could have constituted a conflicting interest for religious citizens, and they 
would probably have opted for their church first; therefore, despite the best intentions, 
they could not have supported civil organizations under the 1% law. Conversely, it would 
not have been attractive for churches themselves48: given that the population in Hungary 
has rather weak religious ties to the churches, the vast majority would probably have sup-
ported a civil organization49.
There are two noteworthy differences between the “civil” and “second” 1% systems. Firstly, 
under the current law, the Hungarian government has agreed that the state will guaran-
tee 0.5%50 of the total personal income tax revenue to the churches; if less money has 
been collected, the state will complete the sum in proportion of designations. (Sebestény 
2009). Secondly, not only can the “second” 1% be designated to churches, it can also be 
assigned to a so-called “special budgetary allocation”. This is important, because when 
analyzing the religious designations, we must note that 25%–30% of both designations 
and total revenue is allocated to these funds, not to churches (Figure 16).  
47 Act CXXVI of 1996: On the Use of a Specified Amount of Personal Income Tax in Accordance with the 
Taxpayer's Instruction
48 The churches argued that the 1% system would jeopardize their autonomy and undermine their free-
dom from state scrutiny. They also mentioned the dangers of an official register of church members 
and supporters. What they did not mention was the results of an opinion poll, which showed that only 
4% of taxpayers would have nominated churches as the beneficiaries of the permitted 1% of their per-
sonal income tax (Bossányi, 1997, p. 102).
49 According to various studies and rough estimates in Hungary, about one third of the Hungarian popu-
lation are non-religious, a further third are “believers in their own way”, and the remaining third ac-
tively practice their religion. Among the practicing believers, almost one third go to church regularly.
50 This share has gradually increased, nowadays it is 0.9%.
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As we can see, more taxpayers use the civil 1% option rather than the “second” 1%. Specifi-
cally, 91% of all designators nominated civil organizations, even in 2014, while only 63% of 
them named a church or state fund.
In 2014, most designators (55%) used both options, naming a non-profit organization as 
well as a church. More than one third nominated a civil beneficiary only and eschewed 
the “second 1%”, while only 8% did the contrary. As the 1% designation does not involve 
any financial burden for the taxpayer, and the technical conditions are equal for the civil 
and “second” 1%, these figures show that citizens in Hungary prefer civil organizations to 
churches. 
The subdivision of the “second” 1% among the different churches reflects the sectar-
ian distribution of Hungarian society. The traditional churches gather one third of the 
potential 1%; surprisingly though, two relatively small churches – the Krishna conscious 
community of believers, and the Faith Church Hungary – comprise a significant share of 
the 1% market.
As trends go, the time-series implied that the willingness of taxpayers in Hungary to des-
ignate their 1% to a religious organization is continuously increasing.
Figure 17:
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What to do with “stuck” 1%: The National Civil/Co-operation 
Fund in Hungary
The “stuck percentages” have been a constant topic of discussion. In one view, the tax-
payer who did not designate their 1% did so deliberately, intending this amount to remain 
in the state budget. In contrast, others believe that 1% of the total tax revenue should be 
used somehow to benefit civil organizations, as the state had already, in a way, waived 
this amount for that purpose.
In other contexts, it had been suggested that a simplified form of state support should be 
constructed to strengthen the civil society sector – especially in terms of general operat-
ing costs. Therefore, the idea emerged of setting up a special fund using the “stuck one 
percents”, and through an application system, a wide range of civil organizations could be 
helped financially. This became known as the National Civil Fund.
However, as the law was being drafted, a conflicting interest surfaced; namely, that en-
couraging more taxpayers to designate 1% would reduce the source of revenue for this 
Civil Fund. For this reason, the law that was finally passed stipulated that the govern-
ment would assign exactly as much money to the civil fund as was received under the 1% 
scheme. This sent a message to taxpayers: “Those who give once, give twice!”
At the same time, the introduction of the law fulfilled an old idea: both in the council and 
in the boards, elected civil representatives were in the absolute majority, which could 
ensure sufficient competence, expertise, and experience against the influence of the pre-
vailing political power. After a change of government in 2010, the National Civil Fund was 
abolished, and the National Cooperation Fund, which operates in a similar way, was cre-
ated in its stead. However, in the National Cooperation Fund, two-thirds of the governing 
body members of civil organizations are appointed by the government (see Table 9). A 
short official review of the National Civil Fund can be read below; this is followed by a 
diagram comparing the two funds in terms of the most important indicators. 
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NATIONAL CIVIL FUND 
The Hungarian Parliament enacted the Law No. 50 on the National Civil Fund on  June 
23, 2003 that aimed to strengthen the operation of civil society organizations and to 
develop the third sector through grant supports.
All those private foundations and non-governmental organizations (excluding employ-
ers’ and employees’ interest groups, political parties and insurance associations) who are 
registered and operating in Hungary at least for a year can gain support from the Fund. 
The grants are distributed by the Boards composed of the representatives of civil society 
organizations. The principles of the grant-support system are laid down by the governing 
body, the Council that has a majority of delegates from civil society organizations as well.
The exceptionality of the National Civil Fund is the decision-making process; civil soci-
ety representatives – free from government influence – are responsible for decisions. 
The applicant organizations can be sure that their applications are considered by the 
delegated members who dispose the available resources.
The first call for applications appeared in May 2004, attracting great interest among 
the eligible organizations. At this stage, more than 6 billion HUF (approximately 24 
million EUR) was granted as non-refundable support for the successful applicants. 
Although this amount is not enough to support all desired programs and aims, it fa-
cilitated the operation of many and helped the implementation of various programs 
and the development of the sector.” (Source: http://www.nca.hu/?page=webtext/
show&wte_code=english Accessed: 28 June 2016).
NATIONAL COOPERATION FUND IN 2015
Finally, to introduce the present circumstances of the National Cooperation Fund, it is 
worth quoting the following news from the webpage of the Ministry of Human Capaci-
ties, which is responsible for the operation of the fund:
“NGOs receive an additional 2 billion HUF from the state budget this year”
(February 19, 2015 6:27 PM).
NGOs will receive a total 5 billion HUF (16.4 million EUR) this year from the state 
budget’s National Cooperation Fund, a two billion forints increase compared to 2014, 
Minister of State Miklós Soltész announced on Wednesday. 
Mr Soltész said that last year, about 4,000–4,500 NGOs won state support at various 
tenders and added that the 50 percent increase in subsidies will also mean that the 
number of supported NGOs will rise proportionally, which will provide a great oppor-
tunity for them. 
The increase also means that the Ministry of Human Capacities will not have to impose 
a previously expected restriction according to which NGOs which won state funding 
in the past three years may not re-apply.
Mr Soltész said that the Ministry wishes to contribute both to operational expenses 
and specific projects. Among the latter, priority will be given to community-building, 
family support and helping Hungarians in neighboring countries.
He also pointed out that in light of the increased funding, the hysteria generated by 
a few dozen NGOs in the past months and years should die down, as the rise clearly 
demonstrates that the government regards NGOs as important partners.
Tenders are available on the websites nea.hu and civil.info.hu and will be evaluated by 
five professional committees of nine persons each.”
(Ministry of Human Capacities)
(Source: http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-human-resources/news/ngos-re-
ceive-an-additional-huf-2-billion-from-the-state-budget-this-year Accessed: 28 June 
2016)
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The Case of Corporate Percentage Tax  
Designation in Slovakia Fedor Blaščák
 
THE ORIGINS
In 2002, before the parliamentary elections in June, a decision was made in Slovakia to 
open the tax designation model to corporate entities, starting in 2004. This diversion of a 
portion of corporate income tax to civil organizations made the Slovak version of the tax 
percentage system globally unique and interesting. Therefore, in this text we will describe 
the corporate designation in more detail, noting first of all that revenues from corporate 
designations are almost double those from individual taxpayers. 
The government introduced corporate tax designations in response to pressure from the 
non-profit sector to follow the example of the Czech Republic, which at the time used 
1% of its privatization revenues to fund Czech foundations. This proposal had not been 
accepted by the Slovak government, which instead had prepared a law extending tax des-
ignation to corporate taxpayers. Later in 2003, the percentage designation was increased 
to 2%, so that in 2004, both changes came into practice at the same time. 
THE EVOLUTION
Since its introduction, the system of designation by corporate bodies has undergone 
changes; not only is the model a subject of constant political concern, but it substan-
tially changes the overall environment for donors as well as relationships within the NGO 
sector. “For example, once it became available for corporate taxpayers, the number of 
foundations established by corporate entity started to grow. Between 1990 and 2001 only 
23 corporate foundations were registered in Slovakia. Since 2002 to 2007 there were 58 
new corporate foundations established. Many would bear the same name as the found-
er. In 2011, there are up to 90 corporate foundations that make 20% of all foundations.” 
(Strečanský 2012).
THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST
The allocation of designations into corporate foundations led to a severe concentration 
of funds, which became one of the main subjects of critique from each Finance Minister, 
regardless of the political affiliation of the government. More specifically, these corporate 
foundations were branded “oligarchic structures” (sic). Three major arguments against 
the scheme were raised by politicians at the time:
a) corporations had evaded tax and misused the mechanism by designating corpo-
rate income tax to recipients with a minimum track record, non-existing public 
image, and zero transparency;
b) the mechanism had been misused in that the corporate foundations had branded 
the projects they were supporting with the logo of their parent corporations, thus 
using public funds for private promotional and marketing activities;
c) in the austere environment of 2009, designating such a high portion of corporate 
tax revenue seemed fiscally unfeasible.
THE BATTLE
The first serious attempt to abolish the corporate tax designations appeared in 2006, 
when the then Finance Minister, Jan Počiatek, outlined several direct fiscal arguments, as 
well as some more refined criticism. Specifically, he labelled the corporate tax designa-
tions a deviation from the original goal of the system, which was to build relationships 
between NGOs and individual taxpayers. In doing so, he was attacking the corporate 
foundations, which had adopted the role of excess intermediaries. The attempt was not 
successful, as the NGOs effectively mobilized broader public support with their campaign 
Ľudia ľuďom (People for people). Moreover, one of the government coalition partners 
(surprisingly, the infamous movement of  Vladimir Mečiar), in a move intended to increase 
his political capital within the coalition rather than to strengthen civil society, took the 
side of the NGOs. 
The highest revenue from corporate tax designation was collected in 2009, a year that 
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also marked major changes in the tax percentage system. The government gradually re-
duced the percentage designation for corporate taxpayers, starting in 2010. Again, NGOs 
campaigned to maintain the 2%; this time however, they only managed to reach a com-
promise – a gradual reduction from 2% to 0.5% between 2011 to 2019. Besides reduc-
ing the percentage designation, the new amendment outlined incentives for businesses 
to engage with NGOs through direct financial support from their own profits; this was 
known as the matching principle. 
The system was reconstructed to benefit corporate taxpayers who contributed to NGOs 
from their own profits. As of 2011, corporate taxpayers who had made private donations 
equivalent to 0.5% or more of their tax could assign 2%; otherwise, the designation was 
only 1.5%. Therefore, the gradual decrease in the tax percentage between 2011 and 2019 
was expected to be subsidized by an increase in private donations of up to 1.5% of corpo-
rate taxes. However, this gradually decreasing model has never actually been enforced, as 
NGO leaders have successfully campaigned for its postponement every year. This process 
came to a head in April 2015, when a new agreement – the Memorandum between the 
Ministry of Finance and the non-profit sector – reinforced the corporate tax percentage 
model, settling the conditions as follows: if donations from company profits exceed 0.5% 
of corporate income tax, the company may designate 2% of their income tax; otherwise, 
the tax designation percentage falls to 1%. In this way, the philanthropic incentive for tax 
designation, rather than the financial one, is more economically relevant. Further observa-
tion of how the new model works in practice could resolve the question of whether such 
tax designation incentives help to engage corporations in private philanthropy, as “the tax 
assignation was not seen as an optimal tool for enhancing this involvement.” (Kuvíková a 
Svidroňová 2014). 
HAPPY ENDING?
Finally, it should be stressed that the percentage system (used by individuals and corpo-
rations) in Slovakia has led, in addition to financial gain, to successful public campaigns 
that have mobilized ad hoc and strategic alliances – both within the NGO sector and be-
tween the sector and other relevant stakeholders in the field. In this way, the designation 
scheme has contributed towards the financial revenues51 and advocacy capacity of the 
entire non-governmental sector.
51 The cumulative revenue of corporate percentage designations exceeded 300 million EUR throughout 
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The revenue collected from corporate tax designation constitutes about 1.6 % of total cor-
porate income tax; this exceeds the lowest percentage designation available52. The reason 
the percentage surpasses 1.5% is threefold: 
a) about 40% of corporations do not use the scheme, and therefore lower the total 
efficiency percentage; we assume that a significant portion of these companies 
contribute relatively little towards the overall tax revenues;
b) around 8% of corporations are eligible to designate 2% (those whose private do-
nations reach 0.5% of their taxes); therefore, they raise the percentage collected 
up to a final level of 1.57%. 
c) approximately 10% of corporations – those with the highest income taxes – con-
tribute about 96% of corporate tax designation revenue; we assume that a signifi-
cant portion of these designate the upper level of percentage available – 2%.
To ascertain the additional potential of non-profits to raise funds through corporate in-
come tax designations, we must consider the upper (orange) indicator in Figure 22.  Un-
like individuals, corporations have no significant additional potential (about 2.5 million 
EUR) 90% of potential revenues are already designated (by about 60% of participating 
providers). 
The greatest challenge for NGOs is to mobilize corporate taxpayers into private giving. 
An increase in this sphere would substantially raise total revenues in two ways: firstly, 
private donations would increase, and corporations could then apply to designate 2% of 
their taxes.  So far, only about 7%–8% of corporations with positive taxes have officially 
declared that their private donations match their designations. Interestingly, in 2013, the 
revenue of the NGO sector from private corporate donations more than doubled (about 
57 million EUR) the total revenue from corporate tax designations (25.7 million EUR)53, 
indicating that  corporations partake  in philanthropy without declaring it along with their 
tax designations.
After 2004, about 60 new corporate foundations54 were established, due to the intro-
duction of corporate designations. In particular, large companies – especially those in 
telecommunication, banking, or energy – allocated a huge proportion of the percent-
age designation to foundations that they themselves founded.  Specifically, 12 corporate 
foundations were listed in the TOP 20 most successful recipients in 2014. However, such a 
concentration of funds is counterbalanced by a strict requirement to spend tax designa-
tions by the end of the calendar year that follows receipt of the funds; this has steered the 
52 (Molokač and Hagara 2015) p. 3.
53 Slovstat: On-line Database of the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 2015.
54 Corporate foundation is not a legal term in Slovakia, as the Act on foundations does not define the 
concept.  We have instead borrowed the term from its use in common language, which arose because 
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foundations into professional grant-making. In fact, corporate foundations have become 
some of the most relevant grant-making institutions in Slovakia, replacing the strong in-
ternational donors that operated in the 1990s. Most tax designation funds in corporate 
foundations are being thoroughly spent through open grant-making programs. 
Conclusive Remarks
A year after the original percentage law was introduced in 2002, Slovakia adopted an 
innovative system of tax designation unlike any other in the world, where not only indi-
viduals but also corporations could divert a portion of their income tax to civil society 
organizations. This pioneering system substantially changed the relationships among 
NGOs, businesses, and the government, provided additional revenue for thousands of 
not-for-profit organizations, as well as better advocacy skills in the non-profit sector, and 
led to the proliferation of corporate foundations. 
On the other hand, since their introduction, corporate designations have become the 
subject of constant political concern. There have been accusations of tax evasion as well 
as alleged misuse of the system in the PR, marketing, and business strategies of the par-
ent companies. To the detriment of many organizations, the model underwent changes 
during the financial crisis: the percentage was reduced in 2009, and the model was simul-
taneously enriched with an incentive to enhance private giving (the matching principle). 
Nonetheless, in the decade since their introduction, corporate tax designations have gen-
erated income for NGOs exceeding 300 million EUR.
 
Table 10:
Tax designation allocations: recipients, providers, and amounts 2002–2014. 
Source: the Institute for Financial Policy at the Finance Ministry; the Financial Administration Office; the 
Ministry of Interior; the author's own calculations. 
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Number 





















Total amount  
(thousands 
EUR)
2002 4,042 341,776 n.a. 3,382 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3,382
2003 3,398 286,164 n.a. 3,222 -4.7 n.a. n.a. 3,222
2004 3,829 402,057 8,364 9,159 184.2 18,896 n.a. 28,055
2005 5,746 418,241 14,063 10,371 10.8 20,525 8.6 30,896
2006 7,100 446,973 17 740 11,713 20.9 25,629 24.9 37,342
2007 7,662 408,277 21,632 12,819 12.8 29,306 14.3 42,125
2008 7,759 449,909 26,691 15,036 16.7 34,144 16.5 49,180
2009 9,098 503,253 30,078 17,684 12.2 37,496 9.8 55,180
2010 9,585 467,983 26,172 15,553 -20 28,592 -23.7 44,145
2011 10,049 475,843 25,427 16,526 -4.9 25,444 -11.0 41,970
2012 10,711 538,814 26,621 18,548 6.5 26,146 2.8 44,694
2013 11,235 542,672 31,362 20,944 4.5 25,762 -1.5 46,706








This chapter provides country insight into national variations of the tax designation 
mechanism through reports written by research associates from Hungary, Italy, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Besides the “percentage club” countries, the chapter 
also includes a report featuring discussion among the policy-makers, politicians and ex-
perts about the tax designation mechanism and arguments for and against its adoption 
in the Czech Republic. The research project in its design originally focused on countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe that, in spite of national specificities, have a common 
political and economic heritage. Later in the project, the Italian case was included as 
well. The editors decided to include Italy into this section in order to provide a different 
reference framework and allow readers to compare the application of the mechanism 
in post-communist contexts with the case from a western country. The country reports 
follow a similar structure. First, each country report provides the context of the tax des-
ignation within the non-profit sector. This is followed by a description of the mechanism 
through its basic economic and statistical parameters and how they changed over time. 
Also, there are explanations of how the mechanism has been implemented in prac-
tice. Then each report provides an overview of key changes that the mechanism went 
through over time – at the policy or technical implementation levels. Finally, the authors 
discuss the meaning and contribution of the mechanism on the non-profit sector and 
overall.
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Country Report: The Introduction of the 1% System. 
Development of “Activating” in Hungary István Sebestény
INTRODUCTION
The population of Hungary was 9.849 million on 1 January 2015, which was 28 thousand 
fewer than one year before. In 2014, important demographic figures developed favorably 
– there were more births and marriages than in the previous year, and fewer deaths and 
divorces; the number of induced abortions decreased considerably, and the infant mortal-
ity rate sank to a record low. Moreover, the positive net international migration continued 
to decline (HCSO 2015:1).
SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE HUNGARIAN NON-PROFIT SECTOR
Three main indicators can be used to illustrate the growth of the non-profit sector, as 
well as its increasing economic and social weight: the number of organizations, the real-
terms value of revenue, and the number of employees. Since 1993, when regular statistical 
monitoring began, all these values have increased steadily, although at different rates 
from each other and with the exception of a few years. Since 2008, these trends have 
become very moderate, with the exception of the employment trend. Indeed, 2012 was 
the first year in which each of these three values was lower than in the previous year, and 
this decline continued in 2013. Although the decrease in the number of organizations was 
not significant, the real-terms value of revenues fell by 3%, and the number of employees 
decreased by 11%. Nevertheless, these reductions, observed at a sector-wide level, were 
only detectable among service-providing non-profit enterprises (a 13% drop in revenues, 












In 2013, about 64.5 thousand civil and other non-profit organizations operated in Hungary 
– seven hundred fewer than a year before. Approximately a third (22.5 thousand) of these 
organizations operated as foundations, and 42 thousand functioned as social non-profit 
organizations. Furthermore, 62% of foundations continue to be active in three areas: edu-
cation (32%), social services (16%), and culture (14%). Among the social non-profit or-
ganizations, leisure (25%) and sports (16%) associations, as well as cultural organizations 
(13%), still comprised the highest proportion of the total. The proportion of organizations 
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Regarding the finances of these organizations, 91% had full cash flow in the reference 
year; 2% had only revenues, 3% had only expenditures, and 4% of the organizations did 
not conduct any financial activities. Revenues amounted to nearly 1.242 billion HUF (4.2 
billion EUR)56, this was a 1% decline at current prices, and a 3% decrease in real terms, 
compared with 2012. The proportion of organizations with revenues of less than 500 
thousand HUF (1.7 thousand EUR) decreased from 45% to 42%.
The proportion of funding that came from state aid continued to decrease. In 2013, 35% 
of the revenues of the entire sector originated from state or local government budgets, 
which was 5% less than in the previous year. At the same time, the proportion of revenues 
that came from organizations’ own activities (both basic activity and business) increased 
from 40% to 44%. Taken together, the support index57 of the sector decreased from 60% 
to 56%. Compared with 2012, the state contribution to the sector decreased by 74 billion 
HUF (250 million EUR). More specifically, this figure represents 87 billion HUF (293 mil-
lion EUR) of funds, previously allocated to non-profit enterprises, that were withdrawn, as 
well as a 1 billion HUF (3.4 million EUR) “loss” in the foundation sector; these losses were 
offset by a 14 billion HUF (47 million EUR) surplus that emerged throughout the different 
forms of associations.
HUMAN RESOURCES
Between 2012 and 2013, the number of people who were employed in the non-profit sec-
tor decreased by 10%. In 2013, that total number exceeded 130 thousand, which amounted 
to more than 3% of those employed58 in the national economy. Among these, there were 
83.5 thousand full-time workers, and 46.9 thousand part-time or non-full-time employees. 
Therefore, the joint performance of the sector was equivalent to the work of 104 thousand 
full-time employees. Non-profit companies accounted for 64% of these equivalent full-
time employees, while the rest were employed by associations or foundations. 
In 2013, an estimated 490 thousand volunteers were active in the sector. The 51 million 
hours performed by them59 corresponded to the working time of more than 24.5 thou-
sand full-time employees; the estimated value of their work was 55 billion HUF (185 million 
EUR). Throughout the sector, employees accounted for three quarters of the necessary 
human resources, while volunteers comprised nearly one fifth.
56 Exchange rate in 2013: 1 EUR = 297 HUF.
57 The proportion of the total (public and private) support in all revenues.
58 A proportion of the number of employed persons aged 15–74. Source: Labour Force Survey.
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There is a close relationship between income and employment: they are not two inde-
pendent variables. If we take the average of the two values, which is considered to in-
dicate the weight of the sector in the national economy, it is clear that the weight has 
steadily increased. Indeed, it almost doubled and exceeded 4% during the 2010–2012 pe-
riod. However, the ratio decreased in 2013, because of changes to the provision of public 
services that had a significant impact on non-profit companies (HCSO 2014).
THE 1% PERCENT MECHANISM IN HUNGARY
Since 1997, Hungarian taxpayers have been able to designate 1% of their paid personal 
income tax to a chosen, not-for-profit organization. Beginning in 1998, they have been 
permitted to allocate an additional 1% to a church, in accordance with Act No. 26/1996 
on the Use of a Specified Portion of Personal Income Tax According to the Designation 
of the Taxpayer.
Although the 1% is connected to the tax system, it is actually a peculiar type of indirect 
state support, rather than a tax benefit. Its source is the tax revenue of the public budget, 
but its distribution is based on the taxpayers’ decisions, and not on a central (governmen-
tal) decision. 
The Act recognizes two categories of potential beneficiaries. The first comprises certain 
organizations of the civil non-profit sector, while the second encompasses churches and 
advanced (“earmarked”) budgetary purposes. As stipulated by the Act, the categories 
differ in terms of the requirements for beneficiary status.
Beneficiaries in the “civil” category can be civil society organizations established on the 
basis of Act No. 2/1989 on the Freedom of Association60, or foundations fulfilling the fol-
lowing requirements: registration by the court at least two (previously three) years prior 
to the first day of the year in which the designation statement was made, and effective 
pursuit of a public benefit activity, as defined by the Act on Public Benefit Organizations 
and set forth in the organization’s founding documents, for at least one year before the 
first day of the year in which the designation statement was made. Public foundations 
pursuing public benefit activities, non-profit enterprises (previously “public benefit com-
panies”), and certain national public collections and other cultural institutions also belong 
to this category. The category excludes political parties and interest groups for employers 
and employees. 
60 From 2012 on the basis of the Civil Act.
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With regard only to the “secular” half of the designations, the mechanism of the 1% sys-
tem is the following: individual taxpayers may make their designation statements on a 
special form provided by the Office for Taxation and Financial Control, or a copy of this 
form. The only data taxpayers must indicate on the form in every case is the tax number 
of the beneficiary organization. Taxpayers must then put the completed forms into a 
standard sized envelope, seal it, and write their name, address, and tax identification code 
on the envelope. They must place this envelope in their tax return package. In the event 
that the personal income tax is reported by the employer instead of an individual, the 
individual must submit this envelope, along with with the designation statement, to the 
employer no later than 25 March. The tax return can also be completed electronically; in 
such a case, the taxpayer need not use an envelope, the designation of the one percents 
is a part of the virtual form.
Tax authorities instruct beneficiary organizations to certify that they do not have public 
debts due, and that they comply with other prescribed requirements of the 1% Act61. If 
beneficiary organizations can meet the requirements by the given deadline, the office 
transfers the funds to the beneficiary civil organizations. Previously, beneficiaries had to 
publish a press release on the proper (targeted) use of the designated funds; since 2008 
however, they have had to send this report directly to the tax office, and they may publish 
it on their webpage if they have one. Tax authorities are entitled to check whether the 
designated funds transferred are used for public benefit activities. 
The 1% Act was criticized in different ways. For example, some participants of the non-
profit sector complained that the period between when the designation statements are 
completed and when the designation is delivered was too long—around six months in 
practice—and that it should therefore be reduced. Others have criticized the number of 
invalid designations, which do not reach the addressee for various reasons (e.g. incorrect 
tax numbers, or inability of the beneficiary to meet requirements); it has been proposed 
that such designations should not be left in the state budget, but rather should be used 
to support the sector.62 Some have even suggested that the state should renounce the 
1% regardless of whether the taxpayer designated it. To date, this problem has not been 
solved, so the undesignated one percents stay in the budget (Csóka 2000).
Another problem was the anonymity of designators. Some beneficiaries wished to be 
aware who their designators were so that they could contact them; after all, designa-
tors also constitute possible donors. Conversely, releasing this information may embarrass 
those who have not designated 1% at all, or who have not done so to certain “expected” 
or “sensitive” organizations.63 In 2013, this issue was satisfactorily resolved: designators 
must declare whether or not they consent to their identity being learnt by the respective 
organization.
Two other significant changes may have affected the output of the system. Between 2011 
and 2013 the dual-key personal income tax system gradually changed to a flat tax system 
with a lower rate. As a consequence, the amount of funds which can be designated has 
been decreasing; in addition, the rate of tax is now set to be 15% rather than 16%. Above 
all, since 2015, an “active system” has been used, rather than a “passive system”. This 
means that organizations who wish to collect the 1% must be registered in advance in a 
list at the tax office. For this reason, the number of “spoiled”, incorrect, and unnecessary 
designations is expected to decrease. 
61 E.g. They modified their founding documents to prove that they are not engaged in a prohibited po-
litical activity; they continuously pursue a public benefit activity.
62 The concept of a National Civil Fund arose from this idea in 2003.
63 E.g. Consider the expectations of school foundations toward parents, or of minority organizations.
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FACTS ABOUT THE 1% IN HUNGARY
To determine the economic and social impact the 1% system has had on the non-profit 
sector, we must sketch the main tendencies and changes that have taken place in Hun-
gary during the last decade.
The possible sum designated increased until 2008, when it reached 70 million EUR. Later, 
a negative trend appeared, probably due to the economic crisis, which brought financial 
restrictions as wages and salaries were cut back. However, in the last four years, the gov-
ernment’s tax policy has transformed the dual-key system into a flat tax, radically reduc-
ing the tax rate, so the sum of personal income tax has diminished. 
Figure 26:
Composition of 
possible sum of civil 
1%, 2005–2014
Sources: NTCA64
64 NTCA: National 
Tax and Customs 
Administration of 
Hungary
THE WEIGHT OF THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
Many data are available regarding the role of the non-profit sector in the national econo-
my, its direct and indirect participation in public services, its contribution to the gross do-
mestic product, and its employment potential. Between 1993 and 2011, the total revenue-
to-GDP ratio of non-profit organizations increased modestly—by one-third—but still did 
not reach 5%. A much more dynamic development occurred in employment: the labour 
market share of the sector increased nearly threefold. During this period, the total number 
of employees in Hungary remained virtually unchanged, so this increase in market share 
also represented a real-terms expansion of the non-profit sector. This positive trend was 
broken in 2012, and there was a further decline in 2013.
Figure 27:
Distribution of the 
possible civil 1%, 
2005–2014
Sources: NTCA
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Figure 28:
Changes in the 
distribution of the 1% 
based on the field 
of activity of the 
recipients
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The willingness to designate—with the exception of 2011—seems to be relatively stable; 
50%–60% of the total 1% allocation has been transferred to non-profit organizations. On 
average, the unsuccessfully designated amount has represented 2%–3% of the total; this 
has increased the mass of “stuck 1%”.
Although organizations performing healthcare and social services, or operating in the 
field of education, continuously receive the majority of the 1% support, the share of envi-
ronmental protection and sport is growing radically, and that of recreation is increasing 
more moderately.
As we can see in Figure 28 the distribution both of the designations, and of the desig-
nated sum, is very similar in terms of field of activity. This implies that, as far as the sup-
ported aims or missions are concerned, the priorities of taxpayers do not differ signifi-
cantly among different income levels.
However, the breakdown of the number of beneficiaries shows that NGOs contributing 
to health and social care receive by far the most support. This suggests that, in these ar-
eas rather than some greater nationwide, it is mainly foundations that attract the bulk of 
designations. In contrast, in the field of sport and culture, a wider range of organizations 
are naturally supported at a lower level on average. Unsurprisingly, the most popular and 
“competitive” issues in Hungary are ill children and animals.65 
Three quarters of designations specify foundations as beneficiaries, because the tradi-
tional function of a foundation is as a charity, which requires public donation—and the 1% 
designation is a special form of such donation, according to public opinion. As mentioned 
above, civil organizations must compete with non-profit enterprises and public institutes 
as well, but these do not represent a considerable share of the 1% funds.
Not only did the 1% system increase the number of beneficiary organizations, it also re-
placed many organizations that had previously received central budgetary resources. Sta-
tistical data also show that small, local, non-profit organizations are more successful in 
persuading citizens to support them than in raising other forms of state support. Similarly, 
the regional distribution of the 1% is somewhat more even than that of other public sup-
port. Budapest, the capital, receives 52% of all budgetary support, and “only” 43% of the 
1% income. Nearly half of the 1% income is received by non-profit organizations operating 
in towns. Even though the “share” of villages in the 1% “cake” is very low, they gain almost 
twice as much funding from 1% designations as from central budgetary support. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 1% DESIGNATIONS AND PRIVATE DONATIONS 
In the debates surrounding the birth of the 1% system (Bossányi, 1997; Mészáros and 
Sebestény, 1997; Kuti and Vajda, 1997; Vajda and Kuti, 2000), a central issue—unresolvable 
at the time—was the effect the system would have on private giving among the general 
public. Those in the pessimistic camp feared that taxpayers would feel their 1% designa-
tions were sufficient in terms of philanthropy, and that NGOs would therefore attract 
fewer private donations. In contrast, more optimistic commentators predicted that tax-
payers who had already been persuaded to exercise the new form of costless ‘percentage 
philanthropy’ would also gradually be persuaded to give money from their own pockets 
to support NGOs (Kuti, 2007).
Data collected by HCSO for the period 1997–2013 seem to corroborate the position of 
the optimists. Since the introduction of the 1% system, the number of NGOs that have 
received private donations has continually increased, albeit not very rapidly.
65 The 10 organizations that receive the most resources from percentage allocation in 2014 are as fol-
lows: the Foundation for the Development of Pál Heim Children’s Hospital, the National Ambulance 
Service Foundation, the Bátor Tábor (Brave Camp) Foundation, the Szent Márton Pediatric Emergen-
cy Medical Service Foundation, the Together for Children with Leukemia Foundation, the Children’s 
Cancer Foundation, the Noah's Ark Animal Shelter Foundation, the Together for Children with Cancer 
Foundation, the Rex Dog Shelter Foundation, the Saint Francis of Deva Foundation.
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Figure 32 also shows that a large (and ever-increasing) number of NGOs were able to at-
tract private donations from members of the public as well as 1% designations. During the 
same period, there was a considerable rise in the number of organisations that received 
1% designations, but not private donations.
Figure 32:
Number of NGOs 
that received 1% 
designations and/




Breakdown of NGOs 
based on receipt of 
1% designations and/
or private donations 
in 2013
Source: HCSO
According to the most recent data available from HCSO, only 23% of NGOs received 1% 
designations only, and only 18% benefited from both 1% designations and private dona-
tions. Almost half of all NGOs received neither 1% designations nor private donations. 
In terms of the number of benficiaries, the 1% system has clearly not overshadowed pri-
vate donations, nor reduced their importance. The same is true in terms of the amounts 
received from the two forms of funding66. 
Notwithstanding the rapid growth in 1% designations, private donations continue to be of 
greater importance in the financing of the NGO sector. 
66 The break in the positive tendency in 2008 was due to both the economic crisis and changes in the 
tax system, as described earlier.
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On a related note, a new kind of NGO seems to be focusing entirely on obtaining 1% des-
ignations rather than on the labour-intensive process of attracting donations. It seems 
particularly inexplicable that such an organisational attitude seems to be spreading when 
research carried out on private donations shows a very clear, positive, and close link be-
tween taxpayers exercising the 1% designation and their willingness to make individual 
donations (Kuti 2007). 
Figure 34:
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Country report: Italy  Marco Marucci
BACKGROUND
In Italy, there are  three similar percentage systems in operation within the income decla-
ration (IRE form, known in Italy as IRPEF): the 8 per thousand i.e. 8/1000 to the State and 
some religious entities; the 5 per thousand i.e. 5/1000 to non-profit organisations; and the 
newly 2 per thousand, i.e. 2/1000 to political parties.
We can’t talk about the 5 per thousand for non-profit sectors without a brief preface 
on the first percentage system, originally completely dedicated to support the Catholic 
Church: the 8 per thousand. The mechanism started with a law in 1985 (L. 222/1985), in 
order to regulate the financial relationships between the State and the Catholic Church 
after the reform of the treaty (the “Concordato”) in 1984. In fact, since Lateran Pacts of 
1929, the Catholic Church has always received a special income guaranteed from the Ital-
ian State. In 1985, this income was substituted by a new form of compulsory deduction 
from citizens’ income declaration: although the citizen didn’t allocate the 8/1000 to a 
specific beneficiary, this sum was withdrawn from the tax amount. This is one of the most 
important differences from most of the other successive percentage systems that are 
based on voluntary participation and voluntary choices.
During the years, the list of beneficiaries of 8/1000 has grown beyond the Catholic church 
and now it includes several other denominations67, and, by this year, also Soka Gakkai 
International, a Buddhist organization, to a total of 13 potential recipients, including the 
State. As we talk about a “compulsory donation”, let’s shortly explain how the allocation 
is divided by the total amount of those who have not indicated in the income declaration 
which entity they want to support: this sum is split to beneficiaries in the same percent-
age of the taxpayers who indicate a choice. 
For instance, last data (based on income declaration of 2011) indicated that around 37% of 
taxpayers choices was to the Catholic Church, 6% to the State and 2% to other religious or-
ganizations. Now the 54% of taxpayers who did not choose any 8/1000 (corresponding to 
690,480,720 EUR) was allocated with 37% to the Catholic Church. At the end, the Catholic 
Church gathered 1,054,310,702 EUR (82% of total 8/1000) instead of 473,107,160 EUR (37% 
of the choices). This kind of allocation was obstructed in the last years by the Italian Court 
of Auditors (Corte dei Conti) pressing to adopt another system, such as the Spanish one. 
In other words, a taxpayer who doesn’t choose to select the destination in the 8/1000 
form in the income declaration is advised that that payment will still be done and allo-
cated proportionally to the percentage of the choices made by other taxpayers68. That 
way, also those who didn’t allocate the 8/1000 of their own income taxes, are at the end 
obliged to pay it.
Last data reporting69 the distribution of 8/1000 resources are listed below (Table 11). The 
total amount of resources collected was 1,245,253,247 EUR. The percentage of taxpayers 
who indicated a choice was 46%.
The non-profit sectors claimed the same funding mechanism and the claims were adopt-
ed by the Law n.266/2005 (Italian Stability Act for  2006). It originated the second per-
centage system in Italy: the  5/1000 (“Cinque per mille”) to the non-profit sector. One of 
the main differences has been described before and regards the optionality of the dona-
tion. The second important difference is that, as for the normative disposition by which 
this system was created, the 5/1000 didn’t have a structural and persistent form: each 
year the Italian Stability Act had to confirm the same disposition until 201570, when it was 
67 Beyond the Italian State and the Catholic Church, the list include (2016): Union of Methodist and Wal-
densian Churches; Seventh-day Adventist Church; Assemblies of God in Italy; Union of Italian Jewish 
Communities; Lutheran Evangelical Church in Italy[; Baptist Evangelical Christian Union of Italy; Greek 
Orthodox Archdiocese of Italy; Apostolic Church in Italy; Italian Buddhist Union;  Italian Hindu Union.
68 Only the Assemblies of God in Italy and Apostolic Italian Church officially renounced to perceive the 
quote of 8/1000 not clearly expressed.
69 http://www1.finanze.gov.it/finanze2/pagina_dichiarazioni/dichiarazioni.php
70 Art. 1, comma 154, Law 190/2014 (“Stability Law 2015”).
77
finally endorsed by the Italian tax legislation. Linked to its temporary provision, a maxi-
mum limit to the total resources available for each year was set up. During the last years 
(2010-2014), the cap was established to 400,000 EUR every year: it means that if the to-
tal amount of allocations has exceeded this amount, no further resources were allocated. 
Since 2015, the cap was fixed to 500,000 EUR per year, according to the trend of re-
sources given by taxpayers during the past, then by now the resources are available each 
year without other provisions: an experimentation lasted ten years seems to be finished. 
The 5/1000 mechanism will be explained in detail in the next paragraph and meanwhile, 
we can make a point to the last (and least) percentage mechanism of the Italian fiscal 
system: the 2/1000 created to support political parties, recently introduced in the fiscal 
legislation. Started in 2014 and referred to 2013 incomes, it allows taxpayers to divert 
2/1000 of their income to a political party with a regular charter. To cover this kind of 
designation, the government provided a budget of 7.75 million in 2014; 9.6 million in 2015; 
27.7 million in 2016 to reach 45.1 million in 2017, with a specific fund. The public support 
to parties that this kind of mechanism aimed to substitute will remain in effect until 2017, 
when the 2/1000 system will replace the original funding mechanism to parties. The ben-
eficiary parties must be eligible by entering in a list accessible only if at least one of the 
politicians of each party has been elected in the Parliamentary Chamber, the Senate or 
the European Parliament. For the Political Groups, the number of elected members to be 
admitted is 20 deputies in the Chamber and 10 in the Senate.
Table 11: 
Resources of 8/1000 
based on income 
declaration of 2011 
(resources distrib-
uted in 2015) Source: 
MEF- Dipartimento 
delle Finanze (2015 
data release)
Figure 35:
Form used since 
2014 for 2/1000 
to political parties 
(facsimile)
* In 2011 the list of 
beneficiaries was 
composed by seven 
bodies
Beneficiaries* N° choices % of choices % on total of taxpayers
Amount 
allocated % of amount
State 2,904,884 7.03 15.35 195,612,564 15.71
Catholic Church 15,185,809 36.75 80.22 1,013,054,493 79.94
Advent Christian Church 35,119 0.08 0.19 2,399,406 0.19
The Assemblies of God in 
Italy
48,900 0.12 0.26 1,517,586 0.12
Waldensian Evangelical 
Church
604,345 1.46 3.19 40,284,765 3.24
Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in Italy
63,378 0.15 0.33 4,167,389 0.33
Union of Italian Jewish 
Communities
87,510 0.21 0.46 5,809,088 0.47
Total 18,929,945 46 100 1,245,253,247 100
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Last data on taxpayers’ choices for this percentage system were released in January 2016, 
referring to declaration of 2015: only 2.7% of total taxpayers diverted their percentage 
of income tax to political parties (1.1 million of about 40 million). In 2015, the first year of 
2/1000 application, the percentage of users was of 0,04%. The reason for this low partici-
pation is in line with the results of the 1993 popular referendum where more than 90% of 
effective votes claimed the end of the public support of political parties. The last alloca-
tion of resources with 2x1000 assigned more than 5 million EUR by 1 million people (out 
of 41 million) to the Democratic Party (596,290 choices) and as second beneficiary, the 
Lega Nord, with about 1 million EUR (138,941 choices).
By 2016, with the Decree of 21th March 201671, adopting a disposition of the 2016 National 
Stability Law, in Italy there is another 2/1000 system, focused on associations active in 
the cultural heritage promotion. This choice allows each taxpayer to allocate two euro? 
per thousand of their income tax in favour of a cultural association registered on a list 
established by Ministry of Cultural Heritage. The association must be in operation for at 
least five years and as of the date of this report? (the first year of implementation of this 
system), the number of associations listed in the provisional list is around 1,30072. The 
number is not high considering how many cultural associations are active in Italy, but also 
not as low considering this is the first year of this experiment and the system was not well 
promoted by authorities. 
71 DPCM 21 marzo 2016, “Disciplina dei criteri per la destinazione del due per mille dell’imposta sul red-
dito delle persone fisiche, a favore di associazioni culturali, ai sensi dell’articolo 1, comma 985, della 
legge 28 dicembre 2015, n. 208 ,˝ published in Gazzetta Ufficiale (Serie Generale) n.95 of 23-4-2016.




sources of IRPEF' 
2/1000 in 2015 
(based on incomes 
of 2014) Source: 
MEF-Dipartimento 
delle Finanze (2016 
data release) 
Political Parties Effective choices 
% choices on 
total taxpayers




Partito Democratico 596,29 1.46 53.9 5,358,250
Lega Nord per l'indipendenza 
della Padania
138,941 0.34 12.56 1,109,082
Sinistra Ecologia Libertà 100,991 0.25 9.13 881,588
Movimento Politico Forza 
Italia
60,778 0.15 5.49 529,904
Fratelli d'Italia Alleanza 
Nazionale
56,362 0.14 5.09 472,384
Partito della Rifondazione 
Comunista - Sinistra Europea
46,564 0.11 4.21 342,732
Centro Democratico 19,958 0.05 1.8 137,873
Partito Socialista Italiano 18,257 0.04 1.65 114,938
Nuovo Centro Destra 16,764 0.04 1.52 168,629
SVP - Sudtiroler Volkspartei 12,196 0.03 1.1 149,659
Scelta Civica 9,229 0.02 0.83 90,863
Movimento Stella Alpina 5,263 0.01 0.48 35,52
Unione per il Trentino 4,962 0.01 0.45 39,379
Movimento Associativo Italiani 
all'Estero - MAIE
4,429 0.01 0.4 32,38
Union Valdotaine 4,083 0.01 0.37 35,995
PATT - Partito Autonomista 
Trentino Tirolese
3,014 0.01 0.27 24,68
Die Freiheitlichen 2,949 0.01 0.27 21,843
Popolari per l'Italia 2,65 0.01 0.24 22,041
Partito liberale Italiano 2,608 0.01 0.24 32,259
TOTAL 1,106,288 2.72 100 9,600,000
Total taxpayers 40,716,548
79
We could rightfully call this one the “fourth” (and last?) Italian percentage system, but 
I shall observe the evolution of this “new born creature” to see if it is stable or it will be 
unifying force to the other 2/1000 or 5/1000 measures. In fact, the extent and variability 
of the meaning of “cultural activity” and the variability of various kinds of associations 
allowed to become beneficiaries of the designation, could be one of the critiques to the 
introduction of this measure  at present (2016).
THE 5/1000 “CINQUE PER MILLE” MECHANISM
Before deeply analysing the specific five thousandth (5/1000) mechanism and its evolu-
tion during the past years, lets go over a brief explanation of the Italian non-profit sector. 
Outside the main religious organizations implied with the 8x1000 system, Italian regula-
tion has many kinds of not-for-profit organizations which that fiscal legislation identi-
fied as “ONLUS” (Organizzazioni Non Lucrative di Utilità Sociale, by Legislative Decree 
n. 460/1997), including: 1) all the Volunteering Organizations (Law n.266/1990); 2) all the 
NGOs (recognised by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Law n.49/1987); 3) all the Social Coop-
eratives and the Consortium of all Social Cooperatives (Law n.381/1991); 4) some kind of 
Social Promotion Organizations (Law n.328/2000); 5) some kind of Ecclesiastic Catholic 
Bodies; 6) other private organizations (Foundations, Associations, Non-social Coopera-
tives, etc.)73. Ten years ago, another body was introduced in our system: the Social En-
terprise (Legislative Decree n.155/2006). Some Onlus became Social Enterprise and they 
preserved their status, other Social Enterprises newly founded cannot be Onlus as they 
are managed as properly statement “commercial activities” (nevertheless they pursue 
non lucrative goals). Last census of Non Profit organizations was published in 2013 on 
data referred to 2011. The number of Non Profit organizations (Volunteering; Social Pro-
motion Organizations; Foundations; Social Cooperatives and others) were 301,191. The 
previous census on 2001 data counted 235,232 organizations.
The 5/1000 system in Italy is an important financial source for many non-profit organiza-
tions (NPOs). It’s also a way for citizens to outline their philanthropy to an organization 
in which they are particularly involved or that they want simply to support. This measure 
was created on the basis of the 8/1000, the “big brother” in charge since 1985 for the Re-
ligious Institutions and it was claimed by the wide non-profit sector deeply-rooted in Italy. 
The rise and establishment of other percentage systems among EU countries (Hungary in 
1996; Lithuania in 2002; Poland in 2003 etc.) surely helped during the following phases of 
“stabilization” and endorsement of the measure. 
In Italy, it began in 2005, with the Law n.166/2005, and it was renewed each year with the 
same formula until 2014, when the “2015 National Stability Law74” endorsed the 5/1000 
permanently to Italian Tax legislation. Until 2014, each year, the Stability Law had to con-
firm the dispositive in the income declaration (IRPEF). The Third Sector had to mobilize 
during these years to end it  being an “experimental” provision and to finally be recog-
nized  by the Italian fiscal system. The annual disposition made by Stability Law also 
designated the beneficiaries (mainly non-profit organizations, Scientific Research Centres 
and Universities; Sanitary Research Centres; Municipality) allowed to benefit and the total 
amount of resources that could be distributed each year. The principal challenges of the 
5/1000 when it was still in this experimental provision. were the limited resources avail-
able75 (usually 400 million EUR each year) and the slowness of their allocation (usually 
with a two year delay). 
73 They might obtain the qualification of ONLUS by pursuing by statute the goals listed in Art.10, co.1 of 
the Law n.460/1997: 
74 Art.1, Co.154, Law 23 December 2014, n.190 “Disposizioni per la formazione del bilancio annuale e plu-
riennale dello Stato (Legge di Stabilità 2015)”.
75 To set a limit to the amount that can be allocated is different from the Central and Eastern European 
experience.
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Since 2010, the Onlus and other eligible beneficiaries to access 5/1000 are the same as 
the ones identified by Decree of the President of the Council of Ministries 23 April 2010: 
a. Volunteering Associations and Onlus, Social Promotion Associations accepted in 
national or regional  registry; other associations and foundations operating for 
social utility purposes mentioned by Art.10, co.1, letter a) of the Legislative Decree 
n.460/1997;
b. Universities and Scientific Research Centres; 
c. Sanitary Research Centres; 
d. Social oriented projects of the Municipality of one’s own residence; 
e. Amateur sport associations registered to CONI, pursuing social interest activities; 
Furthermore, since 2012, private organizations working on preservation, promotion and 
support of cultural and environmental heritage (identified each year by Ministry of Cul-
tural Heritage76) can also receive this allocation.
The mechanism and its procedure seems to be a little bit bureaucratic, but in Italy it is 
not unusual to have lots of controlling procedures to verify the access and utilization of 
public money, even if this kind of provision is not a public expenditure tout court77, but a 
disposition of private citizens mediated by public treasury. The procedure can be sum-
marised by few steps:
1. Each year the Onlus or eligible body sends their candidature to the Income Rev-
enue Authority (Italian “Agenzia delle Entrate”), usually between March-April. 
(There is a website that offers a form and a software to be used for it.) At the end 
of administrative checks, a provisional list is published. There is a lapse of time 
(one week) in which organizations may correct information from that list. A final 
list of entities that can be beneficiaries of the system in the given year is published 
by the Authority.
2. Listed beneficiaries have to send an Official Declaration (“Dichiarazione Sostitutiva 
Unica” – DSU) that is a self-certification of the possession of the requirements and 
send it to the Authority, usually the deadline is at the end of June.
3.  Meanwhile, the taxpayers can use the module from the Personal Income Declara-
tion form (Figure 36) to make their choice: 
a.  Not to allocate the 5/1000 of their income (in that case the money rests as 
compulsory public taxation);
b.  To allocate the 5/1000 without specifying a beneficiary (taxpayers put a sign 
in one of the six macro sectors without writing the Fiscal Code of the benefi-
ciary organization (Figure 36);
c.  To allocate the 5/1000 signing the table of the macro sector (Onlus; Universi-
ties and Scientific Research Centres; Sanitary Research Centres; Cultural and 
environmental heritage promotion; Social activities of the Municipality; Ama-
teur Sportive Associations) and writing the required Fiscal Code of the final 
beneficiary.
4. The Onlus and other eligible bodies can still ask to be listed if they met the re-
quirements by the original deadline (end of April) until the end of September, by 
compiling the form and furnishing all the documentation required plus the penalty 
payment (around 260 EUR)
5. The Authority transmits the Ministry of Economy and Finance all the data to 
provide the payments to the beneficiaries (the payments under 12 EUR are not 
 allocated). The payments to NPOs are directly deposited by the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Policies.
6. The beneficiary has to report the projects financed with these resources of 5/1000 
76 The 2016 call to be accepted as beneficiary was published on 19th May 2016: http://www.beniculturali.it/
mibac/multimedia/MiBAC/documents/1463728000135_AVVISO_PUBBLICO__19_maggio_2016.pdf
77 A also ratified the pronouncement of the Constitutional Court of 18 June 2007, n.202
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within a year from their accreditation, using the form78 and the Guidelines79 pub-
lished on the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies website. The reports are 
gathered by the same Ministry, by traditional mail or certified email (PEC – posta 
elettronica certificata).
The resources (with a maximum cap of 500 million EUR per year since 2015) are distrib-
uted as the percentage of single taxpayer’s choice and the resources of each one of the 
six sectors (the “b” case in the step 3: allocating 5/1000 without specifying a beneficiary) 
are distributed with the same percentage. For instance, in the last allocation of resources 
referred to in 2014 income declarations, the biggest amount was gathered by Emergency 
(an NGO working on international cooperation projects), that received the 3,8% of desig-
nations (choices) corresponding to 13,176,397 EUR. This association will at the end receive 
also the same percentage (3.8%) of the choices to the generic “Onlus sector” (that ones 
without specific single beneficiaries), corresponding to  719,605 EUR. So at the end Emer-
gency will receive 13,896,002 EUR (13,176,397+719,605).
The stabilization of the measure resolved several problems in addition to the the pay-
ment delays, as the maximum cap settled each year was sometimes underestimated and 
resources allocated by taxpayers were not distributed. The fund of 500 million EUR per 
year was provided by Art. 1, paragraph 154, Law 190/2014 - the Italian Budgetary Stability 
Act for 2015. Furthermore, the resources not allocated for one year are to be added to 
the next year’s budget. 
THE 5/1000’ LAST AVAILABLE DATA 
At the end of 2016, 484 million EUR will be distributed to NPOs, Research Centres, Mu-
nicipalities and Sportive Associations, related to the choices of 2014’s Income declara-
tion, according to the list of 45,332 registered organizations just published by Revenue 
Authority. Out of this, the total of the NPOs sector is 332,8 million EUR corresponding to 
11,264,426 choices (68% of total), the main sector financed. The biggest share is for the 
AIRC (an Association for Cancer Cure Research) that gathers about 66.1 million EUR, the 
13% of the total amount. The revenue represents half of AIRC total budget. The other “big” 
for the section NPOs are Emergency (13.9 million EUR), Doctors Without Borders (9.7 mil-
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Further, 1,243 NPOs received no preferences and 3,382 (8% of total requests) are the 
NPOs ruled out (Table 13) by Revenue Authority (to know the motivation they can ask 
to the same Authority). The NPOs admitted (37,904) are the 70% of total eligible bodies 
and they received the 83% of total choices, gathering the same percentage of resources 
corresponding to 332,877,367 EUR. If we compare the NPOs admitted to the last census 
of 2013, we state that they are 12.5%. The following data shows the allocation of resources 
(without the information on the choices of private organization supported by Ministry of 
Environmental and Cultural Heritage). 
We cannot argue exactly how much the 5/1000’ resources weight in the total revenue 
of non-profit sector because there is no specific survey available right now. We can only 
estimate it with the few data we can access. The last census of ISTAT, the Italian National 
Statistical Agency, was made in 2011 (related to the information at 31. 12. 2010). The total 
revenue of the non-profit sector (that is quite different From the eligible/admitted NPOs 
sector related to 5x1000 system) results in 63,939,884,443 EUR (about 64 billion). If we 
refer to the same year, the revenue of 5x1000 for NPOs is 259,358,274 EUR, the 2.46% 
with all the approximation mentioned.
According to ISTAT census, 86.1% of non-profit institutions receive funding from private 
sector (5/1000 included) and 13.9% from public sector80 (revenues from contracts or 
conventions with national or international public bodies). 
If we consider the total budget of NPOs, the distribution of all the revenues shows that 
private funding represents 65% while public funding reaches 35%. In particular, as shown 
in Table 4, the highest incidence out of the total of the revenues results from contracts or 
conventions with national or international public institutions (29%), from members’ yearly 
contributions (26%), from the selling of goods and services (19%). Contributions, gifts, 
donations and bequests account for 7%, the same share is reported by revenues from 
financial assets and real estate. A modest share is recorded from grants revenues and 
from contributions by national or international public institutions (5%).
80 The institutions active mainly in Health, Social services and emergency prevention and in Develop-
ment and housing sectors are mainly financed by public sector (respectively with a share of 36.1%. 
32.8% and 29.9%). The revenues from private funding are higher in the institutions operating in the 
sector of Religion (95.5%), of Business and professional associations, unions (95.3%), of International 
co-operation, of Culture, sports and recreation (both 90.1 %), of Law, advocacy and politics, of Philan-
thropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion (respectively 88.7% and 86.7%).
Table 13: 
Allocation of 
resources of 5/1000 
IRPEF (2014 income 
declaration) Source: 
Our elaboration 
on Agenzia delle 
Entrate (2016 data 
release)
* Total Income Dec-
larations presented 














No Admitted 37,904 430 104 8,125 6,894 53,457
No of ruled out 3,382 26 0 0 1,298 4,706
Ruled out’ Resources 
(not allocated in EUR)
9,114,269 1,249,158 0 0 1,169,645 11,533,072
N°effective choices 10,531,308 1,563,959 1,233,930 563,797 302,924 14,195,918
N°sector’ choices 733,118 689,133 959,481 0 62,358 2,444,090
% choices on total 
taxpayers*
28% 6% 5% 1% 1% 41%
% choices on total 
choices
83% 17% 16% 4% 3% 100%
Resources allocated by 
effective choices (EUR)
313,845,088 48,053,715 36,574,468 14,934,825 9,405,747 422,813,843
Resources allocated by 
sector (EUR)
19,032,279 17,774,546 23,587,359 0 1,802,974 62,197,158
Total Resources 332,877,367 65,828,261 60,161,827 14,934,825 11,208,721 485,011,001
% on total Resources 83% 17% 15% 4% 3% 100%
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We cannot say what the exact percentage of 5/1000 mechanism of total revenues is, as 
it is all lumped in under the general “Contributions gifts, donations and bequests”. The 
percentage for the philanthropic intermediaries and volunteering associations account 
for 6,7% of the total revenues. This number is not far from the results of another study: 
an experimental survey conducted each year by the private organization “Istituto Italiano 
della Donazione - IID”, on a sample of 200 NPOs81. The data reveals that 46% of the NPOs 
receive less than 5% of their budget from 5/1000 mechanism (Figure 37). Furthermore, 
74% of NPOs gain less than 15% of their budget from 5/1000.
In 2011, ISFOL (Istituto per lo sviluppo della formazione professionale dei lavoratori) con-
tributed to understanding of the percentage philanthropic mechanism of 5/1000 in Italy, 
by publishing a report focused on the motivations of taxpayers and utilization of revenues 
by NPOs (and reporting system). Almost all (88.2%) of the respondents (601 taxpayers), 
signed 5/1000; with 94.3% of them claiming to have indicated a specific NPO. Research 
reveals two very homogeneous clusters of donators: the first consists of "urban low in-
come retirees " and the second consists of "middle class commuter workers". The taxpay-
ers who decide to donate, are characterized, therefore, as a social "ordinary status" fami-
lies with sons, middle class, educated, but not from the high-society or pensioners living 
in the city, a context where it is more complex to meet their social needs.
The media by which respondents became aware of 5/1000 are mainly direct links 
(35.3%); direct knowledge of the association (26.5%), and friends’ advising (8.8%). A small 
percentage of Citizens know 5/1000 through the mass media (TV, radio, newspapers and 
advertising). Finally, 7 out of 10 respondents believe that the third sector associations do 
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Education and 
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No Admitted 37,904 430 104 8,125 6,894 53,457
No of ruled out 3,382 26 0 0 1,298 4,706
Ruled out’ Resources 
(not allocated in EUR)
9,114,269 1,249,158 0 0 1,169,645 11,533,072
N°effective choices 10,531,308 1,563,959 1,233,930 563,797 302,924 14,195,918
N°sector’ choices 733,118 689,133 959,481 0 62,358 2,444,090
% choices on total 
taxpayers*
28% 6% 5% 1% 1% 41%
% choices on total 
choices
83% 17% 16% 4% 3% 100%
Resources allocated by 
effective choices (EUR)
313,845,088 48,053,715 36,574,468 14,934,825 9,405,747 422,813,843
Resources allocated by 
sector (EUR)
19,032,279 17,774,546 23,587,359 0 1,802,974 62,197,158
Total Resources 332,877,367 65,828,261 60,161,827 14,934,825 11,208,721 485,011,001
% on total Resources 83% 17% 15% 4% 3% 100%
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CONCLUSION
In this paper we tried to explain the many Italian percentage legislation systems that 
were created to achieve several goals, although they have similar functions. The first 8 
per thousand to Ecclesiastic entities, was characteristic for being the only compulsory 
emolument, different from the Spanish system also because the “non –choices” aren’t 
automatically assigned to the State balance, but are proportionally distributed among 
all the beneficiaries. The second 5 per thousand to the non-profit sector was the more 
debated (and contested) as it was created as an experimental dispositive but the 
experimentation ended ten years later. The recent twin 2 per thousandth were created, 
apparently under a strategy of substituting of direct public resources, but they lead the 
way in which the percentage system could be a very powerful and eclectic tool under 
the umbrella of “taxation and self determination” principle. Furthermore, it is a tool aimed 
to replace the persistent cuts in public investment to social, cultural and environmental 
projects.
In the following Table 15 we summarise the specification of each per thousandth model. 
Figure 37:
Contribution of 
5/1000  to the total 
revenues of NPOs 
Source: IID 2015 data 
releaseSource: IID 
(2015 data release)
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By this year, many NPOs were listed both in 5/1000 and 2/1000 beneficiaries. Even if the 
last percentage system of 2/1000 to cultural associations is still not well known (only 1300 
associations were listed this year), it’s possible for a non-profit organization working on 
cultural promotion, to receive both the emoluments by the same taxpayer. It means that 
for some organizations, the achievable percentage is now a 7 per thousandth of the citi-
zens tax on income. This is a percentage that is more similar to other European Countries, 
where an amount of 1% is allowed.
In Italy, since 2005 (the 5/1000 was introduced in 2006) there also has been a special 
deduction for donations to NPOs. The law is called “More You Give, Less You Pay”(Più 
dai, Meno versi). It works for physical persons and companies up to 10% of total taxable 
income for a maximum of 70,000 EUR per year. According to the data of the Ministry 
of Finance, 681,672 of Italians used this benefit in 2011 for a total of 225,239,319 EUR of 
donations to NPOs. 
There are many ways to support non-profit organizations, especially when considering 
the new perspectives of fundraising strategies coming from utilization of new technolo-
gies (crowdfunding platform and utilization of social media). However, a simpler way to 
help them is by signing a form in the annual income declaration. That is a very powerful 
way. Italian government seems to understand this and replication of this mechanism for 
supporting other activities as well is the right way to enhance the citizens’ active partici-
pation at this point, although some correction to the old systems like 8 per thousand, is 
still necessary. 
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Country report: Lithuania Vaidotas Ilgius 
ABOUT LITHUANIA
The Republic of Lithuania is situated in Northern Europe along the southeastern shore of 
the Baltic Sea. As such, it is one of the three Baltic states. Lithuania regained its independ-
ence after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1990, and the country joined the European 
Union in 2004. It currently has an estimated population of 3 million, with 1 million private 
income tax payers. Lithuania has 60 municipalities, the largest of which is the capital city 
Vilnius (with a population of 0.6 million).
LITHUANIAN NGO SECTOR
No precise numbers are available regarding NGOs currently operating in Lithuania, be-
cause there is no single Lithuanian NGO register. Even though a Law on the Development 
of Lithuanian NGOs was passed in December 2013, it is not quite clear which of the doz-
ens of non-profit legal entities fully matches the definition of an NGO. Experts say82 that 
Lithuania was home to 25 thousand CSOs (civil society organizations) in 2013; however, 
at least a quarter of them may be inactive, as complicated procedures are required to 
deregister a non-functioning organization. 
After Lithuania regained independence, the number of NGOs in the country started to 
mushroom rapidly, particularly in the period of 1992–1995, when the main laws regulating 
NGOs and charitable donations were passed. In particular, organizations that had existed 
before the Second World War, but which were banned during the soviet occupation pe-
riod, were restored. In addition, new civic movements were established, particularly in 
areas where public services were absent or poorly developed: environmental protection, 
youth, human rights, religion, independent arts, etc. In parallel, many soviet era societies 
continued; these included various professional organizations, gardeners’, fishermen’s, or 
hunters’ clubs, and sports associations. 
For many years Lithuanian NGOs were considered weak and poorly financed; they were 
not thought to be influential or to play a significant role, and they lacked public support 
and recognition83. There were no strong traditions of private philanthropy, and state finan-
cial support was very limited. Notably, the majority of public service-providing non-profit 
institutions involved in health protection, education, social welfare, or (to a lesser extent) 
culture had not been denationalized and remained state-run. For this reason, many inde-
pendent NGOs felt that they were in “unequal” and “unfair” competition with state-run 
“rival” institutions. Often understaffed, and run mainly by volunteers, NGOs believed they 
were caught in a vicious circle84.
Since Lithuania gained state independence, NGOs have relied heavily on foreign funding; 
for instance, the Open Society Lithuania Foundation had for many years been a major 
donor in this country. In addition, Later on European and other international aid programs 
were providing substantial assistance to strengthen the core of Lithuanian third sector 
institutions. However, their dependence on irregular foreign aid grants meant that organi-
zations lacked stability, and could not ensure sustainable and long-lasting results.
In 2004, to stimulate further growth in the sector, a law was passed permitting non-
profits to engage in economic activities85. This measure, combined with the increasing 
use of IT tools and exploitation of the media, broadened considerably the possibilities for 
fundraising and allowed NGOs to provide membership services. Nonetheless, in the new 
millennium, it was clear that the NGO sector needed more instruments to encourage sup-
82 2013 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, 17th edition, USAID, 2014, 
128.
83 Nevyriausybinės organizacijos Lietuvoje, SIC rinkos tyrimai, 2002, accessed September 5, 2015,  
http://www.3sektorius.lt/docs/NVO_2002_2013-01-17_15_21_55.doc
84 Lietuvos nevyriausybinių organizacijų situacijos analizė, BAPP/NIPC, 2005 (accessed Septem-
ber 5, 2015), http://www.3sektorius.lt/docs/Treciojo_sektoriaus_instituciju_situacija_Lietuvo-
je1_2013-01-17_15_28_40.pdf
85 Remigijus Šimašius, Ne pelno organizacijų ekonominės veiklos teisinio reglamentavimo problemos, Li-
etuvos Teisės universitetas, 2013 (accessed September 5, 2015), http://simasius.popo.lt/files/2012/04/
NPOekonomineveikla2003.pdf
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port and participation from the general public. Therefore, when in 2003 taxpayers were 
given the option of designating 2% of their private income tax to a chosen public benefit 
organization, the decision was welcomed as timely and significant.
After joining the European Union on 1 May 2004, Lithuania became a developed country-
donor; this resulted in many withdrawals of foreign funding. Since then, Lithuanian NGOs 
have had to learn to survive on their own, appealing for support from the general public, as 
well as from socially responsible businesses. As a result, NGOs have been steadily growing 
in membership, and have begun to use the fundraising techniques of many advanced 
organizations in Western countries. Thus, Lithuanian NGOs have quickly caught up with 
those in the rest of developed world (the only drawbacks to this process were caused 
by world economic crises in 1999 and 2008). In recent surveys, 56% of respondents have 
donated money to NGOs86, compared to a stable 12%–15% from 1998 to 2008, and 47% of 
Lithuanians claim to volunteer (compared to 10%–12%).
Currently, the Lithuanian NGO sector, along with others in the so-called “Northern Tier” 
(Baltic and Visegrad states), demonstrates a stable, high sustainability score (2.7)87, tak-
ing into account the legal environment, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, and 
infrastructure. In addition, the sector is gradually increasing its organizational capacity 
and public image.
BEGINNING OF THE TAX PERCENTAGE SYSTEM
The Lithuanian tax percentage system was initiated mainly by the NGO Information and 
Support Centre (NISC). In 1999, availing of an opportunity to use a USAID DemNet Pro-
gram grant, then NISC director Vaidotas Ilgius embarked on a study visit to Budapest, 
where he explored different aspects of a similar percentage philanthropy system that 
was operating in Hungary. He met NGO leaders, experts, and civil servants in charge of 
the percentage scheme. To promote this cause in Lithuania, the NISC created the Lithu-
anian NGO coalition, and launched the “2% for charity” lobbying campaign. As a part of 
this campaign, a survey was commissioned to discover the opinions of different political 
fractions on percentage philanthropy. Moreover, a national conference of percentage phi-
lanthropy was organized in the Lithuanian Parliament88.
Notably, from 1999 to 2001, Lithuania was governed by a coalition of Liberals and 
Conservatives—during this period, the principal decision was made to adopt percentage 
philanthropy in Lithuania. After the 2001 election, a governing coalition was formed by 
both Social Democrats and Labor Party representatives. Under the auspices of the finance 
minister, Dalia Grybauskaitė, the percentage system was enacted into law. This suggests 
that there was a rather broad consensus among various political parties regarding the 
proposed percentage system and its anticipated consequences. The Lithuanian percentage 
system was legally enacted in 2003—private citizens have been able to use it since 2004.
THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE LITHUANIAN TAX PERCENTAGE SYSTEM
The main difference in the Lithuanian percentage system is that, in addition to NGOs, 
public non-profit entities can benefit from it—public schools, kindergartens, hospitals, mu-
seums, etc. This transpired due to a compromise that was reached among right and left 
wing politicians. The Social Democrats argued, in opposition to the Liberals, that private 
non-profits such as NGOs are no more deserving than state-run public schools, hospitals, 
or museums, so it would not be fair to design a percentage system for NGOs only. There 
were further concerns that the percentage system would constitute a huge loss to the 
national budget; as a result, the income tax deduction to private donors was abolished.89 
Data provided by the Lithuanian State Tax Inspection90 show that more than half of the 
86 The 2014 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, USAID, 2015, 140.
87 Ibid, 6, 137.
88 Aušra Maldeikienė, Ar bus leista Lietuvos gyventojams skirti paramai 2 proc. savo pajamų mokesčio? 
(NIPC, 2000)
89 Aurelija Olendraitė, Ar filantropijos daigais vėl maitinsime biudžetines įstaigas? NVO teisės institutas, 
2015 (accessed August 28, 2015), http://www.nvoteise.lt/lt/node/232




designated funds are donated to NGOs; that is, that NGOs are still the main beneficiaries. 
Otherwise, the Lithuanian percentage system works in a similar manner to that in other 
countries. Lithuanian citizens (or foreign residents) can designate up to 2% of their paid 
personal income tax to their chosen public benefit entity/ies. The taxpayer can divide the 
2% into portions, unless the single designated amount is lower than 2.90 EUR. Taxpay-
ers who wish to designate these funds must fill out the annual income declaration—the 
deadline for this is 1st May.
It is also possible to send a special designation form (FR0512)91, either in printed form (via 
post, or hand-delivered) in a signed envelope, or in electronic form (online). Nowadays, 
the majority of tax payers prefer to use online forms.
Each year, the Lithuanian tax authority checks whether designators have fulfilled their du-
ties (i.e. declared their annual incomes and paid taxes), and whether form FR0512 is filled 
out correctly. Next, starting in July, and by mid-November at the latest, the Tax Inspec-
tion transfers the designated amounts to the beneficiaries. Moreover, the Lithuanian Tax 
inspection publicizes the results of 2% distribution of the given year.92 
Beneficiaries of the Lithuanian percentage system enjoy a relatively light administrative 
load. They are not required to spend their designated amounts in any prescribed way, 
neither are there any reporting requirements—only general rules on the public reporting 
of annual income and expenditure apply. 
CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENT 
The rules regarding the implementation of the percentage scheme in Lithuania have been 
amended several times; for instance, in 2003 and 2004, changes were made to the des-
ignation forms. Specifically, after the amendment, the designator had fewer compulsory 
fields to fill out manually, such as the beneficiaries address and identity number.
Another amendment was passed in 2008 regarding the delivery of the designation form. 
From this date, the Tax Inspectorate no longer accepted envelopes with designation 
forms that were not delivered personally; this was a reaction to the attempts of some 
beneficiaries to persuade reluctant individuals to sign a designation form. Before this 
change, it was possible to send a printed designation form, via an employer’s representa-
tive (if the taxpayer had only one employer), in a sealed and duly signed envelope. This 
was abolished—as a preventive measure against possible manipulation. 
Finally, the most important change was introduced in March 2012, whereby an additional 
1% could be designated to a chosen political party. From this time on, the Lithuanian per-
centage system could be called “2+1%”. This change was prompted by a recently imple-
mented national reform of political party funding. No longer were Lithuanian parties per-
mitted to receive donations from legal bodies, and donations from private bodies became 
limited. Instead, political parties could receive 1% of their followers’ paid income tax93. At 
the same time, it became possible to designate up to 2% of paid income tax for a longer 
period (one to five years), so it is no longer necessary to fill out the same form every year. 
IMPACT ON THE NGO SECTOR
From 1999 to 2003, Lithuanian civil organizations were quite dependent on foreign 
grants—local people did not support NGOs. More than a decade after the country gained 
independence, the situation remained relatively unchanged: civil participation, volunteer-
ing, and private philanthropy were quite weak. Specifically, some 12%–15% of Lithuanian 
91 State Tax Inspectorate, Formos (accessed September 9, 2015), http://www.vmi.lt/formos/pdf/FR0512.
pdf
92 State Tax Inspectorate, Konsultacinės medžiagos katalogas (accessed August 28, 2015), https://www.
vmi.lt/cms/web/kmdb/1.4.15.3#Scroll_600
93  Ingrida Šimonytė, Per gyventojų pajamų mokestį partijoms gali tekti iki 30 million. litų (accessed Au-
gust 28, 2015),  http://zebra.15min.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/i-simonyte-per-gyventoju-pajamu-mokesti-
partijoms-gali-tekti-iki-30-million-litu-253539.html
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inhabitants gave to charities or volunteered. Only half of the population could name at 
least one NGO—the rest were ignorant.94 For this reason, politicians welcomed the pro-
posal to set up a percentage system in Lithuania, hoping that this would encourage tax-
payers to pay more attention to civic and community organizations, as well as to partici-
pate and interact to a greater extent. The aim was to provide potential support that would 
not be absorbed by the most famous and popular national NGOs, but would reach less 
prominent, small, younger, and regional entities as well.
Although no specific research has been performed into the impact of the percentage sys-
tem on the Lithuanian NGO sector, it is clear that, during the past decade, private giving 
has been increasing considerably. For example, in 2012, two thirds of the Lithuanian popu-
lation donated to charities—compared to 15% in 2002. It is possible that the percentage 
scheme contributed to this significantly. More NGOs started using social marketing and 
public relations instruments, and it became easy to designate and donate using electronic 
applications—this all helped to increase the public trust in, and visibility of, NGOs.
In one sense, the percentage system disappointed traditional large NGOs—they had 
hoped to collect large amounts due to their reputation and appeal. However, many 
smaller beneficiaries have been able to receive designations from their members/clients. 
Therefore, the percentage system improves financial viability, particularly in the cases of 
less advanced NGOs. 
Furthermore, several organizations or even sectors have gained a major advantage and 
collected considerable amounts, helping them to become bigger and better. These in-
clude charities that use television to reach out their audience, animal welfare groups that 
were unknown in Lithuania before the introduction of the percentage system, and some 
minority communities that have used the “door-to-door” method effectively to collect 2% 
designations.
CONCLUSIONS
The percentage system in Lithuania has become a permanent and important component 
of philanthropy, helping thousands of NGOs achieve their public benefit goals. Moreover, 
several tasks that were of secondary importance in implementing the percentage system 
in Lithuania may have been successfully accomplished. For example, educating Lithu-
anian citizens about private tax and the functioning of public benefit entities, including 
both public and private sector players. 
Several signals have indicated that the system should be modified to consolidate benefi-
ciaries’ accountability and transparency, and thus prevent possible misuses. However, in 
general, the percentage system provides significant funding to many NGOs that could 
otherwise be deprived of resources. In this way, the system in Lithuania continues to con-
tribute towards the sustainable growth of civil society and philanthropy.  
94 Public opinion survey “Lithuanian NGOs“ (SIC, 2002), 12-14 (accessed August 28, 2015), http://
www.3sektorius.lt/docs/NVO_2002_2013-01-17_15_21_55.doc
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Country report: Poland Kuba Wygnański 
INTRODUCTION
Poland has recently celebrated the 25th anniversary of its democratic reforms. As the 
first country in central Europe, Poland began this complex process with the Round Table 
talks of 1988; these talks led to democratic elections. Part of this process of change (both 
a cause and a consequence) was a certain revitalization of civil society. Today, this term 
has many meanings, but in the early 90s, it was considered a common denominator of 
the changes in central Europe. The big advantage of this phenomenon was that it defined 
both a political objective and a method by which this was to be achieved.
Poland can probably claim to be one of the leaders of both democratic and economic 
transformation throughout the region. In both these areas (though more clearly in the 
economic section), the achievements can be clearly seen. For instance, as one of the few 
countries in Europe, Poland coped relatively well with the recent financial crisis. Further-
more, in studies into the quality of democracy, Poland performs relatively well compared 
to other countries of the former Soviet bloc, although it is still far removed from the coun-
tries of the “old EU”.
The same is true of specific indicators of third sector organizations, according to Freedom 
House (Freedom House 2015), USAID's non-governmental organization (NGO) Sustain-
ability Index (USAID 2014).
Adopted almost 20 years ago, the Constitution of Poland guarantees the freedom to 
establish NGOs, and to conduct the activities thereof. This has been complemented by a 
series of specific laws regulating the activities of associations (1989), foundations (1984), 
and public benefit organizations (PBOs; 2003). Based on research conducted regularly 
for over 20 years by the KLON/JAWOR Association, itself an NGO, we can track trends 
related to these changes quite well. Currently, there are more than 100 thousand NGOs 
operating in Poland (KLON / JAWOR Association 2015), comprising over 17 thousand 
foundations and 86 thousand associations. The non-government sector is an essential, 
sustainable, and systemic factor in Poland, and it fulfils key functions. For instance, it pro-
vides services, supervises government activities, advocates specific causes, encourages 
social innovation, and develops both social capital and co-operation. Of course, each of 
these functions could be done better, but all are present, and participants in the non-
governmental environment are aware of the challenges they face and are actively seeking 
solutions. Indeed, NGOs are currently creating, through their own initiative (on both a 
national and local level), a third Sector Development Strategy (OFOP / SPLOT 2015); ap-
proximately three hundred people are involved in its formulation.
On this note, several solutions have been implemented in Poland that may also be useful 
outside the country. These include a national federation of organizations, and a consider-
able sectoral ability to act collectively, as well as an extensive and widely available sectoral 
infrastructure in several dozen Polish towns and cities, NGO-friendly legislation, a stable 
system of research, a well-functioning system of internal information, a 20-year-old tradi-
tion of national-scale meetings within the sector (the so-called Fora of Non-Governmental 
Initiatives [FIP]), statutorily-empowered organs of communication with both national and 
(in many cases) local government (the Board of Public Benefit Activity), a considerable 
success in managing EU funds (including the election of several dozen representatives of 
the sector to bodies controlling the expenditure of the funds), and a dedicated govern-
mental Civil Initiatives Fund, which has been operating for 10 years. Finally, Poland has a 
statutory obligation to develop an annual program of cooperation with organizations in 
each of the 2500 communes throughout the country, as well as legally guaranteed access 
to public media, a tax incentive scheme (in excess of 1% personal income tax [PIT]), both 
for individuals and for companies, which encourages donations to NGOs, etc. From that 
point of view, 1% of PIT is just a small element of a much wider supportive environment. 
KEY FACTORS OF SUCCESS
In 1996, legislators began working on a new law to allow a 1% allocation; the work lasted 
about seven years. This allocation was part of a broader legislative project in Poland, 
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namely the Public Benefit Law, which aimed to improve conditions for NGOs. The main 
aim of this law was to develop a so-called Third Sector Constitution, as well as to improve 
the relationship between the third sector and the authorities.  It should be stressed that 
the 1% tax allocation was not the most important issue. At the time of these develop-
ments, other issues were much more important, such as the regulation of access to public 
funds, the “legalization” of voluntary service, and the separation of PBOs from among all 
NGOs.   
Many institutions were involved in this undertaking, including the government (in particu-
lar the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy). However, it was the NGO sector, and espe-
cially those involved in the Polish Forum of Non-Governmental Initiatives (Ogólnopolskie 
Forum Inicjatyw Pozarządowych), that played the most important role. The Forum was 
the nucleus of the national federation of organizations, which now exists as a separate 
organization, while the Forum has now ceased to exist. The Forum conducted many ad-
vocacy activities for the benefit of organizations, including triennial meetings of organiza-
tions from all over Poland, which took place in Warsaw and brought together one to two 
thousand people. In several of these meetings, the bill, as well as the pressure to pass it, 
was an important element.
The fact that the 1% mechanism had been introduced in other countries (including Hun-
gary) was no doubt an important incentive to its introduction in Poland. At that time, 
there was a noble rivalry in this regard—the level of mutual borrowings between central 
European states was high. One reason for this was the presence of foreign institutions 
that catered to the region as a whole and supported this kind of exchange of experience. 
Initially, the 1% law was only partially related to financial demands.  It was supposed to be 
both a lever and a push—to make the sector more transparent and visible, as well as to 
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THE PROCESS OF THE ALLOCATION
Ultimately, the system was introduced in 2003 as part of the new Public Benefit Law (Art. 
27). Taxpayers were able to use the allocation mechanism in 2004 for their 2003 fiscal year. 
Basic elements of the 1% system:
The right to direct 1% of PIT applies to individual persons (including those who run one-
person enterprises). 
The only beneficiaries of 1% PIT allocations are NGOs that have obtained the status of 
PBOs, including: 
• NGOs, i.e. institutions that are not public sector entities and do not operate for 
profit, 
• legal persons and persons without legal personality, including foundations and as-
sociations, 
• legal persons and organizational entities of the Polish National Catholic Church, as 
well as those of other churches and religious communities, 
• associations of regional or local government bodies (Law of 24.04.2003). 
A PBO is a specific legal organization which can take advantage of many privileges, in-
cluding the 1% allocation. In their tax return forms, donors can nominate organizations 
that enjoy this status. 
The method of distinguishing NGOs as public benefit organizations
To receive the status of PBO, an organization must first request it. The Registration Court 
then makes a decision on the issue; the same court can also withdraw the status. To be 
granted the status, an organization must, among other things:
• perform public benefit activities (see the box) that serve either the general needs 
of the community, or those of a specific group of entities (for example, those who 
have a particularly difficult life) materially or otherwise;
• allocate the profits to public benefit purposes;
• have the statutory authority of control or supervision, and no personal or profes-
sional relationships with the members of the board;
• ban the participation in its governing bodies of persons convicted of an offense 
that was prosecuted by public indictment, or a tax offense;
• establish statutory bans related to the assets of the organization (private use);
• comply with one of the conditions introduced in 2010 (Law of 22.01.2010); namely, 
that the organizations must have been incessantly conducting their public benefit 
activity for at least two years before applying for public benefit status. 
Figure 38: 
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OBLIGATIONS OF PUBLIC BNEFIT ORGANIZATIONS
To provide better transparency to the general public, PBOs submit and present their sub-
stantive and financial reports to the minister responsible for social protection. These re-
ports are quite extensive, although their length depends on the size of the organization 
concerned. They are submitted online and used to create a publicly available database 
(Department of Public Benefit - Mnistry of Labour and Social Policy 2015). In these re-
ports, PBOs provide information regarding revenues and expenditures, broken down by 
type, in particular as these relate to the 1% mechanism, as well as expenditures accrued 
within each type (along with those that have been incurred by collecting the 1% PIT). A 
special part of the report comprises information about salaries in organizations.
If the organization fails to report on time, the privilege of receiving the 1% PIT is suspend-
ed. The list of NGOs with the right to use the 1% is a public document, and it is published 
no later than 15 December each year. Currently, nearly nine thousand organizations enjoy 
such a status.
From January until the end of April each year, PIT-taxpayers may indicate one PBO as the 
beneficiary of their 1%; to this end, the taxpayer must enter the corresponding number 
from the registry. The individual tax offices transfer funds to the organizations named in 
the tax return.
The list of PBOs is available on official websites; often it is attached to electronic tax re-
turn programs. Many organizations conduct media campaigns during the period in which 
citizens typically fill out their tax returns. With these campaigns, PBOs aim to convince 
taxpayers to nominate them. 
In the tax return form, a taxpayer can enter the so-called detailed aim, by which they can 
indicate the purpose of the organization, or one of its programs. In practice, this mecha-
nism has been used as a form of disposal for payments to individuals who collect funds 
through the organization. (We will discuss that particular matter below).
Every year, the Ministry of Finance makes public a list of all PBOs, along with the propor-
tion of the 1% PIT they obtained in the previous year.
SCALE OF THE PHENOMENON 
The popularity of the mechanism has skyrocketed (Ministry of Finance 2013). In 2004, 
the first year of the system, only eighty thousand taxpayers donated around 10.4 million 
PLN to such beneficiaries, which accounted for 0.03% of the tax due. For comparison, 
the amount transferred in 2014 was 506 million PLN, which represented 72% of the total 
tax due. 
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Therefore, it can be said that the phenomenon is now widespread. Allocation is used by 
61% of those who fill out the PIT tax return personally (which means all taxpayers except 
pensioners and some persons employed in one workplace, where the tax return may be 
filled out by the company's accounting services). Since this option is more popular among 
those who have higher income, the allocated 1% PIT is around 72% of all resources that 
could be allocated. The mean value of the 1% PIT directed by taxpayers to NGOs in 2014 
was the equivalent of about 10 EUR (Ministry of Finance 2013).
One major challenge in this regard concerns the sharing of the 1% PIT revenues among 
the various PBOs—the funds have become hugely concentrated. For example, in 2014, 
when payment was made to nearly 7.5 thousand organizations, over 25% of the total sum 
was collected by a single foundation95, which has for years gathered funds through its so-
called sub-accounts and directed them to individuals. The ten organizations that collect 
the most revenue from the 1% scheme gathered around 180 million PLN (from the total 
of around 500 million). Six of these are known as “intermediaries”, as they collect funds 
for individual persons or institutions that do not have PBO status. This kind of dispropor-
tion could be considered pathological, and is frequently a target of criticism aimed at the 
entire 1% PIT mechanism.
The success of the allocation system may stem from many factors. The most important 
of which is probably the ease with which the 1% PIT can be transferred. This action costs 
nothing more than entering a number in the tax return. Also significant is the enormous 
media activity of NGOs during the period in which citizens fill out their tax returns: or-
ganizations try, in any way possible, to convince taxpayers to donate the 1% PIT to them. 
95 Data from the annual report of the Minisry of Finance
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Often, the quality of these campaigns is poor, and they have a purely emotional character. 
The campaigns are conducted using all possible media. A certain proportion of NGOs 
(even those without PBO status) try to use the mechanism of 1% PIT, employing external 
“brokers”, who obtain a part of the revenue. In other countries, they established separate 
organizations; in Poland, they used the existing ones. We must also distinguish at this 
point between public institutions of universal access (e.g. museums) and those that limit 
their services to a specific group (e.g. schools and kindergartens), which themselves in-
form their users (i.e. parents), about the 1% PIT payment.
One argument for transferring a part of the tax to an NGO is that it is a unique and ef-
ficient opportunity for taxpayers to influence how public money is spent. Research by the 
Klon/Jawor Association (2015) into the image of NGOs showed that 58% of respondents 
believe NGOs to be more effective in their actions than public administration. This has 
negative implications as well; nevertheless, it reveals a real incentive to donate, which 
results from the critical attitude of Poles towards their own country, and towards the very 
obligation to pay taxes.
CHANGES OF THE SYSTEM: POLICIES, JUSTIFICATIONS AND EFFECTS 
The 1% law has been amended several times. From the point of view of tax allocation, the 
most important change was introduced in 2006, whereby the range of bodies to which 
allocation was permitted was extended to include self-employed individuals (i.e. persons 
conducting individual economic activity, and paying flat-rate tax). Another important ele-
ment of this amendment was a major change to the 1% transfer mechanism. Since 2006, 
the tax office has been transferring the monies on behalf of taxpayers. 
This solution has dramatically increased the number of people using the mechanism, as 
well as the amount of capital reaching the sector. Moreover, work is pending comple-
tion regarding subsequent amendments to the law. Many of these changes concern the 
relationship of NGOs with local authorities, and there are also several cosmetic changes 
concerning the 1% mechanism itself. In particular, more meticulousness will be required in 
terms of informing the public about the amounts collected and spent for particular goals. 
Specifically, this will be achieved with a publically available register of reports.  
While working on the amendments, legislators discussed various other questions, such as 
the necessity to inform the public about the cost of 1% campaigns, the imposition of limits 
on the cost of such campaigns, or the introduction of a ban on computer software for 
tax returns in which it would only be possible to select the distributor of the software as 
the 1% beneficiary, rather than choose from the full list of organizations. Due to problems 
with the formulation of both amendments, work on them has recently been discontinued.
In Poland, the 1% PIT mechanism has had quite mixed consequences. On the one hand, it 
has had clear advantages: in nominal terms, it provides the third sector with around 500 
million PLN, i.e. about 3%–5% of the total revenue of the sector (KLON / JAWOR Associa-
tion 2015). In addition, the mechanism has also forced PBOs to be much more transpar-
ent, and to communicate better with the public. Without any doubt, it has also increased 
the visibility of NGOs (and of PBOs in particular), and the activities they carry out. On 
the other hand, the list of restrictions is quite long, and the system malfunctions in many 
ways. In most cases, NGOs communicate with the public not through rational argumenta-
tion, but rather through emotions; this has at times constituted emotional blackmail. For 
this reason, among others, respondents to the 2015 Klon/Jawor study (KLON/JAWOR 
Association 2014) incorrectly assumed that all NGOs are involved in helping the needy 
(79% of the respondents think so). In reality, only 6% of the activities of the sector can 
be described as such. Furthermore, the assumption proved to be wrong that taxpayers 
would be directed in their decisions by available data (each organization must supply 
such data). However, the most important disappointment of the 1% PIT mechanism is 
that it does not stir genuine philanthropy, but rather limits it. The 1% mechanism has been 
falsely portrayed as philanthropy, and perhaps this is why it has replaced, rather than 
awakened, true philanthropy. In its essence, the 1% PIT is closer to the principles of partici-
patory budget, as it increases public access to the distribution of public money—but no 
one promoted it in this way. Fortunately, the Polish government left incentives for tradi-
tional philanthropy untouched after the introduction of the 1% PIT law. Still, both the PIT 
and corporate income tax (CIT) base have been reduced by 6%, which would have been 
transferred to charity. 
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The fact that the mechanism has in a way been privatized, when it was meant to serve 
the public, is also a problem. Based on the theory of goods, we could say that the 1% PIT 
all too often feeds so-called “club” goods, which are available to a small group, or even 
individual ones (in the case of support for individuals). After all, these are very popular 
targets for the 1% PIT, and they constitute a significant portion of the total amount. The 
role of the NGO has been reduced to that of an intermediary, and in certain cases they are 
far from being competent or prudent re-distributors—two cases in point are those of the 
United Way and the Community Foundation. In this way, the role of NGOs is simple: they 
obtain profit from such a system. 
Another problem, in our opinion, is that PBO status has almost exclusively been reduced 
to a mechanism of official registration as a beneficiary of the 1% PIT. However, the origi-
nal intentions of lawmakers were different; the status was meant to highlight a special 
competence and quality in an organization based on declared documents. In contrast, for 
most people, PBO status means the entitlement of an organization to spend the 1% PIT as 
it pleases, without any real commitment to a charitable purpose.
IMPORTANCE OF THE MECHANISM IN COMPARISON TO OTHER FORMS OF PUBLIC 
FUNDING OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
As we have already stated, the 1% PIT mechanism is not seen by most taxpayers as pub-
lic funding, but rather as a kind of personal philanthropy. There are a number of parallel 
mechanisms of public funding, both at national and local levels. In total, more than half 
of non-governmental sector funding comes from public funds (both domestic and for-
eign, mainly EU, programs). Apart from a small group of organizations, the 1% is regarded 
rather as a supplement to the traditional budget. Its advantage is that the PIT system is 
much more flexible than traditional public funds (which are subject to many conditions).
The 1% mechanism, due to its popularity, has arisen more often lately as a possible model 
for financing churches, political parties, and even public media. A separate concept, which 
has occasionally arisen, is that of starting a similar mechanism with CIT, following the ex-
ample of neighboring Slovakia.
KNOWLEDGE RESOURCES ON THE MECHANISM
Poland has a relatively well developed infrastructure of research and information dedicat-
ed to issues that concern the third sector. In particular, we should consider the activities 
of the Klon/Jawor Association, which maintains a database of NGOs, and every two years 
conducts a study into the condition of third sector (based on a representative random 
sample of two to four thousand organizations). Additionally, every year the Klon/Jawor 
researches volunteering, as well as the perception of the third sector (www.ngo.pl). The 
same association provides data, in the form of a publicly accessible repository, including 
information on the 1% PIT: its dynamics, geography, and relationships within data (www.
mojapolis.pl). 
In parallel, a working group set up in the Central Statistical Office conducts research into 
the sector (www.stat.gov.pl).
The Ministry of Finance portal (http://www.finanse.mf.gov.pl/pit/statystyki) is an extreme-
ly useful source of information, which annually presents detailed statistics on PIT, as well 
as on the 1% allocation and a list of all its beneficiaries, with the exact amount of money 
allocated to them.
The annual list of PBOs is a specific source of data on these organizations and the 1% 
mechanism; it is a publicly available database of the annual reports of these organizations, 
as well as a list, published each year, of all beneficiaries of the 1% PIT, with the amounts 
granted (www.pozytek.gov.pl). 
Finally, the law on public benefit (a part of which is the 1% mechanism) requires regular 
parliamentary reports on the effects of the law. 
One limitation of the above-mentioned sources, from the point of view of this report, is 
that practically all of them are available in Polish only.
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Country report: Romania  Cătălin Gheorghe 
Romania, a republic in Central and Eastern Europe, gained independence in the late 19th 
century and joined the European Union (EU) in 2007. The country has a population of 19.9 
million, representing less than 4% of the total EU population. The country has 42 counties, 
with 54% of the population living in urban areas. Romania is the second poorest member 
of the EU. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR 
The Non-profit Registry of the Ministry of Justice states that more than 92,000 non-profit 
organizations have been registered in Romania since 1990 in the form of associations, 
foundations, and federations.96 Most of these are associations (more than 73,000). The 
main periods of growth for this sector were the mid 1990s and the period after 2005. De-
spite this, Romania still has one of the lowest rates of participation in civic organizations 
in the entire EU (3%–4%, compared with the EU average of 20%),97, The weakness of the 
sector suggests also the fact that only 38% of Romanian non-profit organizations have 
filed the required annual balance sheet with the Ministry of Finance. Of these, 26% had an 
annual turnover of 0 EUR, and 40% an annual turnover of less than 10,000 EUR98.
The main issues faced by the Romanian non-profit sector are99: a lack of financial re-
sources, especially access to public funds, and a lack of human resources, in terms both 
of staff and of volunteers. Secondly, NGO leaders complain that Romania lacks a “giving 
culture”; as a result, fewer donations are received from private donors, both large and 
small. According to studies from 2007–2008, only 10%–15% of the adult population had 
made a donation to an NGO during the previous year.100 
One of the main challenges facing the Romanian researcher into the non-profit sector is the 
lack of reliable, consistent, easily accessed and processed, statistically representative data. 
The Ministry of Finance does not collect easily used data regarding the non-profit sector, 
nor does the Ministry of Justice or the Romanian Statistical Institute. The NGO Registry is 
only available as a searchable .pdf file, and it contains inaccurate data (duplicates and er-
rors). The data provided by the Ministry of Finance has severe methodological limitations, 
which will be discussed in the following chapters. The data from the Statistical Institute is, 
most likely, based on the aforementioned sources.
According to USAID's NGO Sustainability Index, in terms of financial sustainability, Roma-
nia’s score of 4.3 places it in the category “sustainability evolving”. This score has been 
relatively constant for the last decade.
ORIGIN OF THE TAX PERCENTAGE SYSTEM 
Regarding the origins of Romania's tax percentage system, the similar scheme in Hungary 
served as a model. Certain NGOs led by members of the Hungarian minority in Romania 
were quite strong and popular in the late 1990s, but they lacked the necessary influence 
to lobby for policy changes. Nonetheless, they served as both a link to, and an information 
source about, what was happening in Hungary. In 2001, a coalition of support organiza-
tions, namely the Civil Society Development Foundation, Soros Foundation, and CEN-
TRAS, started lobbying the Ministry of Finance, as well as MPs from all major parties, to 
introduce similar legislation in Romania. At that time, when Romania was in the process of 
EU accession, the country was under pressure to develop mechanisms to fund its grow-
ing civil society organizations; few clear, coherent, and transparent mechanisms were in 
place besides subsidies for some social services. Given that the economy was starting to 
recover, and that the financial impact on the national budget was expected to be minimal, 
all parties agreed in principle, and the provision was drafted in the new Fiscal Code (Act 
No. 571.20013) that entered into force in 2004. The Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Na-
96 Romanian Non-profit Registry, Ministry of Justice, 2015
97 USAID, FDSC 2013, Civil Society Index-Romania
98 FDSC, 20010, Romania 2010 Report: The non-governmental sector-profile, trends and challenges
99 FDSC, 2011, NGO leaders barometer
100 Association for Community Relations, 2008, Trends of philanthropic behavior
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tional Liberal Party, and the Social Democratic Party supported the provision by being its 
sponsors. In particular, Ms. Mona Musca (deputy, National Liberal Party) acted as a strong 
supporter and de facto ambassador for the provision. Furthermore, the Association for 
Community Relations played a significant role in designing the methodological norms 
necessary to enforce the provision, and has launched—in partnership with the initiating 
non-profits, the American Chamber of Commerce, and the Ministry of Finance—a national 
campaign to promote the provision among NGOs, taxpayers, and employers. Initially, the 
provision allowed for the redirection of up to 1% of income tax, but this was increased to 
2% the following year (Government Ordinance O.U. 138/2004). In 2008, 35% of the adult 
population knew about the provision while 15% of taxpayers used it. 
MAIN CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENT FROM 2004 TO 2015
The percentage tax system in Romania has undergone several major changes:
1.  In 2004, the proportion of tax that could be directed to an NGO was increased 
from 1% to 2% (Government Ordinance O.U 138/2004). This obviously had a very 
significant impact on the amount that was redirected, which grew from 1.2 million 
RON to 5.2 million RON.
2.  In 2006, Act No. 238/2006 allowed churches (religious institutions), in addition to 
NGOs, to become beneficiaries of the scheme; the same law allowed the system to 
be used for private scholarships. This change came into effect in 2007, as the ben-
eficiaries must be nominated before the 15th or 23rd of May of the respective year.
The second change created a far more competitive environment, as churches are per-
ceived to have a broader influence and a more committed constituency than NGOs. In-
deed, since 2008, many NGOs have complained that their income from the provision 
is stagnating, and personal communications from fundraisers or campaign coordinators 
indicate that many taxpayers use their provision to support their church.
The tax percentage system has been a strong catalyst for promoting and encouraging 
private fundraising in Romania, as it provides a mechanism by which private donors can 
become involved in a cost-effective way; this has offered an incentive to Romanian NGOs 
to start coherently engaging private citizens as financial supporters of their organizations. 
NOTES ON THE PROCESS OF ALLOCATION 
In Romania, non-profit organizations, religious institutions, or individual recipients of pri-
vate scholarships can be beneficiaries of the tax percentage system. Besides legal regis-
tration, beneficiaries need not fulfil any eligibility requirements to receive the designation, 
and they are not required to report on its use. On the one hand, recipients appreciate this 
flexibility, as it basically provides them with general support funding. On the other hand, 
such a system creates a non-transparent and unaccountable environment, and as the 
funds in question are public, more transparency and accountability should be required. 
The percentage tax is allocated using a special form: either Form 230 from the National 
Fiscal Administration Agency (for taxpayers whose only income is their salary), or Form 
200 (for taxpayers whose income is from more than one source).  On both forms, the 
taxpayer must mention the name of the beneficiary, the fiscal code, and the bank account 
in IBAN format. The designated amount can be mentioned, but is not compulsory as the 
fiscal authorities can calculate it. The forms must be submitted to the fiscal authorities, 
directly or by mail, by a deadline in May for the previous fiscal year, which is identical to the 
calendar year in Romania. It is in this process of submitting the forms that one of the major 
challenges of the system lies: given that most taxpayers (75% according to the Ministry of 
Finance) do not have to submit an income statement—as their income is pre-taxed—com-
pleting and submitting the form is seen as a hassle by many potential users of the provi-
sion. Thus, NGOs have started to assist taxpayers in submitting their forms. From a legal 
point of view, such submission by proxy is a rather grey area. Moreover, when the legisla-
tion was established, one important principle was the confidentiality of the taxpayer. Cur-
rently however, some NGOs have large databases (sometimes exceeding 40,000 names) 
for which they have no explicit agreement with the taxpayer. Fortunately, until now there 
have been no problems associated with this submission by proxy, except that some fiscal 
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authority offices do not accept the practice, particularly when they receive forms in bulk. 
Other offices accept it only from what they would consider reputable NGOs.
The information is collected from the designation forms by local fiscal offices (usually 
one per city, with the exception of major cities and the capital, where there are several), 
and centralized at the local level. The first payments are made to the NGOs in September, 
with a peak in November and December. However, contrary to the methodological norms 
(which set a December deadline) payments continue well into the next year (sometimes 
up to March or even April). Payments are not centralized at the national level but are 
made at the local level. Information is then centralized at the national level, but the num-
ber of beneficiary organizations is simply summed up, not taking into account the esti-
mated huge number of duplicates. 
In most cases, taxpayers are not informed if there was any problem with their designation 
(wrong or missing information), although exceptions, where the fiscal authorities have 
contacted the taxpayer, have been known to occur. In the first years of the provision, the 
error rate was as high as 25%, based on information from the Ministry of Finance.
On another note, NGOs have no way to predict the amount they will raised; nor do they 
know when they will receive the allocated monies. 
Furthermore, some NGOs and taxpayers have reported abuses, especially by their em-
ployers, who sometimes offer to collect and submit the forms, but then also exert some 
undue pressure on the employee to donate the tax percentage to an NGO that is linked 
to, or preferred by, the employer.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The tax percentage system has proved to be a major success in Romania, despite its 
shortcomings. It has allowed thousands of non-profits to interact with hundreds of thou-
sands of supporters, and to collect 190 million EUR since the provision was introduced. It 
has spurred a dialogue between non-profits and individual citizens, which has most likely 
played a major role in developing the fundraising practice in Romania.
However, there are signs, mostly based on anecdotal information from fundraisers and 
campaign coordinators, that many taxpayers consider the designation a real donation. 
The taxpayer therefore has the feeling that “they have done their part”; according to some 
NGO leaders, this has a negative impact on other fundraising campaigns. 
Several issues, mainly related to transparency and accountability, affect the system; 
however, with improved methodological norms and data management, these could be 
tackled. Namely, reporting at the national level must be improved by reporting the real 
number of beneficiaries (based on unique fiscal codes). Additionally, based on the same 
information, a searchable database, which would contain the amounts received, must be 
created (even in spreadsheet format).
The designation forms (200 and 230) must be amended to allow the taxpayer to explic-
itly state that they allow the NGO to submit their form and separately to process their 
data. This might have a negative impact on the amounts designated, but it would be in 
line with current data protection provision in national legislation. It would also allow NGOs 
to establish a formal communication channel with the taxpayers that desire one.
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Country report: Slovakia Fedor Blaščák 
Slovakia, a republic in central Europe and formerly a part of Czechoslovakia, gained in-
dependence in 1993 and joined the EU in 2004. The country has 5.4 million inhabitants 
(1.06% of the total EU population), 44% of whom live in rural areas. Since 2000, Slovakia 
has been member of the OECD, and it joined the Eurozone in 2009.
NOTES ON THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR 
According to various sources (e.g. the Slovstat database of the Statistical Office of the 
Slovak Republic, and the Interior Ministry), the number of non-profit organizations in Slo-
vakia grows every year. Specifically, at the end of 2013, there were 49,101 such entities, 
comprising church-based organizations, health and social care institutions (hospitals es-
tablished as non-profits), public law institutions (such as public TV, radio, etc.), political 
parties, associations of homeowners, trade unions, and grassroots civic associations or 
foundations.101 
In 2015 the Interior Ministry reported more than 52,760 registered non-profits—46,687 
civic associations (including homeowner associations and professional organizations), 
536 non-investment funds, 1,559 organizations providing public benefit services, 118 or-
ganizations with an international element, 2,984 trade unions, and 447 foundations. 
Of course, providing such a broad view for the purpose of official statistics blurs any fur-
ther analysis of the data regarding the scope or structure, as well as—more importantly—
the revenues and various aspects of the financing of non-profits. However, the principal 
deficit, from the point of view of any analyst or governmental authority,102 remains the 
overall lack of relevant, well-structured data. Specifically, no current or past information is 
available on a range of important questions; for example, the number of non-profits with 
a single focus area, or the various financial aspects of the non-profit sector (total revenues 
or detailed structure).
In particular, private resources—those donated either from individuals via public collec-
tions, or direct financial support of NGOs by corporations—are hard to access.
Interestingly, establishing criteria for tax percentage recipients may help identify grass-
roots NGOs from within the wider set of all non-profits, based on the assumption that 
running for tax designation funds marks grassroots organizations with a broader public 
outreach. The law defines eligible recipients of tax designations as follows: civic asso-
ciations, foundations, non-profit organizations, non-investment funds, and church-based 
organizations (except churches themselves). In 2015, there were 12,577 such recipients 
officially registered; this number provides a guideline for estimating the scope of the 
NGO sector in Slovakia, as well as for assessing how it fits into an internationally relevant 
comparative framework. 
Regarding the issue of sustainability of the non-profit sector in Slovakia, the U.S. Agency 
for International Development’s (USAID’s) annual NGO Sustainability Index is a key ana-
lytical instrument. In 2014, Slovakia was awarded a score of 2.9, indicating that Slovakia 
ranks within the Sustainability Enhanced category; however, annual decreases have been 
reported in the legal environment, financial viability, advocacy, and infrastructure, thus 
confirming the ongoing trend of deterioration in the overall sustainability of the sector.103 
ORIGIN OF THE TAX PERCENTAGE SYSTEM 
The roots of the political decision to introduce the tax percentage system in Slovakia 
can be traced back to autumn 1998, when the Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar—who had 
autocratic and illiberal policies—was defeated by a pro-Western coalition led by Mikuláš 
Dzurinda. However, the very first impulse for introducing the mechanism came before 
that, at the national NGO conference in Stupava in 1997, where representatives of the 
non-profit sector initially discussed the newly adopted Hungarian model. 104 
101 The source of this data is the author's own official communication with the Ministry of the Interior 
(2015). For international references please see: (USAID 2014), p. 205
102 “Rational expert discussion proves substantial deficits due to the lack of relevant data on various as-
pects of financing of the non-profit sector, including tax designation revenues.” (Molokač and Hagara 
2015)
103 For references see (USAID 2014) p. 205
104 Hungary enacted the unique tax percentage designation model in 1996.
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The strong contribution of the civil society movement towards Mečiar’s defeat forced 
the new government into negotiations with civil sector leaders, who, as a legitimate and 
strong driving force, pressed the new political elite into fulfilling their previous commit-
ment to the development of civil society. In addition, a significant number of civil society 
activists had taken positions in the newly constituted government.  The initial consulta-
tions began between the policy makers and civil society leaders in 1999; the experience 
with the tax percentage mechanism in Hungary at the time served as a best-practice 
example, and this was successfully used to argue for adopting the system in Slovakia. 
The tax percentage system was enacted on 4 December, 2001 in Act No. 561/2001 of Coll., 
amending Act No. 366/1999 on income tax, by an overwhelming majority of 99 out of 
101 MPs present. Since 2002, individual taxpayers have been able to designate 1% of their 
personal income tax to an eligible NGO. 
According to a survey,105 71% of taxpayers were familiar with the opportunity to designate 
tax in the first year of its operation; however, only 341,776 individual taxpayers used the 
system, resulting in a total revenue of 3,381,870 EUR; this was distributed among 3,826 
beneficiaries (out of 4,035 eligible). Furthermore, as Figure 41 shows, the total number of 
taxpayers was much higher than the number of those who participated in the tax desig-
nation system. There are two reasons for this— (1) not all individual taxpayers were able 
to designate the percentage, because in a given year they would have a zero or negative 
tax duty; (2) employees in Slovakia typically do not file their tax statements themselves; 
rather, their employers do so. Unlike self-employed individuals, who must file an income 
tax statement with the Tax Office, employees are not prompted to directly participate in 
decision-making about tax designation. Instead, they go through employers (typically ac-
counting departments), who submit the tax statements to the tax office on their behalf. 
Employees must therefore indicate their tax designation differently, being required to fill 
in a special form. This administrative complication is a limiting factor in the expansion of 
tax designation among employees (Figure 43). 
105  (FOCUS 2002)
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PRINCIPAL CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENTS FROM 2002–2015
Regarding the designation by individual taxpayers, stakeholders have generally support-
ed the model since its introduction; neither political parties nor civil society or the public 
have ever questioned the scheme. Nonetheless, since the system’s inception, two major 
changes have taken place related to individual taxpayers: 
1) In 2003, the designation percentage was increased from 1% to 2%; this took ef-
fect in 2004. The increase from 1% to 2% was the result of a trade-off between 
the civil sector and the government during major tax reforms (2003–2004) that 
aimed to radically simplify the tax system by reducing exemptions. This led to the 
abolishment of various tax benefits for NGOs, including exemptions from prop-
erty tax and VAT, as well as incentives for individuals to donate income tax. Most 
importantly, tax write-offs for charitable donations were eliminated, for both cor-
porate and individual taxpayers. The proposed cuts in tax benefits for NGOs and 
corporate tax write-offs led to negotiations and a subsequent agreement with the 
Finance Ministry on increasing the designation to 2%. 
2) In 2011, a new amendment was introduced that raised the percentage from 2% 
to 3% for taxpayers who had volunteered for at least 40 hours in the previous 
year. This step was intended to enrich and reward the volunteering of individual 
taxpayers with an additional incentive; as such, it was part of the brand new Act 
on Volunteering, which had not existed until 2012. So far, this new addition to the 
mechanism has not been much used; even though official estimates suggest that 
around 327,000 individuals volunteered in Slovakia in 2013, only about 8,000 in-
dividual taxpayers using 3% tax designation, suggesting that people’s decision to 
volunteer is taken independently of tax designation incentives. Notwithstanding 
the administrative cost of issuing the additional tax form-related confirmation let-
ters to volunteers, the legal possibility of raising the designation to 3% remains an 
opportunity for NGOs to professionalize their engagement with volunteers.
Notes on the Process of Allocation 
A tax designation beneficiary in Slovakia can either be a non-profit organization (pre-
dominantly NGOs) or any other type of public benefit organization explicitly listed by the 
respective law (e.g. a church-related charity). The organization must be registered on an 
annual basis by a notary public and pay an administration fee of 70 EUR; in 2015 there 
were more than 12,000 eligible beneficiaries.106 After receiving the funds, the beneficiary 
must spend them by the end of the following calendar year (effectively 18 months); it 
must do so in pursuit of its non-profit mission and thematic focus area. 
106  The list of beneficiaries can be found at www.rozhodni.sk (site in Slovak).
Figure 41: 
Number of individual 
taxpayers with posi-
tive tax duty in Slo-
vakia (in thousands)
Sources: the Institute 
for Financial Policy 
at the Finance Min-
istry, the Financial 
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Recipients who obtain resources of more than 3,320 EUR are obliged to report the use 
of received funds in the Commercial Bulletin (Obchodný Vestník) within 16 months of the 
date that the Tax Authority publishes the final list of recipients. The recipients can spend 
the resources as they wish in fulfilment of their published mission statement, specifying 
the amounts given for single purposes. If the funds received exceed 33,000 EUR, the re-
cipient is obliged to provide an auditor’s statement that conforms to special regulations.
Taxpayers (both individuals and corporations) designate the funds by filling in a separate 
sheet of their tax return form. A volunteering taxpayer who is applying for a 3% designa-
tion is obliged to attach an official confirmation letter from the NGO. The tax authority 
gradually distributes all designations to the respective beneficiaries, all of whom receive 
the funds 2 to 4 months after the tax return deadline (March 31st). 
The number of recipients has been growing constantly since the introduction of the mod-
el—from about 4,000 in 2002 to almost 12,000 in 2015; this indicates the general popular-
ity of the scheme among the recipients.
As regards benefactors, the popularity of the model is similar in both groups (individuals 
and corporations)—in recent years it is estimated that about 55% of individual taxpayers 
(Figure 42) and about 60% of corporate taxpayers with positive tax duty have taken ad-
vantage of the tax designation scheme. 
According to official data, 10% of individual taxpayers—those with the highest income—al-
locate more than 80% of the overall resources.107 Analysts from the Institute for Financial 
Policy have recently expressed108 doubts that altruistic solidarity is the main motivating 
principle in the decision making of individual taxpayers, arguing rather that acquisitive 
factors play a greater role.
In addition, the revenue obtained from the individual taxpayer designation scheme con-
stitutes only about 1.1%, rather than 2%, of the total individual income tax. Thus, the effi-
ciency percentage109 is only about 55%; the remaining potential revenue (about 16 million 
EUR) is left untapped. Such unsatisfactory results challenge NGOs to build better bridges 
with individual donors as regards tax designation.
107 Ibidem., p. 3
108 (Molokač and Hagara 2015) p. 7
109 Efficiency percentage is the ratio of the actual volume of revenues collected to the total potential rev-
enue.
Figure 42: 
Number of individual 
taxpayers (self-em-
ployed) using the 
tax designation (in 
thousands)*
Source: The Institute 
for Financial Policy 
at the Finance Minis-
try, Financial Admin-
istration Office
* Number of 
participating 
individuals includes 
only those who file 
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Table 16: 
Tax designation allocations: 
recipients, providers, and 
amounts 2002–2014. 
Source: the Institute for Fi-
nancial Policy at the Finance 
Ministry; the Financial Admin-
istration Office; the Ministry 
of Interior; the author's own 
calculations.
* Number of participating individuals includes only those who file tax statements for themselves (self-
employed). There is approximately similar number of those individuals for whom tax returns are filed by 
their employees, but there is not data available. The total number of participating individuals is therefore 
higher
CONCLUSIVE REMARKS
The individual percentage tax designation mechanism has not become the subject of 
any relevant public concern; on the contrary, higher percentages and a new incentive to 
volunteering were introduced. One major untapped opportunity for beneficiaries is the 
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Total amount  
(thousands 
EUR)
2002 4,042 341,776 n.a. 3,382 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3,382
2003 3,398 286,164 n.a. 3,222 -4.7 n.a. n.a. 3,222
2004 3,829 402,057 8,364 9,159 184.2 18,896 n.a. 28,055
2005 5,746 418,241 14,063 10,371 10.8 20,525 8.6 30,896
2006 7,100 446,973 17 740 11,713 20.9 25,629 24.9 37,342
2007 7,662 408,277 21,632 12,819 12.8 29,306 14.3 42,125
2008 7,759 449,909 26,691 15,036 16.7 34,144 16.5 49,180
2009 9,098 503,253 30,078 17,684 12.2 37,496 9.8 55,180
2010 9,585 467,983 26,172 15,553 -20 28,592 -23.7 44,145
2011 10,049 475,843 25,427 16,526 -4.9 25,444 -11.0 41,970
2012 10,711 538,814 26,621 18,548 6.5 26,146 2.8 44,694
2013 11,235 542,672 31,362 20,944 4.5 25,762 -1.5 46,706






  efficient percentage = actual volumes of tax designation revenues 
/ overall tax designation revenue of all eligible tax payers
105
Country Report: The Direction of Debates   
on Introducing a Percentage Tax Designation  
Scheme in the Czech Republic  Marie Hladká
 
The Czech Republic is the only country of the Visegrad Four that still does not use a 
percentage tax designation scheme to finance the non-profit sector. The mechanism has 
been discussed in the Czech Republic for years; however, it has not yet been implement-
ed. Several discussions on the topic have been approached as if the discussants were 
seeking a vision for the future, while others have shifted to the political level, or resulted 
in studies on introducing the system into Czech legislation.
The idea of percentage tax designations has triggered sharp arguments from the begin-
ning. Most NGOs have adopted a positive attitude, seeing the potential opportunity to 
obtain funds from the State. Conversely, the vast majority of professionals, mainly econo-
mists, disagree with percentage tax designations.
EVOLUTION OF THE DEBATE AND MAIN ACTORS
Developments before 1997
The idea that percentage tax designations could be used to support the Czech non-profit 
sector first arose in the 1990s in connection with the financing of one part of the non-
profit sector— the churches. The separation of church and State was discussed, as were 
various ways of ensuring financial autonomy and other issues related to independence. 
The models of church designation and of church tax were discussed at the governmental 
level. The professional public mostly disagreed with the financing of churches through 
percentage tax designations; the attitude of public leaders and politicians to church des-
ignations was also rather negative, as they perceived it as a non-systemic measure. The 
opinion of churches was not unanimous either: an 8% designation of income tax would 
have been required in the Czech Republic to satisfy the demands of churches, according 
to estimates made by the Ministry of Culture in 1997. In the same year, the Government 
fell; therefore, the problem of church funding remained unresolved. 
This initial association between percentage tax designation and church funding, com-
bined with the attitude of a part of the Czech society and political scene towards church-
es, was a major reason for the lack of in-depth and serious discussion on the topic of 
percentage tax designation in the Czech Republic.
The First Private Members’ Bill on the Introduction of Percentage Tax Designations 
in 2001
In the Czech Republic, the major breakthrough in introducing the percentage tax des-
ignation scheme was achieved in 2001, when a group of Deputies, headed by Monika 
Mihaličková and Zdeněk Kořistka, started work on a percentage tax designation bill. The 
bill was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies on 12 December 2001, and was circulated 
to the Deputies as Print 1194 under the title “Bill to Designate a Percentage from the 
Personal Income Tax for Charitable Purposes” (hereafter: Bill on Percentage Tax Designa-
tions). The bill was originally intended to allow natural persons who were personal income 
tax payers to designate up to 7% of the decisive part of the tax. However, in the final 
wording, the proposed designation was reduced to only 1%. The designator could pay tax 
on the minimum amount of 7,200 CZK (approx. 260 EUR), and could make designations 
to more than one authorized recipient, determining the precise amount of a percentage 
tax designation, provided that the minimum amount of every percentage tax designation 
is CZK 500 (approx. 18 EUR). The authorized recipient was to be a legal person that was 
not established for the purpose of business, was registered in the list kept at the Ministry 
of Finance, and was established according to listed legal regulations. Moreover, the au-
thorized recipient was to be obliged to use percentage tax designations for one or more 
of the publicly beneficial purposes set forth in the bill. In addition to these indirectly de-
fined entities, the bill listed the Academy of Sciences and the Grant Agency as legitimate 
recipients. Churches were not included among the eligible entities in the bill, because the 
issue of the relation between the State and the church had not been definitively settled.
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When presenting the bill, the sponsors stated four reasons they thought support for the 
non-profit sector was sub-optimal: 
I. a very low percentage of resources for the non-profit sector were allocated at the 
regional level, and thus regional and small organizations were at a disadvantage; 
II. funds were allocated for one year only; 
III. the subsidy provided by the State to NGOs was lower than that granted to budg-
etary organizations, and to organizations receiving contributions from the state 
budget that provided similar services; 
IV. it was very difficult for the non-profit sector to raise funds from non-governmental 
sources.
In the annex to the resolution, the Government expressed its disagreement with the bill; 
they opined that the bill 
I. represented a non-systemic intervention in the funding of the non-profit sector; 
II. contained indirect amendments to other acts; 
III. was self-contradictory, since it referred to “the gift”, and to an “income tax decla-
ration”, even though the tax percentage was not a in fact a gift; 
IV. was conceptually unclear, and even factually vague and misleading. 
The Government also inquired as to the expected financial impact on the state budget, 
although they made no calculation of their own. In its explanatory memorandum, the bill 
stated that the expected amount was 2–3 billion CZK (approx. 92 million EUR). 
In addition, the proposed method of percentage tax designation itself was not received 
positively, not even by the professional public, because, in addition to other problems, it 
did not address in detail 
I. the registration of subjects, 
II. how employees were to declare their percentage tax designations, 
III. the process of summarizing the financial means and their publication, or 
IV. various deadlines.
Nevertheless, debates of the bill focused on whether the percentage tax designation 
scheme should or should not be introduced, rather than on how the proposed system 
was to be properly and optimally implemented. The Deputies failed to, in a sufficiently 
factual manner, 
I. justify the proposed measures, their benefits, the need to find new sources of 
funding, and a drop in support from abroad; 
II. present calculations of the financial burden put on state administration, etc. The 
proposed 7% tax designation was completely unprecedented: ministers could not 
refer to any foreign experience. 
Moreover, it was politically unfeasible. Importantly, the bill was put forward before the 
elections; regardless of the deputies’ intent, this cannot be called appropriate timing, 
given the political situation of the time. Relatedly, we propose that the bill was motivated 
by politics, among other things. In addition, the Deputies did not seek social or, more 
importantly, political support for the bill, nor even for the notion of a percentage tax 
designation scheme itself (e.g. seminars on the topic, recommendations from reputable 
international NGOs, offers to support another parliamentary bill in exchange for support 
of their bill, etc.). 
Nevertheless, the initiative extended awareness of percentage tax designations, initiating 
broader debate and providing a good basis for further work by the parliamentary group, 
among others. The bill was rejected at the first reading by 108 of the 135 Deputies present.
The Second Private Members’ Bill on the Introduction of Percentage Tax Designations 
in 2005
After the unsuccessful attempt of the group of Deputies in 2001, work started on a new 
draft law that would not contain any serious flaws and could gain political support.  The 
Czech model of percentage tax designations mainly based on Hungarian experience, and 
avoided the main problems that had occurred in Slovakia regarding amendment to per-
centage tax designations.
In 2005, Deputy Kořistka proposed introducing percentage tax designations to Czech 
legislation for the second time. The second attempt theoretically has a greater chance of 
success. The second reading of the government bill on income tax was on the agenda of 
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the 49th sitting of the Chamber of Deputies, held on 25 October 2005. Deputy Kořistka 
put forth his proposal to include one new section into the bill, permitting the introduction 
of a percentage tax designation scheme in the Czech Republic. The section wording is 
stated in the proposed amendment: 
“Section 16a Percentage Tax Designations: The taxpayer referred to in section 2 may 
nominate a legal entity, with a registered seat in the Czech Republic and which has 
not been set up or established for business purposes, as the recipient of 1% from the 
personal income tax. The details are stipulated by a special law.” 110
The proposed amendment was drawn up by a group affiliated with the Donors' Forum 
(see below). Subsequently, the Deputy also used the arguments contained in the explana-
tory memorandum prepared by the Donors’ Forum. When the bill was debated, he stated 
that he would support the arguments with documents, but none are available in the par-
liamentary prints. In his arguments supporting the introduction of percentage tax desig-
nations, he repeated the problems of the non-profit sector stated in 2001. Additionally, 
Deputy Kořistka discussed the benefits of the measures for citizens and the State: “Czech 
citizens will obtain the privilege of influencing the allocation of at least a small part of state 
funds; they will decide what is of public benefit in the places where they live. They will de-
cide how to express their solidarity ... They will consider the attractiveness and importance 
of a selected publicly beneficial organization. They may simply decide to help in areas that 
are out of the State’s reach.” According to Kořistka, “By adopting percentage tax designa-
tions in the amount of 1%, the State will change the distribution of a very small part of its 
existing income with deliberation and forethought.” But he further noted that percentage 
tax designations were not intended to replace subsidies or tax reliefs for donors.  
Hence, the main objective of designations was not to resolve the funding of the non-profit 
sector. Rather, they were intended to enable taxpayers to show solidarity at no direct cost 
to them; to make citizens consider the importance and attractiveness of the respective 
public benefit organization and its activity. This would pressure the non-profit sector into 
making efforts to be important and appealing. The Deputy first proposed introducing 
percentage tax designations; only after that, if there was political will, did he suggest 
adopting a special law.
Voting on the proposed amendment took place on 1 November 2005. Out of the 159 
deputies present, 46 were for the proposal and 93 against. Thus, the proposal was not 
adopted. The Minister of Finance commented on the vote in printed media on 3 March, 
explaining why the Deputies of his party voted against the amendment during the last 
vote: “The proposed amendment was then poorly drawn up and would cause chaos in the 
administration of taxes” (Patočková, 2006). Unfortunately, we could not find any detailed 
explanation of why the proposed amendment was poorly drawn up, or how exactly the 
bill would cause chaos in the state administration, as stated by the Minister.
Parliamentary Elections in 2006
On 2 June 2006, the Ministry of Finance invited professionals and other social partners 
to send suggestions and comments regarding the introduction of percentage tax desig-
nations in the Czech tax system. He promised that a professional team would deal with 
the suggestions, and that the suggestions and comments would be discussed with their 
authors, ensuring the best possible result. At the same time, wider groupings of non-profit 
organizations (unions, associations, etc.) or their umbrella bodies were invited to nomi-
nate their representatives to the working group on this issue. Support for the concept of 
tax designations to support the non-profit sector was also included in the election pro-
grams of the majority of parties in Parliament.
In December 2008, a member of the Government’s Council for NGOs drafted an amend-
ment to the Income Tax Act; this provision was intended to imbue taxpayers (natural per-
sons and legal entities) with the democratic right to designate 2% of their tax to a publicly 
beneficial activity through the tax administrator (at least 3.5 EUR monthly for natural 
persons, and 7 EUR monthly for legal entities). The Government’s Council for NGOs did 
110 Parliamentary Print 1194/0, the Private Members’ Bill on Designation of a Percentage of Personal In-
come Tax Revenues for Charitable Purposes (Law on Percentage Tax Designations), the Chamber of 
Deputies of the Czech Parliament from 1998 to 2002.
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not consent to the proposed amendment.
The last active reference to the system was in 2012, when tax designations were associ-
ated not only with non-profit organizations, but once again mainly with the church; this 
was perceived as problematic. 
THE INITIATIVE FOR 1%
In 1997, the non-profit sector learned about the successfully introduced percentage tax 
designation scheme in Hungary, and ideas about introducing a similar system in the Czech 
Republic started emerging.  In 2002, a project was implemented entitled “Creating an En-
vironment Favorable to the Development of the Non-profit Sector and Civil Society”; the 
project was funded by the American Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The VIA Foundation and the Donors’ Forum civic association cooperated in this project. 
Among other activities, the project analyzed the method of introducing tax designations 
in the Czech Republic and developed the contents of the bill on tax designations. Since 
October 2003, the idea has been further developed by the Donors’ Forum only, being 
funded especially from the EU PHARE 2002 funds.
In a declaration issued by the Initiative, its members stated that the implementation of 
public interests requires financial means, and that these should not come solely from 
state institutions, but also via the participation of citizens in decision-making about pub-
lic funds. Support for legislative change that would enable individuals to designate 1% of 
their income tax to publicly beneficial purposes would be a route to a more even inflow of 
money to the regions.  It would also give citizens the opportunity to influence public af-
fairs.  Lastly, it would contribute to the establishment of closer relations between citizens 
and non-profit organizations. The possibility to designate 1% was also in accordance with 
the Government’s program statement, which declared that it would seek to change the 
financing of the non-profit sector and create conditions conducive to the development 
of more varied funding sources for NGOs and other non-profit organizations.  The state-
ment also showed that the members perceived the percentage tax designation scheme 
as an important opportunity to improve the stability of non-profit organizations, as well 
as develop civic society in the Czech Republic.
The Initiative started by analyzing the failure of the private members’ bill of 2001; as such, 
Deputy Kořistka and the Donors’ Forum agreed to cooperate. The Deputy provided all 
source materials he had used for the bill; in reciprocation, the Donors’ Forum promised to 
provide the results of their work. Two working groups were established which were asso-
ciated with the Donors’ Forum. The first was an expert group consisting of lawyers, audi-
tors, tax advisers, and experts on the charitable and non-profit sector. They were respon-
sible for preparing a specific legislative bill. The other group comprised representatives 
from non-profit organizations; their role was to comment on and enforce the proposed 
legislative bills, as well as to cooperate in organizing related communication campaigns. 
After about a year, the group had drafted a bill that would allow payers of natural persons’ 
income tax to designate 1% of it to an NGO. At the same time, the group developed the 
subject-matter of the special bill on designations, which detailed the practical functioning 
of the percentage tax designation scheme.
In its explanatory memorandum to the bill, the group explained why they had opted for 
this procedure. 
“The introduction of the percentage tax designation scheme is proposed in two re-
lated steps: an amendment to the Income Tax Act that will subsequently create a 
space for the adoption of a special law on tax designations that will detail the range 
of possible beneficiaries and the conditions on which the funds will be granted. This 
solution is more appropriate, from a legal standpoint, than an indirect amendment of 
the Income Tax Act. The proposed procedure also allows the separation of the political 
decision on tax designations, in the form of their integration into public finance reform, 
from the subsequent discussion of the specific mechanism thereof.”111 
The Initiative for 1% originated on the basis of work carried out by the Donors’ Forum in 
2003. The Initiative is an informal grouping of non-governmental, non-profit organiza-
111 The draft of the subject-matter of the bill on tax designations, drawn up by a group attached to the 
Donors’ Forum, published on www.rozhodni.cz
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tions supporting the introduction of a possible 1% designation of personal income tax to 
publicly beneficial purposes. On 15 September 2003, the Declaration of the Initiative for 
1% was drafted, in which non-profit organizations expressed their support for designa-
tions. They believed that i) citizens should also decide about public funds directly, ii) the 
percentage tax designation scheme would contribute to the even distribution of money 
to the regions, and iii) the system would mobilize citizens to contribute and thus nurture 
closer relationships between citizens and non-profit organizations.
More than 60 individual organizations had signed the Declaration as of 1 August 2005. 
In addition to the bill itself, the Donors’ Forum focused on communication, whereby they 
targeted two basic groups: the first comprised journalists and non-profit organizations 
themselves, while the second consisted of politicians and public administration. Until non-
profit organizations and politicians understood and supported the problem, information 
campaigns would not focus on the general public. In fact, this may be why no debate was 
launched in the media, and why journalists were not encouraged to address the topic of 
designations.
The Initiative for 1% drew its inspiration for the campaign from foreign, especially Slovak, 
experience. In 2003, the information website www.rozhodni.cz was launched, wherein the 
principle of designations was explained, declarations and statements of the 1% Initiative 
were published, and updated information about designations was announced. The Do-
nors’ Forum published brochures, and attended seminars for NGOs and politicians. It also 
drew attention to examples from abroad that it had been monitoring.
ARGUMENTS PRESENTED FOR AND AGAINST THE PERCENTAGE TAX DESIGNATION 
SCHEME
Opinions on the introduction of the percentage tax designation scheme in the Czech 
Republic have not been unanimous. Both pros and cons of its introduction have appeared 
in the discussions.
Arguments Against
Economic theory does not deal in depth with the problems of percentage tax designa-
tions; nonetheless, the majority of economists in the Czech Republic reject percentage 
tax designations, asserting that they undermine the basic purpose and principles of taxes 
for several reasons:
I. Taxes should be non-purpose. The non-purpose character of taxes can be re-
garded from two perspectives.  Firstly, the tax imposed on a specific tax object is 
not related to the financing of any area that is somehow connected to that object. 
Secondly, the taxpayer is not allowed to select the area that will be funded from 
his or her taxes. According to opponents, the introduction of designations would 
be fundamentally in conflict with the non-purpose character of taxes, particularly 
as it relates to the second perspective.
II. Taxes are non-equivalent. No adequate volume of goods and services is provided 
by the State in return for an individual’s financial contribution to the State. The in-
troduction of designations could introduce a certain degree of equivalence to the 
tax system.
III. Percentage tax designations are not fair. They undermine the horizontal fairness 
of taxes—that is, when two taxpayers have the same taxable income, and one 
of them makes designations and the other does not, the first contributes less to 
cover the payment of public goods than the second.
IV. Taxes are used to finance public goods on the basis of collective decision-making. 
Through tax designations, the State would favor one purpose that it has no obli-
gation to fund, because it lies outside the State’s domain. It could even be argued 
that no consensus exists regarding the need to support publicly beneficial activi-
ties. In that context, Deputy Kocourek expressed his opinion in the 2002 debate, 
held at the Chamber of Deputies, as follows: “Through their proposal, the sponsors 
of the bill want to give citizens an opportunity to make their own decisions about 
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a percentage of their taxes. …The sponsors give citizens an opportunity to decide 
about a percentage of their taxes themselves, however, only in one direction: to-
wards non-profit organizations. I ask, why should citizens not decide about their 
own taxes for themselves? This is called tax reduction. I think this is the only way to 
enable everyone to make decisions about their money absolutely responsibly and 
to declare responsibly whether they want to keep their money, what they want to 
do with it, or whether they want to give it to someone else. But this is called “tax 
reduction”, not tax designation.”112 The same opinion was also expressed in the fol-
lowing way: support of publicly beneficial activities (philanthropy) should be left 
up to the free will of citizens in the form of donorship and volunteering.
Further arguments against the introduction of tax designations were:
I. Tax designations represent an anonymous form of donorship. As is this case with 
public collections, the organization would know neither who designated the tax 
to them nor how many taxpayers made a designation. Non-profit organizations 
would not be able to establish a deeper relationship with the payers of tax desig-
nations.
II. There is no uniform definition of the non-profit sector in the Czech Republic. 
“The public benefit” has not been defined, nor do we know how the financial needs 
of mutually beneficial non-profit organizations compared with those of publicly 
beneficial ones. Furthermore, the Czech Republic has no uniform central register 
of non-profit organizations active in the sector. 
III. The threat of inefficient allocation. Taxpayers who are inadequately aware of the 
tax designation scheme may succumb to media pressure from financially strong 
non-profit organizations. Conversely, small organizations would not have sufficient 
financial resources to create any comprehensive marketing campaign, and would 
therefore fail to connect with enough taxpayers. The media can significantly af-
fect the general public through preferences given to some organizations during 
promotional campaigns.
IV. Other arguments. Designation may prompt the State to gradually reduce subsi-
dies, and may lead to changes in the tax system, such as cancellation of the tax 
relief on charitable donations.
Arguments for
The arguments for the introduction of the percentage tax designation scheme were 
mostly formulated by representatives of non-profit organizations and their supporters; 
they were largely non-economic arguments.
I. Financial securing of the non-profit sector. Tax designations would introduce an-
other means of financing the non-profit sector; however, they are not intended to 
replace any existing support, such as for example state subsidies or tax relief for 
donors. Tax designations are instead a new direct aid from public sources, which 
complements these existing tools. 
II. A tool for the decentralization of state aid to NGOs. This can entail decentrali-
zation of resource distribution within the sector, or between individual organiza-
tions throughout the regions. For example, the Donors’ Forum, in their explanatory 
memorandum to the bill, stated that designations should lead to more recipients 
of financial aid, including small organizations, as well as to a more even distribu-
tion of funds to organizations operating in the regions.113 In 2005, the sponsor of 
the bill, Deputy Kořistka, in his argument for the introduction of tax designations, 
stated: “Thanks to the introduction of designations, the state administration could 
be more decentralized, because the citizen could decide about helping in areas 
that are out of the State’s reach.”  
112 Stenography from the 46th sitting, in February 2002, of the Czech Parliamentary Chamber of Depu-
ties, 1998–2000.
113 The draft of the bill on percentage tax designations, drawn up by a group attached to the Donors’ Fo-
rum, published on www.rozhodni.cz.
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III. A method of activation and motivation of the non-profit sector. Access to certain 
resources allows organizations to develop some activities; however, it is not always 
clear what these activities are and to what extent they are beneficial. Designations 
force organizations to increase transparency when providing their services and 
using their resources.
IV. Philanthropy education for citizens. Designations constitute one form of support 
for certain activities. For the taxpayer, this may be an attractive form, because it 
costs them nothing. Moreover, they must repeatedly decide on the recipients of 
their designation, and thus be drawn into the activities and problems of those re-
cipients. The percentage tax designation scheme could hence be a useful tool to 
support civic philanthropy. Percentage tax designations enable taxpayers to de-
cide what activities their money is allocated to, and may therefore involve citizens 
more closely in political co-decisions regarding what is to the public benefit. 
V. Other arguments. Percentage tax designations confirm the legitimacy of non-
profit organizations (Bárta 2004). The resources obtained from designations 
are not assigned to one single purpose, as is the case with grants (Bělohlávek). 
Designations affect the payment habits of taxpayers, because they alleviate the 
reluctance to pay compulsory taxes, and increase communication between the 
non-profit sector and the general public.
THE OPTIMAL MODEL OF THE PERCENTAGE TAX DESIGNATION IN THE CZECH 
REPUBLIC
The theoretical preconditions for the introduction of designations into the tax and legisla-
tive system of the Czech Republic were formulated as follows by the professional public 
in connection with the submitted bill in 2005:
The percentage tax designation scheme will be introduced for personal and corporate 
income tax only. In the case of natural persons, the tax is paid by a fairly high percent-
age of taxpayers—usually around 50% of the population of the respective state. In 
this way, unfairness (as for example when designations are related to property taxes 
such as the real estate tax, the gift tax, or road tax) can at least be partially elimi-
nated. Nonetheless, a certain injustice remains. Some taxpayers do not reach the tax 
threshold, and certain population groups are not payers of personal income tax at all 
(students, seniors). 
Percentage tax designations range from 1%–2% of the tax liability. It was discussed 
whether designations should be allocated as an absolute amount, or rather be corre-
lated with the tax obligation as a percentage. Given that the purposes of percentage 
tax designations is stimulation of the non-profit sector and philanthropy education 
(not the financial security of the non-profit sector), the percentage may be relatively 
low. The percentage tax designations proposed in the Czech Republic were between 
1% and 2%; such a low proportion would prevent the basic principles of State finance, 
collective decision making, and public choice from being undermined.
Recipients of percentage tax designations will be organizations which perform public-
ly beneficial activities. The taxpayer will only be allowed to select one recipient of their 
designations; this will significantly reduce administrative costs to financial authorities, 
as well as motivate the taxpayer to choose the organization they actually consider 
most beneficial, or whose activity they consider most useful.
Percentage tax designations shall be as little bureaucratic as possible and shall "both-
er" the taxpayer as little as possible.
Organizations will be obligated to publish how the designated funds were used; they 
will also be subject to monitoring by the State, as well as by taxpayers themselves—
the publicly beneficial organisation shall be obliged to publish an annual report con-
taining financial statements and other specified information (number of employees, 
plan for future development, by-laws of the organization, bodies of the organization, 
etc.). Recipients of percentage tax designations would also be obliged to submit a 
special financial report to the Ministry of Finance regarding how the funds from per-
centage tax designations were used.
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ESTIMATED IMPACT OF THE PERCENTAGE TAX DESIGNATION SCHEME IN THE 
CZECH REPUBLIC
If the percentage tax designation scheme were introduced to the tax system of the Czech 
Republic, the non-profit sector, the general public, and the state administration would 
have to change their behavior to a certain extent.
How would the State Administration Change its Behavior?
The following changes, among others, can be expected:
I. The volume of resources allocated as part of the state subsidy policy will change. 
In this regard, one of three scenarios may occur: 1) Percentage tax designations 
will be enforced, the State will not cut any subsidies or reduce the incentives for 
making donations; 2) percentage tax designations will be enforced, the State will 
cut subsidies, but will not reduce tax incentives for making donations; 3) percent-
age tax designations will be enforced, the State will cut subsidies and reduce tax 
incentives for making donations.
II. In the area of control. The control of the management of public funds will have 
to be strengthened, on the other hand, it can be expected that awareness and 
qualification of the officials will be increased, standards will be defined and simple 
control manuals will be created. This could lead to overall simplification, but mainly 
to increased efficiency and transparency of the control process.
III. The State will enable the non-profit sector to participate in political decision-mak-
ing. One major justification for percentage tax designations is that they stimulate 
the non-profit sector and create a relationship between citizens and the non-profit 
sector.
How would Donors Change their Behavior?
A poll carried out in 2005 for the Donor’s Forum may be useful in predicting a change 
in the general public’s behavior.114 Among the 509 respondents, 21.4% had heard at least 
something of percentage tax designations. To the question of whether they would like 
1% of their income tax to be designated directly to a non-profit organisation of their own 
choice, 50.5% of the respondents replied in the positive; 21.6% of the respondents con-
sidered this unnecessary and believed that the State would take better care of non-profit 
organizations; 27.9% of respondents said that they did not care. Based on the opinion poll 
and foreign experience, it can be assumed that about 30%–40% of taxpayers would avail 
of the designation scheme in the first year.
In the first years of the scheme, the mass media, particularly television, will influence 
heavily the public’s decisions regarding designation. For this reason, large, well known 
organizations will likely establish themselves as the most successful recipients of percent-
age tax designations. Nevertheless, some decentralization may occur. The vast majority 
of taxpayers will select an organization that they themselves or some of their close ones 
have personal experience with. A change in the behavior and attitudes of the general 
public is caused, to a considerable extent, by a change in the attitudes of NGOs to the 
general public.
How would the Non-profit Sector Change its Behavior?
Generally, the possibility of receiving percentage tax designations stimulates organiza-
tions to a particular activity. They are forced to communicate, as well as to distribute pow-
ers and responsibilities internally, or to actively engage volunteers. It would be a benefit 
if organizations in the Czech Republic were motivated to implement a real fundraising 
campaign, as few Czech organizations focus on the general public in their fundraising 
campaigns: the majority concentrate on fundraising at the level of public budgets, foun-
dations, and companies.
114 Percentage Tax Designations, Public Opinion Survey for the Donors’ Forum, drafted by MEDIAN, an 
Agency for Market Research, Media, and Public Opinion, June 2005.
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THE FINANCIAL IMPACT ON STATE ADMINISTRATION AND THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR
The income to the state budget from personal and corporate income taxes has been al-
most continuously growing since 2003. The decline in 2006 was due to legislative chang-
es (e.g. a reduction corporate income tax rates, accelerated depreciation in the first to 
third depreciation groups, a new support system for taxpayers with a dependent child, 
joint taxation of spouses, etc.). The reduction in income tax collected in 2009 was mainly 
due to the financial crisis. Until the end of 2007, the personal income tax had been pro-
gressive, ranging from 12% to 32%, depending on the level of income. Since 2008, it has 
been 15% for everyone, regardless of income (flat tax).
Table 17 shows the estimated maximum development of 1% tax designations in the case 
of their introduction. Taking into account experience from abroad, the table has been sup-
plemented with a calculation of the percentage tax designations that would be made if 
35% of taxpayers participated in the scheme.
Year
Income tax in mil-
lion EUR  
An estimate of tax 
designations in mil-
lions of EUR,  the 
maximum amount
Estimated designa-
tions in millions of 
EUR (35%)
2001 5,695 57 2.1
2002 6,537 65 2.41
2003 7,065 71 2.6
2004 7,711 77 2.84
2005 9,146 91 3.37
2006 8,866 89 3.27
2007 10,399 104 3.83
2008 10,646 106 3.92
2009 8,169 82 3.01
2010 8,353 84 3.08
2011 8,431 84 3.11
2012 8,857 89 3.27
2013 8,818 88 3.25
2014 9,366 94 3.45
Table 17: 
The development of 
income tax and an 
estimate of the des-
ignated sum (Czech 
Republic)
Source: The Tax 
Administration of the 
Czech Republic
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Giving by individuals 
No systematic statistical data are available on individual giving in the Czech Republic. To 
provide descriptive statistics of giving by living individuals, we have therefore looked at 
three separate indicators. These will not provide a full picture of individual philanthropy, 
but will at least indicate trends over the past several years. 
The first indicator is from data on giving in the Czech Republic that are collected by the 
Czech Statistical Office from three sources (described later). Two of these data sources 
are not publicly available. Here we present data from the Satellite Account of Non-prof-
it Institutions (available up to 2012 only). The development over time of the donated 
amounts is shown in Table 18.
The second indicator of individual giving is found in the statistics from the Ministry of 
Finance regarding applications by natural persons for tax deductions on charitable dona-
tions made to non-profit organizations. Most individual donations in the Czech Republic 
are made to collection boxes in the street and through text messages, i.e. without a re-
quest for a tax deduction. The development over time of the donated amounts is shown 
in Table 19.
The third indicator is the Donors Message Service (Dárcovská DMS). The Czech Republic 
was the first country to introduce the DMS. The project was initiated by the Czech Donors 
Forum, and gained significant popularity both in the country and abroad. Donations via 
the DMS are easy to measure, and the results are available from the Czech Donors Forum. 
In 2014, people in the Czech Republic contributed nearly one million EUR by text message 
donation to a variety of non-profit projects. The number of non-profit projects involved 
in this donation service changes every month; in 2014, people contributed to almost 280 
various non-profit projects.
Data on giving and philanthropic behavior from individual donors are not collected regu-
larly, and are therefore available to a limited extent only, typically from ad hoc surveys 
conducted by market research companies at the request of local non-profits. For exam-
ple, we obtained interesting information from a recent survey by STEM/MARK entitled 
“How Are We Doing with Charity and Philanthropy?” According to the report, in the years 
2012 to 2014, 68% of Czechs (n = 2,471) contributed in some way to a charity or to chari-
table purposes.
Table 18: 
Uses of donations 
by individuals from 





Number of taxpayers 
and total value of 
donations (Czech 
Republic)
Source: Ministry of 
Finance
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Amount 
of gift in 
millions  
of EUR
478 441 598 418 406 397 396 407
Number of taxpayers
The total value of 












In the Czech Republic, subsidies from state funds, as well as from the state, regional, and 
municipal budgets, are important financial resources for non-profit organizations. Some 
projects are also co-financed from EU funds.
The basic law governing the financing of non-governmental, non-profit organizations is 
Act No. 218/2000 Coll. on budgetary rules, as amended. In the following provision, the 
act regulates subsidies granted by the central authorities of the state administration, from 
the state budget, to non-governmental, non-profit organizations: “Government Policy for 
Granting Subsidies from the State Budget of the Czech Republic to Non-governmental, 
Non-profit Organizations by the Central Authorities of the State Administration”.
Data on the subsidies granted to non-profit organizations come from the Analysis of Fi-
nancing of Non-governmental, Non-profit Organizations from Public Budgets (hereafter 
“the Analysis”). The Government's Council for NGOs has this document drafted annually. 
Table 20: 
The Development of 
the Volume of Sub-
sidies Provided to 
Non-governmental 
Organizations from 
the State Budget of 
the Czech Republic
Source: The Analysis 





Volume in  
millions of EUR 



















In my opinion, the argument expressed in the Parliament of the Czech Republic when the 
bill on percentage tax designations was rejected, namely that “percentage tax designa-
tions are an extraneous element in the tax system”, is justified from an economic point of 
view. All arguments in favor of percentage tax designations are political, not economic. 
This indicates that the notion of percentage tax designations, as a whole, is perceived 
politically and thus unilaterally. Proponents of tax designation emphasize the civic aware-
ness within the states that have adopted the policy, as well as the significant contribution 
that designation would make to the decentralization of resources, which would in turn 
improve the situation of smaller, regional, non-governmental, non-profit organizations. 
Furthermore, it is opined that it should be an option, not an obligation, to designate this 
part of the tax to publicly beneficial purposes. From this perspective, percentage tax 
designations constitute a form of tax relief. The evidence presented in this paper clearly 
shows that percentage tax designations are not a suitable instrument of fiscal policy. 
Several arguments supported this claim. I believe that percentage tax designations are 
not correct from a systemic point of view. They undermine the principles of both public fi-
nance and tax fairness. Hence, percentage tax designations should be rejected, not on the 
basis of the type of the public goods that they are related to, but on principle. It is crucial 
that decisions regarding the public goods to be financed from tax revenues are political, 
i.e. collective. The legal institute of percentage tax designations is therefore an incoherent, 
illogical combination of the obligation to pay determined taxes and the option to take 
individual decisions about how they will be used, which contradicts the meaning of taxes.
None of the advocates of percentage tax designations has yet presented any exact analy-
sis of their benefits and costs. The benefits are estimated based on the experience of a 
few countries. Precise quantification, or at least approximate qualified estimates of ex-
penses, have been neglected. I am aware that this view is controversial, but I am con-
vinced that the introduction of percentage tax designations would be a step backward, 
rather than forward, in the Czech Republic. 
I believe it would be more beneficial in the long run if the attention paid to percentage tax 
designations were turned to permanent support for the development of corporate and 
individual philanthropy, and not only in financial terms for non-profit organizations and 
the state budget, but also for widespread distribution and “rooting” of the idea of altruism 






Questionnaire on The percentage Tax Designation System to country associates
Past, Present and Future
 
1. The introduction and the workings of the percentage systems
1.1. Context
1.1.1. When was the percentage system enacted as a law?
1.1.2. What is the legal reference to the law? What article etc.
1.1.3. When was it amended? If more than once, please provide all dates.
1.1.4. When was the first legislation on NGOs enacted in your country?
1.1.5. Was there a law in place regarding charitable donations to NGOs?
1.2. Rationale for introduction
1.2.1. Describe the actors who have initiated it and supported it. 
1.2.1.1. What was the intent of the actors? 
1.2.1.2. How did the percentage system fit into the political context? (Civil society support; 
public benefit support; philanthropic culture and tradition; outsource government 
funding; funding of church or state organizations; smoke screen in social spending cuts 
or something else? Provide explanation. Possible intentions and rationale? Elaborate on 
them and provide examples and quotes.)
1.2.1.3. Which political party was for and which against it? (We would like to see if it tends to 
be un/favored by left, right, center.)
1.2.2.  How long did it take to get it through in the policy making process? 
1.2.2.1. What was the role of NGOs? 
1.2.3. Explain why you believe the mechanism could be enacted in your country in the given time 
(key success factor for passing the law). 
1.3. Recipients of the original law
1.3.1. Who were the legally defined recipients/beneficiaries of the original law? Were they NGOs/a 
group of NGOs, NGOs with special characteristics, like NGOs with public benefit purpose/
NGOs and other legal entities.
1.3.2. Has the legally defined recipients/beneficiaries of the law changed over time? 
1.3.2.1. If yes, what changed since its enactment and what was the rationale behind?
1.3.3. Does the law regulate the use of money received through the designations by NGOs? If yes, 
how? 
1.3.3.1. Can beneficiaries spend the resources upon their own will as flexible as they like?
1.3.3.2. Does the law define the amount of money that can be spent on fundraising, personnel, 
operational cost, etc.? Please elaborate your answer? 
1.3.3.2.1. If it does, how is it defined?
1.3.3.2.2. If yes, what is the effect of it? 
1.3.4. Did the original law require public reporting of the percentage expenditure of the 
organizations? (Public meaning transparent and publicly available and not only reporting to a 
public authority.)
1.3.4.1. If yes, was it the first time NGOs needed to provide public reports?
1.3.4.2. Does the current law require public reporting regarding percentage expenditure?
1.3.5. Who at the end benefits of the resources - who are the end users, where the resources of the 
percentage tax designation are used/consumed?
1.4. The mechanism
1.4.1. Please describe the mechanism in its essence as it was originally started and as it has 
changed. Only the very basic elements are needed here in a nutshell.
1.4.2. What changes have taken place that make the mechanism better?
1.4.3. Where is there room for further improvement regarding the operation of the mechanism?
1.5. If available, provide extreme examples of systematic misconduct of the system or dubious 
applications of the percentage system in your country (anecdotes, articles, stories).
1.6. Do you think that there are any unintended consequences of working mechanism of the system 
that do not serve the original purpose and may have negative effect on it?
1.6.1. If there were such challenges, have they been remedied?
1.6.2. Do you think that there are any unintended consequences of working 
mechanism of the system that were unintended and have positive effect on it? 
2. Policies
2.1. Is there any formal requirement in your country to evaluate the system? 
2.1.1. If there is, please describe the requirement, its protocol, and evaluate the mechanism.
2.1.2. If there is a formal evaluation produced, please attach it and give a bullet point summary of 
the key issues.
2.1.3. How often is the system evaluated in your country, if at all? Is it an ad hoc evaluation or a 
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planned one? Who is responsible for the evaluation?
2.1.4. If there is an evaluation of the system, what can be and what has been the consequence of 
the evaluation?
2.2. Did any of the changes in the mechanisms result in significant change in the output of the system 
(more users, more designation, different people etc.)? If yes, which one and how?
2.3. Was the system designed to exist for a limited time? If yes, what timeframe was imaged?
2.4. How long do you think the system will exist in your country? 
2.4.1. Why? 
2.4.2. Does the system have any serious proponents/opponents? 
2.4.3. If yes, what reasoning is used?
2.5. Please provide information and/or your opinion if the percentage system in your country is
2.5.1. crowding-out private giving or a school for philanthropy? Please, summarize the main 
arguments and data and give a link to the referenced work
2.5.2. crowding out state support to the NGO sector?
3. Contributors and recipients
3.1. Who is a typical percentage contributor? Describe key characteristics of major groups of taxpayers 
that participate in the system based on research and statistical data that is available or previous 
research and articles that had dealt with this question. 
3.1.1. Does the average percentage contributor differ from a private donor?
3.1.1.1. If yes, how?
3.2. What does a typical percentage system recipient look like based on available data?
3.2.1. Based on available data, can it be claimed that the percentage recipients differ from recipients 
of individual private funding?
3.2.2. Can it be claimed that recipients of the percentage mechanism differ from recipient of other 
types of state funding?
3.2.2.1. if yes, what is the difference?
4. Contribution of the percentage system to the sustainability of NGOs
To have a general understanding of the perceived contribution of the system to key areas of NGO 
sustainability, first fill in Table 3. 
Please give a value to the areas based on your experience. We would like to know how much you believe 
the percentage system has influenced the given area. Your scoring should be from -5 to +5. Give the lowest 
ranking if you believe that it has had a very negative effect on the given area, - 4 if it was quite bad,....0 if you 
do not think that there was an effect, ….5 if it has had a major effect. It is a subjective exercise to lead to the 
discussion of the topic. It is hoped that the views together and the detailed opinion and backup information 
in the following questions will provide valuable input to this question.  
Elaborate your views in the section after the table by giving concrete examples, data, numbers, quotes, cases 
to support your opinion. You are asked to comment on all of the areas, even those that you did not feel 
strong about, if you have evidence for low impact, please provide that too.
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Area
Score from -5 
to 5
a, Legal environment 
E.g. the ease of registration; legal rights and conditions regulating NGOs; and the degree 
to which laws and regulations regarding taxation, procurement, access to information 
and other issues benefit or deter NGOs' effectiveness and viability.
b, Organization capacity
E.g. constituencies, mission, planning, management structures, paid staff,....
c, Financial Viability
E.g. availability of resources,
philanthropy and volunteerism, government procurement, fundraising and financial man-
agement skills, diversification of funding, etc.
d, Advocacy
E.g., influencing public policy, coalition building, monitor government performance, 
 Participation in the political processes,…
e, Service provision 
E.g. Better provision of services reflecting the needs and priorities, contribution to the 
provision of basic social services, etc.
f, Infrastructure 
E.g. information, training, and advice, resource centers, local community foundations, 
sharing of share information, networks, partnerships.
g, Public image 
E.g. understanding and appreciation of the role that NGOs play in society, public aware-
ness and credibility, media coverage, publicity, code of ethics, demonstrated transpar-
ency, annual reports,…
Table 21: Perceived contribution of the system to the sustainability of the NGO sector
4.1. How has the percentage designation system contributed to the (please state examples, cases and 
justify your scoring)
4.1.1. legal environment of the NGO sector in your country?
4.1.2. organizational capacity of the NGO sector in your country?
4.1.3. financial viability of the NGO sector in your country?
4.1.3.1. Please, rank the following areas of activity regarding their revenue from percentage 
designation. Use a year when you also have information on private giving. If your 
statistics do not use the same areas of activity, please move around the areas to match 
the ones here. If you need to do that, please describe what and where you have moved. 
As usual, provide your source of information. 
…. Health and Social Care 
…. Education 
…. Sports, hobby 




4.1.3.2. Please, rank the following areas of activity regarding their revenue from individual 
private giving. Use a year when you also have data on percentage tax designation. If 
your statistics do not use the same areas of activity, please move around the areas to 
match the ones here. If you need to do that, please describe what and where you have 
moved. As usual, provide your source of information. 
…. Health and Social Care 
…. Education 
…. Sports, hobby 




4.1.4. advocacy of the NGO sector in your country?
4.1.5. service provision of the NGO sector in your country?
4.1.6. infrastructure of the NGO sector in your country?
4.1.7. public image of the NGO sector in your country?
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4.1.7.1. Can you provide any information on the argument that due to the percentage system, the 
familiarity with the public with NGOs has risen (numbers, case studies, quotes)?
4.1.7.2. Can you provide any information on the argument that due to the percentage system, the NGO 
sector has improved transparency (numbers, case studies, quotes)?
4.1.7.3. Can you provide any information on the argument that due to the percentage designation 
system, NGOs are more active at communications? (numbers, case studies, quotes)
4.1.7.4. Please link, paste in or attach 3 communications pieces from your country that is about 
fundraising for the percentage/s (e.g. a short film, a poster, a Facebook ad). Provide a very brief 




4.1.8. Any other issue that would relate to the system’s contribution to NGO sustainability, not mentioned 
above? 
5. Innovation, decentralization, fairness, targeting, efficiency. 
Is it true in your country?  
Please note that the comment section is very important in Table 4. Feel free to use any additional space to make your 






Comment and provide evidence, if available 
(data, quotes, papers etc.). It is O.K. to use 
extra space bellow to provide additional 
materials.
Is there any other mechanism in your country where the de-
cision on central budget is outsourced to the individual?115
Does the mechanism allow the designation of 1%? If it is not 
1%,, explain in comments how much is designated.
Does the mechanism allow allocations to NGOS only? If no, 
explain in the comments.
Does the system allow dividing the designation among 
several beneficiaries? If yes, please explain in the comments.
Do you agree that it is an innovative mechanism in your 
country? Give a brief argument in the comments section 
why yes and why no. 
Would the money stay in central budget if the taxpayer did 
not decide to designate this money?
The percentage allocation decision of the taxpayer is not 
challenged for other than formal reasons (i.e. whatever the 
taxpayer decides, is executed). 
Is the system designed so that the tax-payers in their 
allocations is independent of any private and political 
influences.  
Was there any public/state and local government financial 
support to NGOs in place at the time of enacting the 
percentage system?
Do you think that public/state budget allocations to public 
benefit entities were politically biased in your country 
during the years of the start of the system? Is there any 
research or other evidence to support your view (e.g. any 
Transparency International report, any publication, research, 
interviews ,…)?
115 The first question asks whether other mechanism exists beside percentage system. The following ones are referring to the percentage 
system and not to the other possible one.
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Do you think that state budget allocations to public benefit 
entities are politically biased today?
There are NGOs that do not receive state and local 
government funding other than the percentage revenue. If 
yes, in the comments section, please provide numbers for 
the proportion of such entities in the sector.
The percentage tax designation system provides resources 
to recipients in timely fashion (it is highly predictable when 
the resources are transferred). 
The percentage tax designation system provides the 
resources correctly i.e. the system works accurately. The 
failure/omission rate is low. 
The costs of percentage tax designation system are 
perceived by its administration (state) as appropriate 
and not excessive, or at least there is no serious publicly 
expressed views to be contrary. 
The costs of joining and staying in the percentage tax 
designation system on the side of recipients are perceived 
by the recipients as appropriate, or at least there are no 
publicly expressed opinion to be contrary.
Does the law define the amount or proportion of resources 
that can be used for resource mobilization from the 
percentage revenue? If yes, how is it defined?
Is there a concern that the revenue from percentage tax 
designation system is spent to benefit private needs of 
individuals? Provide any evidence in the comments, if 
available.
Is it true that the end users of the revenue from the NGO 
percentage tax designation system are often public 
institutions: schools, hospitals, galleries etc.. Provide any 
evidence in the comments, if available.
Since the start of the percentage system there have been 
legal changes in your country that make private giving 
of individuals less attractive to potential donors due to 
taxation changes.
Since the start of the percentage system there have been 
legal changes in your country that make private giving 
of corporations to NGOs less attractive for them due to 
taxation changes.
Is there any concern expressed that the mechanism is not 
transparent? If yes, explain?
Was there a research on why tax payers chose to make 
use of the system? If yes, please give key points in the 
comments with reference.
Was there any research on the reasons why some people 
do not use the system? If yes, please give key reasons in the 
comments with reference.
Table 22: Clarification on related issues
Provide available information on the issues in Table 5 . It is important that you note that the comment section 
is very important here. Feel free to use any additional space to make your point. Do add further comments, 
use the area after the table or a separate sheet of paper using the references (e.g. for the first question it is 
2.2.1.) correctly referencing all data you use. Please use EURO and consult the Introduction/Guidelines for 
writing the paper section regarding the currency exchange and usage. Table 3 is looking at a progression and 
wants to provide information on how in a given period of time the system evolved: the first, fifth, tenth are the 
bases of the expected data. In case of Hungary they are 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2014. In addition, we should 
have a column for year 15 for Hungary, i.e. 2012, this is the only country that will have that information. They all 
will have year 2014. 























Official inflation rate in the given year (provide 
source in comments):
Population size of the country:
Official number of registered NGOs in the 
given year: 
Number of NGOs registered in the capital city:
Number of eligible NGOs to be beneficiary 
of the percentage system in the given year 
(could be the same as number of NGOs or 
different):
Number of actual beneficiaries of the system 
in the given year:
Total revenue of the sector in the given year:
How much was public (state and local 
government) support (including percentage 
designation) to NGOs in the given year in 
Euros?
How many individuals have donated private 
resources in the given year according to 
official information?
How much was donated as official private 
personal donation by private individuals in the 
given year to NGOs in Euros?
How much was donated as official private 
donation from corporations in the given year 
to NGOs in Euros?
How much was designated from the 
percentage system to NGOs in the given year 
in Euros by individual taxpayers?
% of state/public support going to capital city:
% of private individual support going to 
capital city:
% of percentage designation going to capital 
city:
Average amount of percentage designated 
per beneficiary (in Euros)
Average personal income tax/capita in the 
given year:
Number of taxpayers in the given year:
Number of taxpayers who  legally qualify  
to assign a percentage from their personal 
income tax in the given year (in some 
countries the number is different because 
income level regulations):
Percentage of tax-payers familiar with the 
percentage designation opportunity:
Number of individual taxpayers that used the 
percentage designation opportunity?
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Is there a minimum amount defined in the 
percentage law that determines the minimum 
amount that can be designated? If there is, 
what is the minimal amount in the given year? 
Number of volunteering individuals in the 
given year.
Number of people with membership in at least 
one NGO.
Most popular area of activity of NGOs receiv-
ing percentage designation in the given year 
(i.e. the most number of PEOPLE designating 
their resources to this area).
Most popular area of activity of NGOs 
receiving private giving from individuals in the 
given year (i.e. the most number of PEOPLE 
designating their resources to this area).
Area of activity of NGOs receiving the 
highest amount of money from percentage 
designation in the given year (i.e. the area 
with most MONEY).
Area of activity of NGOs receiving the 
highest amount of gift money from private 
individuals in the given year (i.e. the area with 
most MONEY).
What % of the non-profit sector receives its 
revenue solely from % donation?
The TOP 10 organizations receiving the 
highest amount of resources from percentage 
allocation in the given year.
The names of the Top 10 organizations (in 
English) receiving the highest amount of 
financial resources from private individuals in 
the given year and their field of activity.
The highest amount received by an NGO from 
percentage allocation in the given year.
Do you have access to data on all percentage 
designation recipients with amounts they 
received for the given year? 
Is this information in the public domain?
Is it available as an excel sheet?
Where is this information located?
Table 23.: Data through years of operation 
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Appendix 2 on sources of data in the different countries
Hungary






Az Szja 1+1% 2011. rendelkező évi és a korábbi rendelkező évek főbb 
adatai
http://www.nav.gov.hu/data/cms226615/2_melleklet_OGY_2011.pdf 
Kimutatás a 2001-2011. évi lehetséges nyilatkozók és az érvényesen 
rendelkező magánszemélyek számáról a nyilatkozatok származási 
helye és az 1 % alapja szerint
http://www.nav.gov.hu/data/cms226619/3_melleklet_OGY_2011.pdf 
in: Tájékoztató a Magyar Országgyűlés Emberi Jogi, Kisebbségi, Civil- 
és Vallásügyi Bizottsága részére a személyi jövedelemadó 1+1 %-áról 


































Reference Institution Availability of used figures, data and statistics
EUROSTAT
Statistical Office 































































































Availability of used figures, data and statistics
GUS
Central Statistical Office 
(GUS)
http://stat.gov.pl/





Run by Klon/ Jawor 
Association Mojapolis.pl is 
web based  – repository 
map based local indicators 




Department of Public 
Benefit – Ministry of Social 
Welfare
http://www.pozytek.gov.pl/
Open data base of  PBO annual reports
http://sprawozdaniaopp.mpips.gov.pl/ 
MF Ministry of Finance




Main iformation portal of 3rd sector in Poland
http://www.ngo.pl/ 





















This research has used information from secondary sources. If additional data is 
available in the future, or corrections are recommended it would be most welcome  
to notify the research team through the www.taxdesignation.org website.
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